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PART I: INTRO.DUCTION 
After 13 years of negotiations between the United 
States and Micronesia, a Compact of Free Assoc1at1on 
is on the verge of completion.The Trust Territory of the 
Pac1f1c Islands 1s now composed of four separate 
governments 
(1) The Mariana Islands, which in 1975 approved a 
commonwealth agreement with the U S . 
(2) The Republic of the Marshall Islands, the first 
Micronesian government to sign the Compact 
of Free Association. aiming for an October 1. 
1982 termination of the U.N. Trusteeship, 
(3) The Federated States of Micronesia, which has 
threatened boycotts of the negot1at1ons, 
demanding that the U S complete essential 
capital improvements before term ination of 
the Trusteeship. 
(4) The Republic of Palau. coming out of a 
struggle to implement a sovereign 
constitution. appears ready to sign the 
Compact and terminate the Trusteeship 
Many Micronesians were self-sufficient a generation 
or more ago. Now over 50% of the work force is 
government employed. As people in Palau. the 
Federated States of Micronesia and the Marshall 
Islands face a referendum on the Compact, what 
choices are available to them? How have most 
Micronesians adapted to conditions under the United 
States as Administering Authority following the 
devastation of World War II? How have U.S. economic 
policies prepared people for the future? How has the 
U S responded to the suggestions and criticism of the 
United Nations since the beginning of the 
Trusteeship? 
In 1947, the UN designated Micronesia as the 
world's only "strategic" Trust Territory, granting the 
U S power to use the islands for m1l1tary activities. At 
the same time. the Trusteeship Agreement obliges the 
U S . among other things, to '"promote the 
development of the inhabitants of the trust territory 
toward self-government or independence as may be 
appropriate and to this end shall promote the 
economic advancement and self-suff1c1ency of the 
inhabitants. encourage the development of fisheries, 
agriculture. and industries. protect the inhabitants 
against the loss of their lands and resources .. protect 
the health of the inhabitants . " 
For the first 15 years of the Trusteeship, Micronesia 
was largely ignored by the United States. except for 
the Department of Defense which was busy 
conducting 66 atomic and hydrogen bomb tests 1n the 
Marshall Islands Six islands were totally vaporized 
and hundreds of Marshallese people were seriously 
contaminated with radioactive fallout from many of the 
nuclear tests Told that the bomb blasts were "for the 
good of mankind and to end all world wars," the Bikini 
and Enewetak people had little choice but to leave their 
The Security Council, under the terms of the 
Trusteeship Agreement, "shall subject to the provi-
sions of the trusteeship agreements and without 
prejudice to security considerations, avail itself of the 
Trusteeship Council to perform those functions of the 
United Nations under the trusteeship system relating 
to political, economic, social and educational matters 
in the strategic areas". 
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homes, selected by the military for the tests. The 
nuclear bomb testing ended in 1958, but weapons tests 
continued as a year later Kwajalein, the world's largest 
atoll, became the target for intercontinental missiles 
shot from Vandenberg Air Force Base 1n California. 
Hundreds of Marshallese living on the many islands 
bordering Kwajalein's lagoon were evicted from their 
homes and moved to Ebeye Island. To this day, the 
5,000 landowners. plus thousands of other 
Marshallese who have come looking for jobs. live on 
the 66 acre island in conditions "bordering on a patent 
violation of basic human rights," according to a U.S. 
Congressional report. 
During this time, appropriations of several million 
dollars annually went for administration costs of the 
Trust Territory-little money was made available for 
economic development. The 1959 U.N. Visiting 
Mission reported many Micronesian requests for "re-
establishment of industries such as sugar. pineapple 
canning and fibre industries which had been 
developed under the former Japanese administration," 
adding that "the administration still fails to provide 
adequate funds for the maintenance of present 
services and for the purposes of economic 
development." 
But in the Kennedy administration of the early 1960s, 
past policies were dramatically changed In 1962, 
Kennedy set forth as U.S. policy "the movement of 
Micronesia into a permanent relationship with the U.S. 
within our political framework ." To achieve this 
objective and to "cool off" the increasingly vocal U N. 
charges of neglecting its trusteeship mandate, U.S. 
funding levels and federal programs to Micronesia 
were greatly increased. Grants nearly tripled from 
1962 to 1963 and programs from the Peace Corps to 
Head Start to Care for the Elderly before long began 
flooding into the islands 
No economic development plans existed for use of 
these funds to encourage self reliance. Instead, the 
1964 UN. Visiting Mission commented that the 
"pattern of spending which places great emphasis on 
education and welfare services and other social 
investment proiects but fails to place similar emphasis 
on productive investment will result in an unbalanced 
over all pattern of social and economic development. 
And ... unbalanced economic and social development 
cannot but have repercussions 1n the field of political 
development " 
One of the foremost obstacles to income producing 
development has been the lack of Micronesian control 
over budget appropriations and development 
planning. "It is essential," the U.N. remarked as early 
as 1964, "to mobilize the informed interest and 
enthusiasm of the people of Micronesia behind 
economic development and increased production . 
the people in general have taken little or no part in 
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developing economic plans for their islands. 
The formation of the Congress of M1crones1a in 1965 
provided the Micronesians with a forum for dealing 
with political status and economic development 
issues. But all the decisions concerning 
appropriations continued to be made in Washington 
and the COM's actions were subject to the veto of the 
American High Commissioner By 1973, the U.S had 
officially come out against self reliance: "The 
Administration continues to seek means to promote 
development of the economy of Micronesia so that 1t 
will become geared to a world money economy and 
thus. its subsistence aspects will become 
supplemental. " 
By 1978 appropriations to M1crones1ans were S 114 
m1ll1on The 215 federal programs for which 
M1crones1a was eligible added another $35 m1ll1on 
annually for about 130.00 people. In 1978. the trade 
deficit was almost 3-1 . but even this understates the 
magnitude of Micronesia's dependence on the U S . 
which in 1982 provides over 85% of the islands 
budgets. 
The requests from the U.N. and from Micronesians 
for Micronesian involvement 1n economic 
development planning to creat a self-reliant economic 
base during the 1960's and 1970's were largely 
ignored Said Congress of Micronesia Representative 
Sasauo Haruo in 1973: "An economically self-
sufficient Micronesia can stand up to the world and 
proclaim itself a nation and negotiate with the United 
States from a position of strength An economically 
dependent Micronesia must deal with the United 
States from a position of weakness How much 
different the political status negot1at1ons would be if 
we could negotiate with confidence that with or 
without the United States grant funds our nation and 
our people would thrive." Continued on Page 6 
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According to Secretary of Defense James 
Schlesinger, the purpose of the ongoing political 
status talks was "only to change the form of 
(trusteeship) agreement while retaining the basic 
objective and responsiblit1es we have had for nearly 
thirty years." 
And in 1973, he pointed out: "The region not only 
surrounds the access routes to Guam, but also those to 
the Near East. and our sources of Asian raw materials 
can be controlled from Micronesia. Moreover. a north-
south line of communication, of greater and greater 
importance, passes through the region, linking our 
Northern allies. Japan and Korea, to our allies and 
friends in the South, Australia. New Zealand, the 
Ph1l1ppines and Indonesia In the strong sense of the 
word . the U S must remain a Pacific power." 
And also during 1973, a series of U.S. Army War 
College papers discussed m1l1tary plans for 
M1crones1a· "The only feasible tailback position (from 
Asia ) is unquestionably located in Micronesia where 
island bases, unlike those in SE As1s, would be under 
permanent U S. control. .. Palau has excellent 
anchorages. Ponape and Babelthuap have land areas 
in excess of 100 square miles and are suitable for 
nuclear weapons storage and training areas .. " 
Another report commented, "The widely scattered 
islands in Micronesia provide the needed dispersion in 
the nuclear age By using islands to support a complex 
of military bases instead of concentrating on a single 
island such as Guam, an enemy would find it difficult to 
destroy U.S defenses with a single coordinated 
nuclear attack " 
Not surprisingly, the Defense Department-
dominated negotiating team was instructed not to 
discuss independence with the Micronesians during 
this period. 
A stark picture of economic dependence in 
Micronesia was painted by the 1970 U N. Visiting 
Mission which "did not see signs of significant 
progress in the economy ... The basic infrastructure is 
still in a lamentable state, agriculture is stagnant, 
adverse trade balance is increasing ... " 
The focus of American economic activity in 
Micronesia became the building of a "minimum basic 
infrastructure", but perhaps not precisely what the 
UN Visiting M1ss1on was looking for In the 1970's, 
military civic action teams began working 1n all the 
districts. One writer noted that "an interesting pattern 
emerged . Army engineering teams became 
responsible for civic action in the Marshalls where 
Ant1-Ball1stic Missile testing is done under the Army, 
Navy Seabees work in the Carolines where naval port 
facilities and Marine training sites are planned, and Air 
Force "Prime Beef" teams operate 1n the Marianas 
where reconstruction of World War II airbases on 
Tin1an and Saipan are in the cards." 
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IMPERIALISM 
OF THE PAST 
Micronesians first discovered Spain's Ferdinand 
Magellan on their shores in 1520. While Spain 
controlled the islands from that time. it was not until 
1668 that it began real colonization in the Mariana 
Islands. In less than 100 years, Spain brought 
Christianity to the islands and was responsible for 
decimating the native Chamorro population from 
approximately 70,000 to just 1,400 people. 
Concentrating its activities in the Marianas. Spain 
exercised little control of the eastern-most Marshall 
Islands. By the 1890's the Marshalls had become a 
focus of Germany's copra export and it established an 
administrative headquarters there. In 1899, Germany 
bought the Marianas and Carolines from Spain, whose 
control had continued to diminish with the increasing 
American and German missionary and trade activities 
in the islands and with U.S. acquisitions of Guam and 
the Philippines in the Western Pacific. 
Germany's tenure in Micronesia was cut short by 
Japan at the outset of World War I. Taking the islands 
by force, Japan set up a military headquarters in Truk. 
Subsequently, the Japanese divided the islands into , 
six administrative districts (Marshalls, Ponape, Truk, 
Yap, Palau and the Marianas) and in 1919 the islands 
were placed under Japanese administration as a ' 
League of Nations Mandate, allowing Japan to rule 
them "as an integral part of the Japanese Empire." 
Japan set out to develop the islands for its own 
economic and military benefit. Micronesia's 
infrastracture was improved by the new roads and 
harbor facilities built, while agriculture and fishing 
production expanded.1 
Japan used Micronesians primarily for unskilled 
labor, while importing its skilled workers from Japan 
and Korea. Control was maintained over the 
Micronesians by educating them in Japanese 
language schools. As the Micronesians "were not 
trained to share in the new economy except on the 
lowest rung of the labor ladder," they were educated 
only up to the fifth grade., 
By 1928, Japan's economic activities produced a 
balance of trade favorable to the islands, mainly 
because of the success of the sugar cane industry in 
the Marianas. By 1936, exports from Micronesia of 
more than $14.2 million exceeded Japanese imports 
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which were about $9 million. The major cash exports 
were sugar. dried bonito, phosphate, copra and 
alcohol.2 
The islands were also used as an outlet for Japan's 
over-populated country-by 1938, more than 50% of 
Micronesia's population was expatriate.3 As the 
Japanese population in Micronesia increased, so did 
criticism of this policy from League of Nations 
members. The Japan government ignored the 
criticism, and, as they began to build military bases 
throughout Micronesia in preparation for World War 11, 
withdrew from the Leagu re of Nations. 
After Pearl Harbor. the U.S. fought its way through 
Micronesia-the islands with Japanese military bases 
were scenes of the bloodiest fighting of World War 11. 
The Americans and the Japanese lost tens of 
thousands of soldiers, while the Micronesians-
caught in a war they neither cared about or benefited 
from-lost an estimated 5,000 people. 
A Micronesian commented. "The Japanese, like the 
Germans and the Spaniards, promised that they will 
protect and defend us ... But we found out that the 
Japanese military bases did not even defend us during 
the war-our islands were being attacked by the 
American planes and the whole island was turned into 
a battlefield ... Our relatives, our elder people died. It's 
their war, but we lost our life from it."4 
•·oecolomzation," A pubhcallon of The United Nations Department of 
Political Affairs April , 1980 
'A History of Palau. Vol 3 · Japanese Adm1ntstrar1on & US Naval Admin-
istration (Palau Community Ac tion Agency 1978). p. 333-48 
'"Decolon1zalion", p.7 
•M1crones1a Support Committee. Bulletin . Vol 6 #4, 1981 p.3 
CASH INCOMES HIGHER 
UNDER JAPANESE 
"The fact that it was the Japanese rather than the 
Micronesians who supplied the labor for the then-
flourishing sugar cane and commercial fishing 
industries and who benefited most from the Japanese 
government's subsidization of the area does not alter 
the fact that per capita Micronesian cash incomes were 
almost three times as high before the war as they are 
now and that the Micronesians freely used Japanese-
subsidized extensive public facilities." 
Report of the Solomon Mission. 1963 
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Continued from Page 6 
A 1977 article commented that "the ... Capital Invest-
ments planned for the six districts from 1976 to 1980 
are investments in the infrastructure, half of which is 
programmed for airfields and ports." 
By the mid-1970's U.S. economic policies appeared 
to be ruling out the independence choice for the 
Micronesians. And it is precisely "the placement of the 
proposed infrastructure (which) may leave Micronesia 
more economically dependent in 1981," said a 1976 
U.N Development Program report, pointing out the 
lack of cons1derat1on of the subsequent costs for 
operation and maintenance of the facilities being built 
The UN. Visiting Mission of 1976 observed with 
dismay that the Micronesian people expressed "a 
general but regretful feeling that the Territory was still 
too dependent on United States aid to be able to 
consider loosening its ties" with the U.S. 
At the 1981 U.N. Trusteeship Council annual 
meeting, Asteno Takesy of the Federated States 
pointed out that "the problem of basic health in 
Micronesia 1s not simply a hard battle that is 1n the 
process of being won; 1t 1s. on the contrary. a hard 
battle that is steadily being lost...lt profits Micronesia 
very little to build a new hospital if there are no 
qualified medical personnel to staff 1t or 1f as has 
happened, one sends a sick child to a sh iny new 
hospital only to find that the hospital has no ant1b1ot1cs 
and not even an aspirin One extreme fear on this 
subject will perhaps best be portrayed by relating the 
unoff1c1al results of recent health surveys that have 
shown an alarming incidence of active tuberculosis in 
children entering grade school in Ponape and an 
equally alarming number of cases of leprosy 1n the 
states of Truk and Ponape .. 
Republic of Palau Vice President Alfonso 01terong 
at the same meeting said "the water system still does 
not work The people of Koror and its surrounding 
areas have water for only two hours 1n the morning 
and .. in the evening ... If the water system can be 
adequately repaired we believe that the sewer system. 
which 1s now not operating. can be made to func-
tion . Failure to have adequate water not only 
threatens our health and safety but also our basic 
economic development " 
Is this bleak story told to the Trusteeship Council the 
whole reality in Micronesia today, or 1s there another 
side? Are the resources available to M1crones1ans 
adequate for the decisions they must now make for 
transition into a self-governing future? What are these 
resources? 
The greatest resource of all to the Federated States 
of M1crones1a. Palau and the Marshall Islands 1s the 
people themselves The Trusteeship has lasted a brief 
35 years. but their trad1t1on of self-sufficiency goes 
back hundreds and even thousands of years Among a 
wealth of other resources are: the numerous 
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thoughtful United Nations reports since 1950; 
experiences of Pacific neighbors, many of them newly 
independent and all increasingly supporting each 
other: studies of other U .S territories and contacts 
with their people; the histories of the decolonization 
process in the many countries that have moved to self-
government since World War II: and the spirit of 
cooperation among the developing countries of the 
world. 
A POEM 
Dedicated to the Wonderful and Inspiring Men Who 
Comprised the Solomon Mission 
July-August 1963 
On the 18th of April in '62 
With a fresh wind blowing, and skies of blue 
The Pres approved memo one-forty-five 
And the Solomon Committee sprang alive. 
Eight summers ago-in '63 
Nine men came out from the Land of the Free 
To the sunny trust isles, facts to find-
As well as assess the islanders' mind. 
Their search was simple-just find what's right 
to insure a favorable plebiscite. 
And see that the long-shelved Micro-nation 
Would be American-owned by affiliation. 
Yes. out they came. these nine great guys 
To serve as the President's personal eyes 
And determine which way the natives would go 
When the status winds began to blow. 
The objectives were stated as a, b, and c 
And were geared to do everything rapidly. 
Their outline proclaimed that the Trust Islands' fate 
Could be sealed and delivered by late '68. 
In motif their work was 'American Colonial' 
But knowing this bothered them not one i-on- ial. 
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In Part II: The Political Status Chronology and Part 
Ill: The Compact of Free Association, Excerpts and 
Implications, as well as in the experiences of people in 
small countries and territories told in these pages, this 
booklet opens many questions for consideration and 
discussion People of the world concerned with human 
rights, self determination, and the environment have 
watched the islands of the Trust Territory with 
increasing interest: they will continue to be involved 
and concerned about the future of the new 
governments which are working to take their place 
among other self governing people. 
For these were old men who remembered the WAR 
And knew that the islands had long been a whore 
To Spaniards and Germans and Nippons and such 
-'Protectors' who screwed without paying much. 
Their final plan was really quite simple, 
And resembled the act of picking a pimple. 
After starting a TT-wide Congress as head 
They fill it with loads of Commonwealth bread. 
And when it gets soft and ready to flow 
They pump in some plebiscite fever and blow. 
The name of the game was 'Follow the Leader' 
And the Solomon crew swore nothing was neater. 
They also suggested that leaders be caught 
By leadership grants and to Washington brought. 
And even commented that kids in school 
Could be curriculated toward American rule, 
Adding that scholarships in gay profusion 
Could win the voters through confusion. 
To top this off, they said PCV's 
Will Teach "The West" for chicken feed 
And a dash of Social Security, please 
(To replace the function of coconut trees) 
Will guarantee, without a doubt, 
That Micronesians won't get out. 
By Joe Murphy, founder of Micronito r Publrshmg Company and Publisher of 
the Marshall Islands Journal, Majuro. 
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PART II: MICRONESIA 
A POLITICAL STATUS CHRONOLOGY 
1947-1982 
1947 FEBRUARY 26: The U.S. drafted 
Trusteeship Agreement states the objective of 
developing Micronesia "toward self-government" but 
omits any reference to "independence" The Soviet 
Union adds the phrase. "self-government or indepen-
dence as may be appropriate ... " to which the U.S. con-
sents In April, the US and the Security Council ap-
prove the agreement designating Micronesia as the 
only U N "strategic" Trusteeship, granting the U S 
extensive military powers 1 
"The United States feels that it must record its oppo-
sition, not to the principle of independence, to which 
no people could be more consecrated than the people 
of the United States. but to the thought that it could 
possibly be achieved within any foreseeable future in 
this case." 
-Ambassador Warren Austin to U.N. 
Security Council, February 26, 1947 
JULY 18: The U S. Congress approves the U N 
Trusteeship Agreement for the Micronesian islands. 
The agreement obliges the U.S. to "promote the 
development of the inhabitants of the trust territory 
toward self-government or independence as may be 
appropriate to the particular circumstances of the trust 
territory and its peoples .. and to this end 
shall .. promote the economic development of 
fisheries. agriculture and industries. protect the 
inhabitants against the loss of their lands and 
resources protect the health of the people .. "1 
1960 DECEMBER 14: The U N General 
Assembly adopts Resolution 1514 on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and People 
which declares. "Immediate steps shall be taken. in 
trust and non-self-governing temtone5 to transfer all 
powers to the peoples of those territories without any 
cond1t1ons or reservations in accordance with their 
freely expressed will and des1re ... 1n order to enable 
them to en1oy complete independence and freedom." 
DECEMBER 15: The next day, Resolution 1541 is 
adopted, outlining three different ways for non-self-
governing territories to gain a "full measure of self-
govern ment'" "(e)mergence as a sovereign 
independent state, (f)ree association with an indepen-
dent state, (i)ntegration with an independent state" 
"Free association," the resolution states, should be the 
result of a free and voluntary choice by the peoples of 
the territory. (A)nd retains for the peoples of the ter-
ritory .. the freedom to modify the status of that 
territory through the expression of their w1ll. .. (T)he 
right to determine its internal constitution without out-
side interference .... " 
GLOSSARY 
BORA Base Operating Rights Agreement 
CFPST Commission on Future Political Status 
and Transition 
COM Congress of Micronesia 
FSM Federated States of Micronesia 
JCFS 
KAC 
KMR 
MIG 
MIPSC 
MPSC 
NEPA 
NSAM 
OMSN 
PCST 
SOFA 
Joint Committee on Future Status 
Kwajalein Atoll Corporation 
Kwajalein Missile Range 
Marshall Islands Government 
Marshall Islands Political Status 
Commission 
Mananas Political Status Commission 
National Environmental Polley Act of 
1969 
National Security Action Memorandum 
Office for Micronesian Status 
Negotiations (U.S. State Department) 
Palau Commission on Status and 
Transition 
Status of Forces Agreement 
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1961 JUNE 21: Burma's U.N. Represen-
tative, U Thant, asserts. "The Sa1pan district appears to 
be enjoying special privileges over other districts of 
the Territory. The Administering Authority 1s said to be 
putting more money into Saipan than into other dis-
tricts, and consequently employees of the adminis-
tration in Saipan are better paid. The Saipan district 
has better schools with more qualified teachers, more 
hospitals better equipped with staff and other facilities, 
and it has better roads and what not. This kind of dis-
criminatory treatment certainly will not be conducive 
to a development of territorial consciousness, a 
development of a sense of. .. nationhood among the 
Micronesians."3 
The United Nations Visiting Mission calls on the U.S. 
to "take the heat out" of the Marianas Movement to 
become a part of the U.S. as a separate territory 
1963 The Solomon Team, commissioned 
by President Kennedy to make policy recommen-
dations, reports: " ... Micronesia is said to be essential to 
the U.S. for security reasons. We cannot give the area 
up, yet time is running out for the U.S. in the sense that 
we will soon be the only nation left administering a 
trust territory. The time could come, and shortly, when 
the pressures in the U.N. for a settlement of the status 
of M1crones1a could become more than 
embarrassing." 
In recognition of the problem, the President, on April 
18, 1962, approved NSAM No. 145 which set forth as 
U.S. policy the movement of Micronesia into a per-
manent relationship with the U.S. within our political 
framework. In keeping with that goal, the memo-
randum called for "accelerated development of the area 
to bring its political, economic, and social standards 
into line with an eventual permanent association." 
To obtain these objectives, the report says the U.S. 
should sponsor Micronesian leader visits to the U.S., 
introduce American curriculum and patriotic rituals in 
the schools, increase college scholarships, begin a 
Peace Corps program and offer Micronesians 
economic incentives.• 
1964 The U.N. Visiting Mission to 
Micronesia comments: "The people of the Territory 
have not begun to think at all widely about the range of 
alternatives open to them. Almost all speakers 
assumed that there were only two alternatives-full 
independence or some form of integration with the 
United States. Independence is taken to mean that 
Micronesia would have to stand entirely on its own 
strength and that United States aid would immediately 
cease Since Micronesia 1s clearly not self-sufficient, 
most people concluded that the only alternative was 
some form of integration with the United States, either 
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as part of Hawaii or part of the Territory of Guam." 
JULY 1965: The Congress of Micronesia. a territory 
wide legislative body modelled on the U.S. Congress, 
holds its first session after being created by Interior 
Secretarial Order #2882 in 1964. The Congress is sub-
ject to the veto of the American Trust Territory High 
Commissioner. 
1967 AUGUST 8: The Congress of 
Micronesia (COM), with representatives of each of the 
six Micronesian districts, establishes a political status 
commission to: 1) recommend procedures and 
courses of political education in Micronesia; 2) study 
the range of political status alternatives open to 
Micronesia; 3) recommend ways of determining 
Micronesian views on their future political status; and 
4) undertake a comparative study of self-
determination in Puerto Rico, Western Samoa, the 
Cook Islands and other territories.5 
The U.N. Visiting Mission to Micronesia 
reports: "The Mission considers that the initial work of 
the Congress of Micronesia has helped to sweep away 
one of the barriers to political progress by providing a 
force for unification and centralized leadership. The 
main obstacles remaining in the way of progress to 
political freedom and self-determination lie in the 
excessive economic dependence of M1crones1a upon 
the United States and the lack of pol1t1cal under-
standing among the members of the public. parti-
cularly in the more remote islands, of the alternatives 
open to them." 
1968 JUNE 26: The COM political status 
commission submits its "Interim Report," with these 
observations: a divided territory would bring no 
greater political, economic or social advantage than a 
unified territory; Micronesia's size and the possibility 
of economic specialization would enable each district 
to "complement" the other; and the four possible 
political alternatives for Micronesia are· 
1) independence. 2) a "freely associated state," 
3) integration with a sovereign nation as a common-
wealth or unincorporated territory, and 4) remaining a 
trust territory. 
AUGUST: The Kwajalein Atoll landowners. removed 
from their home islands by the military. live crowded 
on 66-acre Ebeye Island, lacking adequate compen-
sation and facing serious health, sanitation and social 
problems The people petition the Congress of 
Micronesia, which supports their demand that the U.S. 
compensate them and allow the people access to their 
islands for food growing and fishing. The U S ignores 
the initial demand from the Kwajalein people, but fol-
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lowing a week long occupation of their "off limits" 
islands, the U.S. agrees to negotiate their demands. 
1969 JULY: The second report of the COM 
Political Status Commission lists three alternatives: 
1) independence, 2) free association, and 3) integra-
tion with a major power. It recommends free 
association as the first choice, stating that both mili-
tary bases and the power of the U.S. to control foreign 
affairs would be acceptable if Micronesia were a self-
governing state. 
"We choose a free state because the continuation of 
a quasi-colonial status would prove degrading to 
Micronesia and unworthy of America .. (l)f it should 
prove impossible to renew our partnership with the 
United States as an associated free state, the Political 
Status Commission feels that independence would be 
the only road left open to us ... We maintain that the 
basic ownership of these islands rests with 
Micronesians and so does the basic responsibility for 
governing them."6 
Trident Missile 
OCTOBER 1-17: Micronesian and U.S. representa-
tives meet in the first round of exploratory future 
political status negotiations, The Micronesians 
present a list of 11 positions. The U.S. rejects two key 
Micronesian points: the right of Micronesians to 
control land (eminent domain), and the ab1l1ty of 
Micronesians to terminate a future agreement 
uni laterally. 7 
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Later, a National Security Council (NSC) Under-
secretaries Committee, including the Undersecre-
taries of State and Interior, the head of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, the Deputy Secretary of Defense. a represen-
tative of the CIA, and the assistant to the President for 
National Security Affairs, drafts a bill to establish 
Micronesia as an unincorporated territory of the U.S. 
similar to Guam, with some internal autonomy, but 
with sovereignty residing with the U.S. 
This follows a meeting of Henry Kissinger, the 
Secretaries of State and Interior and the Trust 
Territory High Commissioner in which Kissinger 
argues that Micronesians must not control their land or 
retain the power unilaterally to alter the U.S -
Micronesia relationship. Interior Secretary, Walter 
Hickel, disagrees: according to his account, he sup-
ported "negotiated purchase or lease of land. We had 
established military bases in Turkey and Spain without 
the right of eminent domain. What right did we have to 
invoke eminent domain on the M1crones1ans?" 
Hickel's account of Kissinger's response is well known 
in Micronesia "There are only 90,000 people out there 
Who gives a damn?"8 
1970 JANUARY: During informal talks 
with Congress of M1crones1a leaders on Sa1pan. 
Interior Assistant Secretary Harrison Loesch c1 r-
culates a draft brll to establish M1crones1a as an 
unincorporated territory Under thrs proposal. the 
United States would gain permanent control and 
sovereignty over M1crones1a. The Micronesians re-
spond that the U.S. offer 1s 1n direct conflict with the 
U.N. Trusteeship Agreement and maintain the internal 
self-government of M1crones1a should be "reserved 
solely to the people of Micronesia." They flatly reject 
the offer. 9 
MAY 4-8: During the second round of U.S -Micronesia 
talks on Saipan, the U.S. presents a revised proposal 
for commonwealth status similar to Puerto Arco, 
offering "permanence, security and stability to the 
people of Micronesia" with the Territory becoming a 
"part of the United States." It meets some of the 
specific requests made by Micronesians earlier, but 
the U.S. refuses to budge on the eminent domain issue, 
insisting on retaining the right to expropriate land. The 
Congress of Micronesia negotiators state their "total 
opposition to any action that would limit Micronesia's 
desire for internal autonomy." The Micronesian nego-
tiating team presents four "non-negotiable" points: 
1 Sovereignty resides in the people of Micronesia 
and their government; 
2. The right of self-determination includes the 
choice of independence or association with 
anyone; 
3. Micronesia has the right to adopt its own consti-
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tution and amend or revoke it at any time; 
4. Association would come about by a compact 
terminable unilaterally by either side. 11 
Leadership in the Marianas alone favors pursuing 
negotiations for commonwealth status with the U.S. 12 
With an uncertain political climate in the Philippines 
and Japan, and the possibility of losing bases in 
Okinawa, Pentagon planners develop new fallback 
position centered on Guam and Tinian. A new Tinian 
base would guarantee the U.S. an amphibious training 
site and a secure launching pad for future Asian 
military operations. 13 
U.S. OFFER OF COMMONWEALTH 
"The U.S. offers us a new name: This Trust Territory 
would become a Commonwealth. But the United 
States would control our future. Micronesia would 
become a permanent part of the United States' poHtical 
family-that is the phrase they use-but eminent 
domain would remain eminent domain; veto would 
remain veto: Kwajalein would remain American and 
Ebeye would be Micronesian. And Micronesia would 
become the newest, the smallest, the remotest non-
white minority in the United States political family-as 
permanent and as American, shall we say, as the 
American Indian." 
-Lazarus Salii, Chairman, JCFS 10 
The 1970 U.N. Visiting Mission reports: "The COM 
has a most important and vital responsibility to 
acquaint the people of the Territory with the nature 
and consequences of the choices before them. It is a 
daunting task: size of the area, divisions of language; 
primary loyalties to a district, group of islands or even 
to one island; no territory-wide political party; no 
organization devoted to the study of TT's political 
future; no widely-read newspaper. 
"The Administration must avoid giving the impres-
sion that it is supporting or opposing any of the 
choices on which the COM might declare itself ... As the 
Mission pointed out in its various meetings in 
Micronesia, there is a great deal of experience in the 
U.N. concerning the ways in which the people of 
former Trust Territories opted to decide their own 
future. The Mission trust that at an appropriate state, 
the United Nations will be formally requested to play 
its part in the fulfillment of the Trusteeship Agreement, 
1n accordance with the Charter." 
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JULY: The Micronesian status delegation reports to 
the COM "profound" differences between the U.S. and 
Micronesia, with the Americans "unwilling or unable to 
support" free association. The Micronesians go on 
record in this report opposing any status which would 
create permanent ties with the U.S. Both procedural 
and substantive differences over land control and 
unilateral termination result in an impasse in the 
negotiations lasting nearly 16 months. 14 
AUGUST 17: The Congress of Micronesia establishes 
the Joint Committee on Future Status (JCFS) and sets 
forth its mandate to negotiate for either free asso-
ciation or independence. 15 
AUGUST 20/21: The Marianas legislature passes two 
resolutions: (1) requesting the U.S. to meet with the 
Marianas Legislature on the Commonwealth proposal 
and (2) endorsing and urging the U.S. commonwealth 
proposal be submitted to Marianas people for 
endorsement and implementation. 16 
NOVEMBER: The reelection of al I Joint Committee on 
Future Status members to the Congress indicates 
strong popular support for a tough negotiating 
position. 17 
1971 FEBRUARY 19: The Marianas Legis-
lature declares in a resolution its intent to secede from 
Micronesia "if necessary by force of arms" in order to 
join the U.S. 
The Independence Coalition is formed in the Con-
gress of Micronesia, including the entire Truk dele-
gation and members from Palau and the Marshalls. 18 
President Nixon appoints F. Haydn Williams, a for-
mer Assistant Secretary of Defense and currently 
President of the CIA-organized and -funded Asia 
Foundation, to be the U.S. ambassador for the 
Micronesian status negotiations. 19 
JULY 30: The National Security Council establishes 
an interagency Office for Micronesian Status 
Negotiations (OMSN), funded by the State, Defense 
and Interior Departments.20 
OCTOBER 4-12: Ambassador F. Haydn Williams 
attends his first session. Land control and unilateral 
termination are the most sensitive issues at the third 
round of talks in Hana, Maui: Williams attempts to 
defuse the land problem, stating the U.S. "would 
commit itself not to exercise any power of eminent 
domain," once military land requirements are met. 
These requirements include: continued use of 
Kwajalein Missile Range; option to use the port and air-
fields and an unspecified amount of land in Palau and a 
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major portion of Tinian Island in the Marianas. U.S. 
negotiators point out that they have "definite" plans 
only for the Marianas. But unilateral termination 
remains, in Sen. Sal i i's words. " the single most 
important" disagreement. The negotiators agree in 
principle to free association, granting the U.S. defense 
and foreign affairs powers. w ith Micronesians to con-
trol internal affairs. 2 1 
1972 APRIL 2-13: The U.S. accepts, in 
principle, the Micronesians' right of unilateral 
termination , as well as the right to adopt and amend its 
own constitution and legislation. The U.S. will 
relinquish power of eminent domain at the time the 
Compact becomes effective. But differences remain 
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over the extent of U.S. authority in defense and foreign 
affairs; when termination could take place; and the 
amount of U.S. financial assistance (annually) .17 
APRIL 11: During the fourth round of M1crones1a-U .S. 
status talks, Marianas representatives in the Congress 
of Micronesia's Joint Committee on Future Status 
request that Ambassador W1ll1ams enter into talks with 
the Marianas. 23 
APRIL 12: Ambassador Haydn Williams announces 
the U.S. plan to negotiate separately with the Mariana 
Islands. with talks beginning in December. causing 
further d isagreement between the U .S . and 
Micronesian negotiators.2• Continued on Page 19 
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MARIANAS 
CHRONOLOGY 1972-1976 
1972 DECEMBER 13-14: Ceremonial speeches 
begin the first exploratory round of U.S.-Marianas 
status negotiations. Edward Pangelinan, Chairman of 
the Marianas Political Status Commission (MPSC), 
outlines four major issues fer the negotiators to 
resolve: 
(1) Political status - are the Marianas to become a 
commonwealth, unincorporated territory or have 
another status?; (2) Use of land - the Marianas 
leadership agrees in principle to provide land for the 
U.S. military, but wants to insure that land cannot be 
purchased by non-Marianas people; (3) Future 
funding levels; and (4) Transition - there could be 
no changes in the Trusteeship without United 
Nations Security Council approval ; but through 
separate administration, the U.S. and the Marianas 
could implement the new status without waiting for 
U.N. approval. 1 
19 7 3 JANUARY: AU. S. News and World Report 
article states that "according to tentative plans, the 
Marianas-along with Guam-would become 
America's main outpost in the Western Pacific." Such 
reports fuel rumors that military plans are the primary 
U.S. interest in negotiations with the Marianas.2 
MAY 15-JUNE 14: During the second round of 
Marianas-U .S. talks, agreement is reached on 
commonwealth as the form of association. The 
Marianas status commission's position is based 
"largely upon examination of the Puerto Rico 
precedent." 
WILLIAMS SETS 
DISCUSSION LIMITS 
On the question of termination, U.S. Ambassador 
Williams makes it clear that: 
"We have come together to discuss close, 
permanent ties. It seems to us inappropriate, 
therefore, to give any substantial consideration in 
our discussions to the question of possible 
termination ... Nor does it seem to us that...there 
should be any need to establish a mechanism for 
review of the United States-Marianas ties at stated 
intervals."3 
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"BECAUSE OF RECENT EVENTS' '"e have 
come to realize that 'if you starve a 
persoo, he'll eat anything he is given.' 
We have been getting only cruml>s. Our 
land is precious and scarce, we cannot 
condone the use of it by a foreign 
government. We are Chamorros and pre>ud 
of it and want it to stay that way. 
We steadfastly oppose the military 
takeover of any of our beautiful island 
for purposes of aestruction and instead 
offer a life-giving alternative--the 
growing on QUr super ... rich soi.1 of food 
for our struggling nation. " 
Tinia n Students, Vniversi ty of Gui m 
Summer, 19 ?5 
MAY 30: The day after presenting U.S. military plans to 
the Marianas negotiators, Ambassador Williams, in a 
public radio broadcast on Saipan, outlines U.S. 
military needs: (1) Farallon de Mendinilla: indefinite 
use for target practice: (2) 320 acres in Saipan's 
Tanapag Harbor for future use; (3) Isley Airfield on 
Saipan: joint use; (4) 500 acres near Isley Field: 
contingency use as a support area; and (5) the entire 
40 square mile island of Tinian: the northern 2/3 for an 
Air Force and Naval base and the southern 1/3 to be 
returned for civilian use.• 
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MAY: Tinian is the focus of American military interest 
in the Marianas. In Williams' words, "Requirements on 
Tinian are extensive-so much so that we feel we 
should acquire the northern two-thirds of the island for 
military purposes. We feel we should also ask to 
acquire the southern third but would make this part of 
the island available to the current residents for normal 
civilian activities and community life."~ However, the 
military wants use of the protected, deep water Tinian 
harbor for an ammunition wharf, requiring relocation 
of nearby San Jose, the island's only village, to the 
swampy southern part of Tinian bordered by rocky 
hills. 6 
JUNE: The MPSC terms U.S. plans for Saipan 
"unreasonable" and states it is "especially concerned" 
by the proposed relocation of San Jose village on 
Tin1an 1 
JUNE 5: Opposition from the small Tinian farming and 
fishing community of 900 is immediate and vigorous. 
U.S. and Marianas negotiators arrive to discuss the 
military plans with landowners and are greeted with 
the first ever demonstration on Tinian. In a series of 
public meetings, people strongly oppose the reloca-
tion plan, demanding that the U.S. restrict its activities 
to 1/3 of the island. In the meetings, people held signs 
reading: "Land for Ranchers, not for Bombers."8 The 
livelihood of the Tin1an community 1s based on farming 
the rich soil-described by some as the most fertile in 
Micronesia-which produces fruits and vegetables 
that have been exported to markets as distant as 
California. 
JUNE: Opposition to the Tinian base was the primary 
controversy during the negotiations, occurring largely 
outside of the formal talks. Following the May-June 
negotiating session, however, one Marianas status 
commission member expressed objections, 
commenting that the negotiations were moving along 
in too much of a rush, not allowing time for negotiating 
the best land and financial settlements. Another mem-
ber comments that the Marianas had conceded 
sovereignty to the U.S. to easily and too soon. 9 
JUNE 5: The Tinian Municipal Council circulates a 
petition with 7 pre-conditions for military use of their 
island, among them that the U.S. must limit its plans to 
approximately 1 /3 of the island and agree not to 
relocate San Jose village under any circumstances. 
The petition notes that the U.S. "has a moral obligation 
to give due consideration to the wishes of the people 
concerned " 10 
DECEMBER 6-19: The third round of Marianas-US. 
talks focuses on military lands. The U.S. drops its 
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T1n•an Protest Oemonslraloon 
demand for all of T1nian. conceding that the people 
could control and own 1/3 of their island " 
During 1973 and 1974. military and c1vtl1an teams 
visiting Tin1an included Vice Admiral George P 
Steele. Commander. 7th Fleet. Admiral Maurice F 
Weisner, Commander and Chief. Pac1f1c Fleet. Admiral 
Noel Gayler, Commander in Chief Pac1f1c. Lt General 
Louis H. Wilson, Pac1f1c Fleet Marine Force Command-
ing Officer, Jack Bowers. Assistant Secretary of the 
Navy for Installations and Log1st1cs. W1ll1am Clements. 
Deputy Secretary of Defense. and Morton 
Abramowitz , Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for East Asia and Pac1f1c ' 1 
197 4: AUS defense planner predicts. "Given 
the changing regional power structures of Pac1f1c-
As1a. and the probability of ma1or m1l1tary ad1ustments 
by the United States from our present forward pos1-
t1ons, it is quite conceivable that 1n ten or twenty years. 
the entire U S Pac1f1c presence will be centered on a 
Guam-Tin1an axis "' 3 
FEBRUARY: The T1nian Mun1c1pal Council passes a 
bill scheduling a referendum for April 7 to consider the 
questions 
·Do you agree to the relocation (moving) of the 
Village of San Jose from its present site to another 
area of the Island of Tin1an? 
·In your opinion. how much of the Island of T1n1an. 
in terms of land area. should the United States 
m1l1tary be permitted to occupy? None? One-
third? Two-thirds? Other (specify)." 
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1974 MARCH 8: Trust Territory District 
Administrator for the Marianas, Francisco Ada, vetoes 
the Tinian referendum, saying that it is "an attempt to 
undermine tl1e United States-Marianas .negotia-
tions," and that the "good of the whole comes first , not 
Tinian's interests " 15 
MAY: Following the Trust Territory administration veto 
of the Tinian referendum, more than half of Tinian's 
registered voters sign a petition opposing the extent of 
American plans. 16 
MAY 15-31: At the fourth round of Marianas-U.S. talks, 
a series of working and public meetings on Saipan, 
Tinian and Rota, the U.S. announces that San Jose 
village on Tinian will not be relocated, as the weapons 
wharf can be constructed elsewhere on Tinian The 
U S. concedes to all the demands of the Tinian Council 
in its June 5, 1973 petition, with the exception of 
limiting its use to 1/ 3 of Tinian 11 
MAY: The projected cost of the Tinian base grows from 
$144 million to over $300 million, announces 
Ambassador Williams at a public meeting on Tinian, 
adding that approximately 5,000 to 6,000 troops will be 
based on Tinian. with another 7,000 arriving 
periodically for war training maneuvers.18 
JUNE 21: A detachment of Marines from Okinawa 
conduct an amphibious assault on Tinian, the first 
active military presence since World War II. 19 
NOVEMBER: During elections for the Marianas 
Legislature and the Congress of Micronesia (COM). 
objections to the haste and secrecy of the Marianas 
status negot1at1ons become a major issue Edward 
Pangelinan. MPSC Chairman, is defeated in his bid for 
reelection to the COM. With the status talks nearing 
completion . the Marianas Legislature arranges for 
Pangelinan's continuance as Chairman of the nego-
tiating team 20 
NOVEMBER: Tinian Mayor Felipe Mendiola, Munici-
pal Council Speaker Sylvestre Cruz and other T1n1an 
residents petition the U.N. Trusteeship Council urging 
its help to stop the U.S.'s "land grab" of Tinian. Their 
petition states: "We deplore and condemn the sales 
pitch and tactics utilized by representatives of the 
United States military 1n their relentless attempts to 
convince the inhabitants that what is good for the mili-
tary is good for Tinian."21 
NOVEMBER: A Socio-Economic impact study of 
Tinian prepared for the U.S. Air Force proiects the 
Tinian military base will expand the current population 
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MILITARY PLANS FOR MICRONESIA 
Because of its excellent facilities and permanent 
political relationship with the U.S., Guam would 
certainly be the center of any increased U.S. military 
activity in the area. It has minimal strategic value, 
however, without U .S. control of the entire Trust 
Territory. 
Palau has excellent anchorages, Ponape and 
Babelthuap (sic) have land areas in excess of 1100 
square miles and are suitable for nuclear weapons 
storage and training areas. The Marianas in general 
are ideally suited for airfields. Although Tinian has no 
adequate harbor it is suitable for a major air base as 
well as nuclear stockpiling and troop staging facilities. 
Rota has a small airfield and could support a missile 
base and troop training. 
From The Strategic Importance of Micronesia by Lt Col. A.A. Giroux. Army 
War College. October, 1973 
of 900 by about 5,000. Additionally, some 8,000 to 
12,000 civilians will be brought in for construction and 
base operation activities "With the projected 1 1 
population density ... agriculture activities will be 
severely limited and the present standard of living will 
deteriorate .. ", the report states. This Air Force study is 
not made available for public discussion in the 
Marianas prior to the June 17, 1975 vote on the 
Commonwealth Agreement.22 
DECEMBER: The fifth rou11d of Mananas-U.S. nego-
tiations produces basic agreement on a "covenant". 
which will give the Marianas permanent control of land 
ownership The U S., however, retains the power to 
"exercise within the commonwealth the power of 
eminent domain to the same extent" as "in a State of 
the Union." American negotiators confirm rumors that 
the U.S. will not begin immediate construction of the 
proposed Tinian base.23 
197 5 FEBRUARY 15: American negotiators and 
13 of 15 Marianas negotiators sign the Covenant to 
Establish Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana 
Islands in Political Union with the United States of 
America The Covenant provides the U.S with a 100 
year lease on 17 ,799 acres (2/ 3) ofTin1an for a payment 
of $17,500,000-or approximately $10 an acre per 
year.2• 
FEBRUARY 20: The Marianas Legislature approves 
the Covenant and sets June 17, 1975 as the plebiscite 
date for the Covenant.25 
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APRIL 11: Interior Secretary Rogers Morton 
announces the appointment of former Christian 
Science Monitor editor, Erwin Canham, as com-
missioner for the Marianas plebiscite. just 2 months 
away. His duties include overseeing an impartial 
political education program on the Covenant.2$ 
APRIL: The Interior Department announces the 
questions to be voted: 
1. Yes - I vote for Commonwealth as set forth in 
the Covenant to Establish Commonwealth of 
the Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union 
with the United States of America. 
2. No - I vote against Commonwealth in political 
union with the United States as set forth in the 
Covenant, recognizing that, if Commonwealth 
is rejected, the Northern Mariana Islands, will 
remain as a district of the Trust Territory with 
the right to participate with the other districts in 
the determination of an alternative future 
political status. 27 
Because of the wording, a negative vote is a vote 
against Commonwealth ("if Commonwealth is 
rejected") rather than a vote against the Covenant. 
This wording forces a "yes" vote by those who support 
the idea of commonwealth but want changes in the 
Covenant. 28 
APRIL: Opponents of the Marianas Commonwealth 
Covenant charge that the plebiscite is being rushed, 
that four months between the signing and the 
plebiscite is insufficient time for thorough political 
education. Despite protests from Marianas people and 
members of the U.S. Congress, the Interior 
Department refuses to change the ballot wording.29 
MAY: Martin San Nicolas. a Tinian resident repre-
senting the just-concluded Fiji Nuclear Free Pacific 
Conference, appears before the U.N. Trusteeship 
Council asking for U.N. action to delay the June 
plebiscite and allow more time for voter education. 30 
MAY: Less than three weeks before the commonwealth 
vote, the educational booklets on the Covenant in 
three languages are made available for public 
discussion. 31 
JUNE 17: The Marianas Covenant is approved by a 
78.8% margin-3,945 to 1,060 votes 32 
JULY 21: The U.S. House of Representatives passes 
the Marianas Commonwealth Covenant by voice vote. 
The New York Times notes: "With a haste that is both 
unnecessary and ominous, the Congress is moving 
toward rubber stamp approval of a far reaching 
commitment that Americans may come to 
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regret ... After perfunctory moments of debate with 
fewer than 25 members on the floor. the House of 
Representatives gave its approval by voice vote .. "33 
1976 JANUARY: Abel Olopai, a spokesperson 
for the United Carolinian Assoc1at1on on Sa1pan 
(which represents about 1/3 of the Mananas popu-
lation), delivers a statement to US Congresspeople. 
"The educational program for the election was inade-
quate. The Covenant was signed in February. 
Although it was very complicated and terribly impor-
tant to the people here. Interior Secretary Morton set 
June 17 as the date for the plebiscite as though there 
was some reason for hurrying. More important. the 
education program for the people regarding the 
Covenant itself only dealt with the Covenant, telling us 
nothing about possible alternatives ... "3• 
FEBRUARY 26: After delays because of strong opposi-
tion by Senators opposed to the Covenant, it is passed 
by a Senate vote of 67 to 23. 35 
MARCH 15: President Ford signs the Marianas Com-
monwealth Covenant into law. marking the first U.S. 
acquisition of territory since the purchase of the Virgin 
Islands in 1917.,. 
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1972 JULY 17-AUGUST 1: During the fifth 
round of Micronesia-U.S. talks in Washington. D.C .. 
tentative agreement is reached on the Preamble and 
three titles of a draft Compact of Free Association: in-
ternal affairs, foreign affairs and defense. Micronesia 
would govern its internal affairs while the U.S. would 
have full responsibility for foreign affairs and defense 
matters. including the exclusive right to establish, 
maintain and use m ilitary areas and facilities in 
Micronesia.25 
AUGUST: During the COM Special Session in 
Ponape, the Compact is attacked by growing indepen-
dence forces. The COM directs the JCFS to negotiate 
for both independence and free assoc1at1on.26 
SEPTEMBER 28-0 CTOBER 6: The sixth round of 
U.S -Micronesia status talks at Barbers Point Naval 
Station in Hawaii breaks down over the issue of 
independence. The Micronesians are prepared to con-
tinue discussion on the draft Compact but note the 
growing sentiment for independence in Micronesia. 
The U S. delegation is specifically instructed not to 
discuss independence. "In a not too veiled threat ... the 
United States let the Micronesians know that the 
United States strategic requirements would not 
countenance independence."27 
NOVEMBER: A serious blow to the COM Inde-
pendence Coalition is the election defeat of Rep. Hans 
Wiliander from Truk 
Fifty elected and traditional Palau an leaders issue a 
declaration: "Whereas. the people of Palau have no 
desire to have military installations and personnel on 
Palauan land .because this could result in suffering for 
human beings within or without Palau, Whereas, the 
people of Palau see the right to control their land as the 
basis of Freedom. Justice and Equality both at the 
present and in the future We hereby dec lare that we 
are unequivocally opposed to the use of land in Palau 
by the United States military .. "18 
The Palau legislature goes on record with a state-
ment that the U.S. military is "not welcome " A 
traditional chief and the Speaker of the Palau 
Legislature point out that negotiations of possible U.S. 
military land use must take place only after all land 1s 
returned to the people of Palau (more than 60% 1s 
controlled by the U.S ) 29 
1973 APRIL: The Congress of Micronesia 
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adopts the Palau Legislature's position that the 
resumption of political status talks is dependent on a 
return of public lands to local control and ownership.30 
"The looser the relationship the (COM) Joint Com-
mittee talked about, the more Defense became 
interested in something closer with the Marianas," 
comments a State Department official.3 ' 
The Marshall Islands N1tijela (Legislature) forms the 
M.I. Political Status Commission (MIPSC) to negotiate 
separately with the U.S government. 
After suggesting the Marianas could choose to be a 
part of Micronesia until the time when a ma1ority of 
districts might decide on unilateral termination . the 
1973 UN. Visiting Mission continues: "Alternatively, 1f 
an arrangement is negotiated for Micronesia which is 
satisfactory to the Congress but not acceptable to the 
Marianas. it wou ld appear likely that, at this stage, the 
Congress ... would be ready to accept the inevitability 
of a separate status for the Marianas. There would then 
be constitutional propriety in the secession It is a 
matter of urgency that the Congress, the Administra-
tion and the Administering Authority give the most 
serious attention to the question of the unity of the 
Territory They should refuse to allow the course of 
events which the inactivity, indec1s1veness and failures 
of the past have set in train to continue unchecked 
without the most earnest and serious examination of 
whether that course will or will not benefit the people 
of Micronesia, both severally and as a whole · 
OCTOBER: More than a year's halt 1n the status talks 
prove to be counter-productive for the COM . as the 
Marianas begin separate negotiations. encouraging 
separatist sentiment in other islands 
NOVEMBER 1: The U .S issues a policy statement that 
public lands will be returned directly to each district 
before termination of the Trusteesh ip Agreement. 
demanding. however. that any public lands wanted for 
military use will not be returned until the Micronesians 
agree to meet U S. land needs The M1crones1an 
negotiators. although dissat1sf1ed with these con-
d1t1ons. agree to resume the status talks J 
NOVEMBER 14-21: The seventh round of M1crones1a-
U S talks begin in Washington. but quickly break 
down over money issues Senator Sali1 states that the 
U.S 's "unyielding" pos1t1on on finance prevents 
continued Compact negotiations without "significant 
curtailment" of US authority for military and foreign 
affairs. The major difference 1s that the U S financial 
aid o ffer 1s for only five districts because the separate 
Marianas negotiations are well advanced. The JCFS. 
however, insists on negotiating for all six districts. 
never having recognized the legality of the U.S.-
Marianas talks. The talks break off indefinitely.33 
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1974 MARCH: Spurred by the separate 
Marianas negotiations, the Marshall Islands Nitijela 
requests the U.S. to enter into direct status nego-
tiations with the Marshalls, separate from the COM 
which has been negotiating for all of Micronesia. 
APRIL 26: The Palau Legislature declares that "Palau 
cannot and shall not accept any other form of political 
unity in Micronesia other than a unity based upon the 
terms and principles of loose federation of states 
where the central government shall have authority and 
supremacy over specific territorial and international 
matters while the district governments shall have 
prerogative over all domestic matters .... " 34 
APRIL: During informal talks in California, U.S.-
M1cronesia negotiators agree to an economic aid 
package providing Micronesia $690 million over 15 
years of the Compact. It is agreed that termination of 
the Trusteeship Agreement will be delayed until 
completion of a five-year, $146 million capital improve-
ment program announced by Interior Secretary 
Norton . 1981 becomes the target date for 
termination. 35 
JULY: Informal talks continue between U.S. and 
Micronesian negotiators on Guam. The Micronesians 
unsuccessfully attempt to increase their control over 
foreign affairs; in the final draft the U.S. retains 
primacy of power in all cases where there is a conflict 
or overlap between U S.-controlled foreign affairs and 
defense matters and Micronesia-run internal affairs.36 
Following a request from the U.S., the COM twice 
passes legislation to implement the return of US. held 
public lands to the Congress of Micronesia. But the 
U S Trust Territory High Commissioner vetoes both 
bills because the COM insists, among other things: 
that agreement to meet military land terms should not 
be required before the return of public land .37 
NOVEMBER: Unable to convince the COM to satisfy 
the Pentagon's land requirements in advance, and 
faced with pressure from Palau and other districts for 
quick action, the U.S. informs the Micronesians at a 
meeting in Honolulu that it is preparing to issue a 
Secretarial order returning public land on terms con-
tradicting the COM's position· individual owners must 
agree in advance to accept U.S. military plans and the 
land will be returned directly to the districts, bypassing 
the COM The Micronesians walk out of the meeting 
and COM House Speaker Bethwel Henry charges the 
unilateral action by the U.S. "constitutes an indication 
of how responsive the U.S. will be toward Micronesian 
interests and concerns under any future political 
association. " 38 
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1975 During its regular session, the COM 
rejects the financial provisions in the draft Compact of 
Free Association and expresses concern about the 
overriding U.S. control of foreign affairs. 
APRIL 28: The fifth Palau Legislature creates the 
Palau Political Status Commission (PPSC) and selects 
Palauan COM Senator Roman Tmetuchl as chairman. 
Tmetuchl writes U.S. Ambassador Williams requesting 
the U.S to "consider a future political status agree-
ment between Palau and the U.S. similar in nature to 
that of the Northern Marianas .... " 39 
MAY 27: Marshall Islands COM Representative 
Wilfred Kendall, speaking at the U.N. Trusteeship 
Council , states U.S. policy "1s deliberately designed to 
lead to the separation of the Mariana Islands District, 
and in so doing, to deny any chance for the preser-
vation of the unity of Micronesia." 
JULY 15: The Micronesian Constitutional Convention 
opens on Saipan with 56 delegates representing all the 
districts in Micronesia. The Con-Con is marked by 
uncertainly from the beginning: The Mananas delega-
tion only agrees to participate at the last minute, 
threatening withdrawal if the U.S. Senate approves the 
Marianas Commonwealth bill With both Palau and the 
Marshalls leaning toward separate negotiations with 
the U.S. , Marshallese traditional chiefs refuse to attend 
and the Palau delegation demands that the 
Micronesian capital be in Koror and that the national 
government's taxation and land control powers be 
limited.•0 
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NOVEMBER 8: A Constitution for the Federated 
States of Micronesia is signed by 52 of 56 Con-Con 
delegates. the entire Palau delegation. all the 
delegates from T ruk. Ponape, Kusaie and Yap, and a 
majority of the Marianas and Marshalls delegation 
sign 
1976 JANUARY: Tia Belau . Palau's only 
newspaper. devotes an entire issue to the first informa-
tion publicly re leased about the p roposed $20 billion 
oil super-industria l port complex for their islands The 
Save Palau Organization, headed by the High Chief 
lbedul, 1s formed and begins a local and internat ional 
campaign to block the superport. 
JANUARY: Admiral Kent Carroll , Commander of US. 
Naval Forces in the Marianas, visits Palau and hails the 
p roposed Pa lau superport "The U.S is certainly not 
opposed to it I p red ict the preliminary stud ies wi ll 
show it's a viable concept .. I th ink it will be difficult fo r 
the Palauans to tu rn down ... " 4 ' 
The Marshall Is lands Nitijela (l egislature). cites the 
unequal treatment of the Marshall Is lands in the COM 
Free Association Compact negotiat ions and instructs 
the MIPSC to seek separate status talks with the U.S. 
MAY: The Palau Legislature again requests the US to 
begin separate negotiations with Palau. 
MAY 28-JUNE 2: Although the Marshall Islands and 
Palau are seeking separate negotiations with the US, 
at the eighth round of U.S -Micronesia negotiations. 
Lazarus Sal ii, Chairman of the JCFS and Ambassador 
Wi lliams initial the Free Association Compact No 
agreement is reached, however, on key Law of the Sea 
issues. The Compact now gives the U.S control of 
Micronesia's defense and foreign affairs. Military 
requ irements 1n Palau outlined in Annex B include 
(1) Anchorage rights 1n Malakai Harbor and 
adjacent waters. and rights to acquire 40 acres 
for use within the harbor: 
(2) Rights for JOint use of the A1rai airport on 
Babeldaob, rights to improve the airfield to meet 
military requirements and the right to exclusive 
use and development of aircraft support 
facilities: 
(3) The right to acquire 2,000 acres for exclusive 
use on Babeldaob, along with non-exclusive use 
of 30 000 acres of Babeldaob land for ground 
force training and maneuvers 42 
JUNE: The COM creates the Comm1ss1on on Future 
Pol1t1cal Status and Transition (CFPST) to replace the 
JCFS The new Commission's mandate 1s to negotiate 
the Compact into conformity with the FSM 
Const1tut1on 
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JULY 24: In a speech to the COM, Marshall Island's 
Representative Ataji Salos aserts "we have only been 
promised aid provided that we give America our lands 
for military purposes as listed in the so-called Free 
Association Compact. We have been promised aid 
only if we forbid other nations from doing what the 
United States wants to do in our islands-that is, 
dominate us militarily .... " After detailing the forced 
exile o f the Bikini, Enewetak and Kwaialein people, he 
says. " I cannot believe that an agreement, any agree-
ment, with a nation which has so abused its sacred 
trust, will protect our islands and people in the 
future .... " 
JULY 30: Ambassador Williams points to "funda-
mental contradictions" between the initialed Compact 
and the FSM Const1tut1on "The Compact . in our 
Judgment. cannot be made to conform with the 
Constitu tion." 
SEPTEMBER 24: In a referendum, 88% of Palau voters 
support separate pol1t1cal status negot1at1ons for 
Palau.4 ' 
DECEMBER: Minutes of Tehran and Tokyo meetings 
of the Palau superport promoters are leaked to the 
media and reveal that Senator Roman Tmetuchl and 
other Palau Political Status Commission leaders have 
assured the Japanese. American and Iranian business-
men of their "active part1c1pat1on and cooperation· in 
developing the superport •• 
DECEMBER: The Washington Post exposes CIA elec-
tronic surveillance of the M1crones1an negotiators 
durng 1975 The US Senate Intelligence Committee 
begins an investigation ·• ' 
... V11ctrellr 
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1977 JANUARY: Kusaie, until now admin-
istered as part of the Ponape district, gains separate 
status as a new district to be known as Kosrae. 
MARCH 4: In a letter to Secretary of State Cyrus 
Vance, the Marshall Islands repeats its request for 
separate "bi-lateral" negotiations with the U.S. 
MAY: The U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee reports 
that the CIA recruited "Micronesian residents, some 
with affiliations with Micronesian pol1t1cal entities .... " 
At least one of the informants "served on one of the 
island government entities involved in developing a 
compact with the U.S as to future status" These 
act1v1t1es began in 1975, notes the report, following 
Henry Kissinger's 1973 directive to the CIA to study 
"the possibility of exerting covert influence on key 
elements of the M1crones1an independence movement 
where necessary to support U.S. strategic objectives." 
MAY 18-21: The U.S and the Palau Political Status 
Commission. the Marshall Islands Political Status 
Commission and the COM Commission on Future 
Status and Trans1t1on meet in the first informal 
"Roundtable" talks 1n Honolulu aimed at resuming the 
status negotiations. deadlocked since June 1976. 
During the meetings, the COM observes that "virtually 
all of M1crones1a remains incensed over (the CIA) sur-
veillance activities .. that appear to have been 
authorized at very high levels of the US government," 
and requests further information A State Department 
representative replies that the U S considers the 
matter "closed," noting that "1t was not only 1n 
M1crones1a that problems of this sort had arisen " 
Both the Marshalls and Palau state opposition to 
ioining with the "Congress of Micronesia in any nego-
t1at1ons regarding political status " At the conclusion 
of the informal talks. a Palau spokesman says "the 
U S. indicated it would favor separate negotiations if 
this expedited the talks."•6 
JULY 21-24: Following agreement at the Honolulu 
Roundtable talks, representatives of all the districts 
meet at an All-Micronesian Conference on Guam to 
discuss unity, law of the sea matters and status related 
issues The Palau delegation presents a "Common 
Links" proposal for a loose Micronesian Con-
federation following termination of the Trusteeship, to 
aid cooperation of the districts on foreign affairs and 
other issues. The proposal calls for allowing greater 
access to Micronesia tor U.S. military needs. "we 
emphasize that it 1s our goal to implement a treaty 
which makes explicit our exclusive reliance upon a 
military partnership with the US whose goals of inter-
national peace and security we share" Menchor 
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Moses, speaking for the Truk delegation, strongly 
opposes the Palau and Marshalls position for separa-
tion. "There are still six districts in Micronesia and the 
will of the people of Micronesia collectively .. will be 
known ... when the referendum is held on the Constitu-
tion for the Federated States of Micronesia."•1 
JULY 25-27: In the second informal "Roundtable" 
talks between the U.S. and the Palau, Marshalls and 
Congress of Micronesia delegations on Guam, the 
U.S. presents a proposal for a new two-level nego-
tiating format. In this plan, the multi-lateral or all-
Micronesia level of negotiations would focus on 
aspects such as defense, foreign relations and overall 
elements of Free Association status common to all six 
districts, while the bi-lateral talks would deal with 
issues particular to individual districts, such as 
specific military land rights and financial assistance. 
The Marshall Islands and Palau delegations hail the 
new U.S position as a "breakthrough," but a member 
of the Ponape delegation "cautions the United States" 
against action "which would inadvertently result in the 
fragmentation of M1cronesa1 "48 
Many in the COM look forward to the July 1978 FSM 
Constitution referendum as the gauge of the people's 
sentiments on Micronesian unity Therefore, they see 
recognition of the Marshall Islands and Palau move-
ments by the U.S before that date as premature. 
JULY 30: In a referendum sponsored by the Marshal 
Islands Political Status Comm1ss1on. 62 5% of Marshall 
Islands' voters support separate status negot1at1ons 
with the United States 
AUGUST: President Carter appoints Peter R 
Rosenblatt as the U.S. chief negotiator to the 
Micronesian status talks, with the rank of Ambassador 
OCTOBER 24-27: The U .S and the three Micronesian 
political status comm1ss1ons begin the first round of 
"renewed" formal negot1at1ons on Molokai, Hawa11 in 
the U.S.-proposed two-level negotiating format The 
COM CFPST does not recognize the Marshall Islands 
and Palau right to negotiate separately from the 
Congress In the negotiations, the U S proposes to 
"modify" but not substantially alter the existing draft 
Compact of Free Association initialed in 1976 The 
Palau and Marshalls negotiators, however, demand 
specific compensation for granting the U.S denial 
powers over Micronesia's three million square miles of 
ocean and land area. The proposal calls for the U S to 
pay $60 million annually to be d1v1ded equally among 
the six districts. Ambassador Rosenblatt says, "the 
concept of denial is unworthy of discuss1on."•9 
NOVEMBER 8: In a referendum, approximately 71% of 
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the Mortlocks and 84% of the Faichuk people living 
inside the Truk lagoon, vote to separate from Truk 
district. 
DECEMBER: Julio Akapito, Truk COM member, 
refuses to meet Rosenblatt on his Trust Territory visit, 
criticizing the Ambassador's statement on the 
"incompatibility" of the Compact and the FSM Const1-
tut1on "I can assure you that you are mistaken when 
you say the issue of denial rights is dead It is very 
much alive in Truk, as well as in the Marshalls and 
Palau. Your comments regarding the upcoming 
referendum are viewed as an attempt to influence the 
outcome ... and linking the level of Capital Improve-
ment Proiect funding and future financial assistance to 
the degree to which Micronesia is dependent upon and 
subservient to the United States will not intimidate 
Micronesians "S< 
1978 JANUARY: The U.S. and the three 
Micronesian status commissions meet in San Diego, 
California The Marshal ls and Palau term a U.S. drafted 
free association "working paper" a "drastic step 
backward" and "fundamentally" in conflict with the 
views of all three Micronesian comm1ss1ons as 
expressed at the Molokai talks.5' 
APRIL 7-9: During the Hilo, Hawa11 negotiating round, 
U S Ambassador Rosenblatt and Roman Tmetuchl of 
Palau, Amata Kabua of the Marshalls, and Bailey Olter 
from the COM, sign an 8-point "Agreement of 
Principles" for free association. In a maior US policy 
change, the Hilo Agreement grants the M1crones1ans 
control of foreign affairs and allows for unilateral 
termination with certa1 n restrictions. Parts of the 
agreement state: 
"The United States will have full authority and 
responsibility for security and defense matters in or 
relating to Micronesia, including the establishment 
of necessary military facilities and the exercise of 
appropriate operating rights ... This authonty ... w1ll 
be assured for 15 years .. 
"The peoples of Micronesia will have authority 
and responsibility for their foreign affairs, including 
marine resources. They will refrain from actions 
which the United States determines to be incom-
patible with its authority ... for security and defense 
matters in or relating to Micronesia. 
• "The agreement will permit unilateral termina-
tion of the free association political status subject 
to the continuation of the United States defense 
authority as set forth .above " 52 
APRIL: Despite earlier statements that the FSM 
Constitution 1s incompatible with the Compact of Free 
Association, U S Ambassador Rosenblatt now 
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declares that conflicting provisions can be dealt with 
through negotiation.53 
Palau leaders of the anti-superport movement 
spearhead support for the FSM Constitution, fearing 
the move for separate political status talks is linked 
both to US. military plans for Palau and the economic 
potential of the proposed superport . 
JU LY 12: After several months of intense 
campaigning in all the districts by proponents of both 
unity and separation, an all-Micronesia referendum is 
held on the Federated States of M1crones1a Const1-
tut1on Palau and Marshall Island voters reject the FSM 
Constitution by 55% and 60% margins respectively, 
while the four other Micronesian districts vote for 1t by 
margins of: Yap 95%, Ponape 75%, Kosrae 61% and 
Truk 69% 
SEPTEMBER 28: Interior Secretary Cecil Andrus 
issues a Secretarial Order separating the districts by 
reconstituting the COM as the Federated States of 
Micronesia Congress and restructuring the Palau and 
Marshalls legislatures as the paramount legislative 
bodies for their districts An Interior official comments: 
"The Secretarial Order ... 1s expected to enhance the 
chances of success of the status negotitations " 
DECEMBER 21: Following two const1tut1onal conven-
tion sessions, 45 of 48 delegates sign the Marshall 
Islands Consti tution 
J v11arelh 
PART II 
1979 JANUARY: After a two-week meeting 
on Saipan, U.S. and Micronesian negotiators term 
each others' position on finance "unreasonable." 
Additionally, Marshall Island Chairman Amata Kabua 
notes the conflict between the U.S. insistence to 
"resolve all disputes in its own favor regardless of how 
unreasonable such action might be ... and our funda-
mental need to be protected against arbitrary 
abuses."54 
JANUARY 28: A popularly elected 38-member Palau 
Constitutional Convention convenes in Koror for 55 
days. 
MARCH 1: The Marshall Islands Constitution is 
approved in referendum, creating the only parliamen-
tary government in Micronesia. The referendum goes 
ahead in spite of a lawsuit challenging the short time 
allowed for political education.55 
Strong local and international opposition to the 
proposed Palau oil superport, spearheaded by the 
Save Palau Organization, forces the Japanese inves-
tors to shelve their plans. 
A week before the Palau Constitutional Convention 
adjourns, American Ambassador Rosenblatt sends, 
through the Palau Political Status Commission, a list of 
U.S. objections to the constitution as drafted, cen-
tering on the provisions which ban nuclear and military 
activ1t1es in Palau and on ocean territorial claims in 
conflict with the proposed Compact of Free 
Association. 56 
APRIL 2: Ignoring last minute U.S. objections, 35 of 38 
Con-Con delegates sign the Constitution for the 
Republic of Palau. Shortly after adjournment, 
Ambassador Rosenblatt flies to Palau to meet in a 
closed session with the Legislature, restating the U.S. 
Government's opposition to the Constitution, 
asserting: "The proposed language (of the nuclear 
ban) would create problems of the utmost gravity for 
the U.S." Hundreds of Palau citizens demonstrate 
peacefully outside in protest against this pressure.57 
The Palau Constitution provides that its ban on 
nuclear substances cannot be removed "without the 
express approval of not less than three fourths (3/4) of 
the votes cast in a referendum submitted on this 
specific question." Voters, therefore, could interfere 
with U.S. military activities specified in the Compact, 
such as use of airfields, ports and land in Palau for 
nuclear powered and missile carrying vessels and 
aircraft. The FSM Constitution, however, allows lifting 
of its ban on nuclear substances through a 
government-to-government agreement. 
APRIL: The Palau Legislature withholds $26,200 ear-
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marked for political education on the new 
Constitution. 58 
APRIL 30: Ambassador Rosenblatt proclaims the con-
stitution incompatible with free association, which 
"offers financial assistance quite generous by 
American standards and the U.S. is ready to commit it-
self to these levels of financial assistance for the next 
15 years ... This is possible solely because ... we are 
discussing free association. If we are discussing some 
other status, I am absolutely confident that these levels 
of funding would not be possible."59 
MAY 10: The first Congress of the Federated States of 
Micronesia convenes, representing the islands of 
Kosrae, Yap, Truk and Ponape. Tosiwo Nakayama of 
Truk and Petrus Tun of Yap are elected President and 
Vice President of the FSM by the Congress.60 
JUNE 1: The Peoples Committee for the Palau 
Constitution, composed of Con-Con members, tradi-
tional leaders, teachers and others, is formed to 
support the Constitution, which is under U.S. attack. 
JUNE 11: Ambassador Rosenblatt sends the Palau 
Political Status Commission a U.S. financial offer for 
incorporation into the Compact with the condition that 
certain modifications be made in the constitution. 
JUNE: The Palau Legislature, under pressure from the 
U.S. and boycotted by pro-Constitution Legislators, 
meets without the 25-member quorum required by its 
charter, and votes to nullify the constitution on the 
grounds that it is incompatible with the Compact. and 
to cancel the July 9 referendum. 61 
JUNE: The Peoples Committee for the Palau Consti-
tution files a lawsuit in Trust Territory court to block 
the Legislature's action. 
JULY 9: Despite the Legislature's action, the referen-
dum goes ahead under U.N. observation and the Con-
stitution is ratified by an unprecedented margin of 92% 
to 8%. 
JULY: The American Chief Justice of the Trust 
Territory High Court upholds the Palau Legislature's 
action to nullify the constitution and the results of the 
July referendum.6 2 
JULY: The Palau Legislature appoints a nine-member 
team to rewrite the Palau Constitution.63 
JULY 1979: Hundreds of Kwajalein Atoll landowners 
occupy their islands to protest unlivable conditions on 
Ebeye, demanding increased compensation and use 
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of their islands. After a two week protest, which 
reportedly disrupted missile tests, the U.S., for the first 
time, negotiates a one year lease for use of Kwajalein 
providing the people $9.9 million. 
AUGUST 21: A re-drafted version of the constitution 
is submitted to the Palau Legislature. Provisions 
objectionable to the U.S., such as those restricting 
nuclear weapons and waste and imposing stringent 
controls on military land use are deleted. The 
Legislature sets a referendum on the "revised" 
constitution for October 23. 
SEPTEMBER: The Legislature appropriates $100,000 
for the PPSC to use for political education of the 6,000 
Palauan voters on the revised constitution before the 
October referendum.s' 
SEPTEMBER 4: Palau voters again go to the polls, this 
time to elect a new legislature to take office in January 
1980. Twenty-seven of the 28 seats are won by 
candidates running on platforms to revive the original 
constitution. They petition the High Commissioner to 
install them immediately. The American High 
Commissioner empowers the old Legislature to con-
tinue until January.s5 
OCTOBER 23: Palau voters reject the "revised" 
constitution by a 70% margin, reaffirming their support 
of the original constitution. 
OCTOBER 27: With U .S.-Palau Political Status 
Commission talks tentatively scheduled for 
December, the People's Committee cables the High 
Commissioner requesting a postponement until the 
new legislature elected September 4 comes into office: 
"There should be no doubt...given the result of the 
October 23 referendum that the people of Palau have 
lost faith in the present leadership." 
1980 JANUARY: The Palau Commission 
on Status and Transition (PCST) is created by the new 
legislature, replacing the former Palau Political Status 
Commission headed by Roman Tmetuchl. Haruo 
Remeliik , Con-Con President, is selected chairman. 
JANUARY: At the Status negotiating session in Kona, 
Hawaii , the Marshall Islands initial the Compact of 
Free Association. Important "subsidiary" agreements 
on radiation claims, the Kwajalein Missile Range and 
other issues remain to be negotiated. 
JULY 9: One year after the first constitution referen-
dum, Palau voters support the original Palau 
constitution by a 78% margin. The constitutional Palau 
government will be formed in January 1981 
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During the year the U.S. meets separately in bi-
lateral negotiating sessions with the three Micronesian 
status commissions. working on subsidiary agree-
ments to the Compact. 
The 1980 U.N. Visiting Mission reports: "The Mission 
was repeatedly told that the Territory was not ready for 
termination of the Agreement and that it lacked the 
necessary economic infrastructure .. At Laura 
(Majuro) and Moen (Truk) among other places. the 
belief was expressed that at the moment of termina-
tion, the Territory would be abandoned and would 
receive no further aid from either the United States or 
the United Nations ... General uncertainty about the 
future, including the steps leading to termination of the 
Territory Agreement and the Micronesians' ability to 
survive economically in a post-Trusteeship world, are 
at present causing fear and despondency among the 
inhabitants of the Trust Territory." 
SEPTEMBER: The U.S. Senate Energy and Natural 
Resources Committee instructs U.S. negotiators to 
demand permanent military denial rights from the 
Micronesian negotiators as a pre-condition to 
Congressional approval of the Compact. 
OCTOBER: During a full negotiating session in Kona, 
Hawaii, with all the Micronesian negotiators present, 
the U.S. submits a clause to include in the Compact for 
permanent U.S. military denial power in the islands. An 
American observer comments: "Before, .. the assump-
tion was that strategic denial would be maintained 
during the 15-year life of the Compact. At Kona, the 
new U.S. position on denial was announced, a move 
that severely alienated the Micronesian 
negotiators ... The U.S. (was) seen as changing an 
agreement already made .... " Under pressure from all 
the Micronesians, the U.S. reduces its denial demand 
to 100 years.ss 
OCTOBER 31: In Washington. D.C., the U.S and the 
Federated States initial . and the Marshall Islands re-
initial the Compact of Free Association . The FSM 
initials two related subsidiary agreements: a 
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1980 OCTOBER 31 
"Memorandum of Understanding" on radioactive 
substances and a law of the sea agreement. The 
Marshalls do not initial any of the eight subsidiary 
agreements under consideration. 
NOVEMBER 4: Haruo Remeliik, former Con-Con 
President, is elected Palau's first President, edging out 
Roman Tmetuchl, former head of the PPSC, by 300 
votes. Alfonso Oiterong, Chairman of the Peoples 
Committee is elected Vice President. 
NOVEMBER 17: President Haruo Remeliik of Palau 
and Ambassador Peter Rosenblatt initial the Compact 
of Free Association and three of the subsidiary agree-
ments in Washington, D.C. The agreements initialed 
are; Military Land Use and Operating Rights; 
Radioactive, Chemical and other Harmful Substances; 
and Law of the Sea. The terms of the military use 
agreement are almost identical to the 1976 draft 
Compact, although more specific The Radioactive 
Agreement permits nuclear-powered ships and 
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submarines and nuclear weapons into Palau under 
certain circumstances, thus conflicting with the intent 
of the Constitution ban, it will have to be approved by 
75% of the voters. 
DECEMBER 4: Reporting to the Legislature on the 
Washington, D.C. Compact initialing, President 
Remeliik notes: "Before a new U.S. administration 
comes into office, we wanted to make firm the gains we 
have made in the negotiations ... The position of the 
Reagan administration vis-a-vis the Compact. .is not 
known .. but there is speculation that the President-
elect is less favorably disposed to free association than 
some other status (e.g., commonwealth]. Initialing 
would serve to strengthen Palau's hand in achieving 
free association from the Reagan Administration." 
1981 JANUARY: The status negotat1ons 
stall, as the new Reagan administration begins a nine-
month interagency review of the Compact. 
KWAJALEIN NOW KEY ANTI-SATELLITE INSTALLATION 
The Marshall Islands, long used by the U.S. military 
as a test range for nuclear weapons, offensive missiles, 
and missile defense radar, have been brought "on-
line" into the strategic arms race. The Altair radar, 
which has been used for Ballistic Missile Defense 
,.~search on the Kwajalein Atoll island of Roi-Namur 
since 1970, became the cornerstone of the U.S. Air 
Forca's Pacific Barrier anti-satellite detection system 
in 1981. 
Beth the United States and the Soviet Union rely 
heavily on orbiting spacecraft for strategic intelli-
gence. communications and guidance. That is, they 
use satellites to survey the other side's military build-
up and warn ot potential attacks; to link the weapons 
systems (such as missiles, submarines, and bombers) 
to the mythical "button", and to provide extremely 
accurate navigational data to weapons delivery 
systems. It is not surprising, therefore, that both 
superpowers have mounted billion-dollar programs 
designed to develop the capability to neutralize or 
destroy the other's orbiting systems. The arms race 
has reached into space. 
One satellite attack could initiate a full-scale nuclear 
holocaust. 
Satellite systems must be linked to ground stations. 
The North American Air Defense (NORAD), a joint 
venture of the U.S. and Canada, operates the Space 
Detection and Tracking System (SPADATS). 
SPADATS links radars and other sensors. scattered 
around the globe, with NORAD's Cheyenne Mountain 
bunker in Colorado. Among the sensors which teed 
information to NORAD are new, powerful optical 
telescopes called the Ground-Based Electro-Optical 
Deep Space Surveillance (GEODSS) system, installed 
in the Pacific at Maui, Hawaii, and Taegu, South Korea. 
Complementing GEODSS is the three-station Pacific 
Barrier radar network with three sites at Guam. the 
Philippines and Roi-Namur. 
The Altair radar, at Roi-Namur, is the most powerful 
of the Pacific Barrier radars. At this time, Altair is one of 
only two or three Air Force radars capable of high 
altitude tracking. 
Because the task of anti-satellite warning requires 
immediate communications to NORAD, Altair data is 
transmitted via microwave to Kwajalein Island, where a 
Defense Satellite Communications System terminal 
relays the information to Colorado. 
This significant new mission at Kwajalein does more 
than add to the political dilemma facing Marshall 
Islanders. FOR THE FIRST TIME, THE ISLANDS ARE 
A TOP PRIORITY SOVIET TARGET. Even in the most 
limited Nuclear war (if that is possible). the Soviets are 
likely to attack Roi-Namur and similar facilities. 
Intelligence, communications, and command and 
control installations are more significant targets than 
nuclear weapons themselves. Without such bases, the 
nuclear forces are blind, deaf and mute. 
By Lenny Siegel. Director, Pac1f1c Studies Center. Mountain View. Calif. 1982 
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JANUARY: Representatives of the Kwajalein Atoll 
Corporation, representing all the approximately 5,000 
Kwajalein landowners, learn that Marshall Islands and 
U.S. government negotiators have drafted a Base 
Operating Rights Agreement for the Kwajalein Missile 
Range without the landowners' participation. The 
Agreement grants the U.S. military rights to Kwajalein 
for 30 years, with a clause allowing 100-year denial 
rights. Senator Imada Kabua, President of the KAC, 
publicly criticizes the Agreement because there is "no 
language about how we are going to be treated as 
people," saying "there may be 30 more years of treat-
ment as second class people in our homeland, with 
one standard of living for the Americans who live on 
Kwajalein and another for the Marshallese community 
on Ebeye."67 
JUNE 19: The Kwajalein Atoll Corporation, excluded 
from U.S.-Marshalls negotiations on the future status 
of the Kwajalein base, responds with a resolution con-
taining nine points, including: "Its members will 
not...grant any use of Kwajalein Atoll unless and until 
the Base Operating Rights Agreement.. is l1m1ted to a 
term of 15 years" Additionally, continued U.S. use of 
the Atoll is contingent on "the development of a master 
plan to construct a decent Marshallese community on 
the Atoll, payment of full and fair compensation" for 
land used since 1944, and "agreement by the U.S. not 
to resume the search and seizure policy adopted. in 
May 1980." 
JULY 25: After years of urging, the FSM Congress 
approves a bill making the Faichuk Islands area inside 
Truk Lagoon a new state of the FSM. 
OCTOBER 3-9: After review, the status talks open 
with the new Reagan administration strongly asserting 
its "need for secure and strategically located bases for 
United States military operations" in M1crones1a as 
well as 100 year denial rights. The Micronesians 
emphasize the severe Reagan budget cuts of essential 
social services and lack of economic development as 
priority issues needing urgent attention.68 
OCTOBER: Citing economic reasons, FSM President 
Nakayama vetoes the law establishing Faichuk as a 
new FSM state. Most other FSM states oppose the 
separation move, one noting that "the example of 
Faichuk could open up the floodgate for even smaller 
communities within the FSM to press for statehood." 
To placate the Faichuk separatists, President 
Nakayama announces he intends to make Faichuk a 
"showcase" of economic development. 
1982 JANUARY: The Federated States of 
M1crones1a negotiators threaten a boycott of future 
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negotiations pointing to a "series of broken promises 
both explicit and implicit" and budget cuts, which FSM 
leaders warn are undermining the people's confidence 
in the U.S .. threatening political instability in the near 
future. 69 
JANUARY: Marshall Islands Foreign Secretary, Tony 
Debrum, exasperated at Reagan Administration 
stalling, declares that the Marshalls may declare its full 
independence 1f no agreement on the Compact 1s 
reached by April 1. 10 
FEBRUARY: The status negotiations continue 1n 
Washington, D.C. with d1scuss1ons on the Compact's 
"subsidiary" agreements. 
Fred Zeder, former Director of Interior's Office of 
Territorial Affairs, is appointed by President Reagan to 
be the U S.'s negotiator with the rank of ambassador 
APRIL: At the request of the Marshall Islands. U S 
negotiators meet with representatives of the more than 
15 rad1at1on-affected atolls in the Marshalls to discuss 
compensation settlements. With claims 1n excess of $5 
billion pending in U S courts. the Marshallese reiect 
the U.S. offer of approximately $50 m1ll1on. including a 
medical program. in settlement of all radiation 
claims.11 
APRIL 19: Senator Imada Kabua announces the 
Kwajalein Atoll Corporation's plan to hold an August 
referendum among its members on the question 
"whether the Corporation should continue to permit 
development of nuclear weapons delivery systems 
using the lands. waters and airspace of the Kwa1ale1n 
Atoll." In a Honolulu press conference. Senator Kabua 
states "to the extent we assist the development of 
nuclear weapons delivery systems we are involved in 
respons1b11ity for their ultimate possible use Most of 
my fellow landowners wish to leave Ebeye Island to 
return to our home islands. Therefore. I call on 
President Reagan and U.S military authorities who 
operate the KMR to declare a moratorium on any 
further U S nuclear weapons delivery system tests at 
Kwajalein until we conduct the August referendum so 
our people can safely return to their islands. as 1s their 
right. " 77 
MAY 18: Marshall Island negotiators. at loggerheads 
with the U S over nuclear testing compensation and 
trusteeship termination issues. publicly notify the U N 
Trusteeship Council of their intent to declare their 
independence from the U.S. on October 1, 1982. Tony 
Debrum, Marshalls negotiator. calls for an August 17 
referendum with the choices of "free association" or 
"independence" to be offered to Marshall Islands' 
voters. 
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1982 MAY 30: Following a hasty agree-
ment by U.S. negotiator Fred Zeder to terminate the 
Trusteeship immediately as to the Marshalls, Marshall 
Islands President Amata Kabua signs the Compact of 
Free Association, ending 13 years of negotiations. The 
Compact is to be voted on August 17; if approved, it will 
go to Congress for action by October 1 Marshalls 
Foreign Secretary Debrum says if the U.S. Congress 
does not approve the Compact by that date, his gov-
ernment will declare its independence from the U.S. 
and then negotiate arrangements through a treaty with 
the u S.73 
JUNE During the third week of June, mem-
bers of the Kwajalein Atoll Corporation, proclaiming 
Operation Homecoming, sailed to Kwajalein Island, 
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Roi Namur and several other islands. At least 800 
women, men and children set up shelters on these 
islands for an "indefinite" stay, Ataji Balos announced. 
They stated that they were upset by the crowded and 
unsanitary conditions on Ebeye and wished to be 
home where there is more space and better living 
conditions. They also resent the Compact signed by 
the U.S. and the Marshall Islands Government without 
their approval. Balos, who resigned as Minister of 
Security in the Marshall Islands Government, said 
most important was the issue of giving the Kwajalein 
landowners an opportunity to vote on the continued 
use of the lagoon for tests of U.S. missiles. Mrs. Balos 
added: "As a wife and mother, I wish nuclear weapons 
delivery system testing would stop at Kwajalein 
forever ... " 
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PART Ill: THE COMPACT 
OF FREE ASSOCIATION 
A. GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNMENT RELATIONS 
From the Compact: 
Self-Government 
Section 111 
"The peoples of Palau, the Marshall Islands and the 
Federated States of Micronesia, acting through the 
Governments established under their respective Const1 
tutions, are self gouernmg. 
Foreign Affairs 
Section 121 
"(a) The Governments of Palau, the Marshall Islands 
and the Federated States of Micronesra have the capacity 
to conduct foreign affairs and shall do so in their own name 
and right, except as otherwise provided in this Compact. 
"(b) The foreign affairs capacity of the Governments of 
Palau, the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of 
Micronesia includes: 
(1) the conduct of foreign affarrs relating to law 
of the sea and marine resources matters, 
1nclud1ng the harvesting, conservation, 
exploration or exploitation of living and non 
/ruing resources from the sea, seabed or sub 
soi/ to the full extent recognized under inter 
national law; 
(2) the conduct of their commercial, diplomatic, 
consular, economic, trade, banking, postal, 
civil aviation, communications, and cultural 
relations, including negotiations for the 
receipt of developmental loans and grants 
and the conclusion of arrangements with 
other governments . and international and 
intergovernmental organizations, including 
any matters specially benefiting their 
individual citizens ... 
Authority and Responsibility 
Section 313 
"Governments of Palau, the Marshall Islands and the 
Federated States of Micronesia shall refrain from actions 
which the government of the United States determines, 
after appropriate consultation with those governments, to 
be incompatible with its authority and responsibility for 
security and defense matters ... " 
INTRODUCTION TO PART Ill 
In PART Ill certain sections of the Compact of Free 
Association and the Subsidiary Agreements with 
Palau, the Federated States of Micronesia and the 
Marshall Islands are selected for comment. PART Ill 
does not attempt to survey the entire Compact or the 
complete Subsidiary Agreements. 
Some of the sections were chosen because they deal 
with subjects about which people have been asking 
questions, some raise questions of conflict within the 
Compact itself or with other documents such as the 
constitutions already adopted; some because they 
seem likely to have the greatest impact on the future of 
the people of Micronesia. 
Some of the agreements were still in draft form as 
this booklet was printed. 
HOW TO USE PART Ill: 
On the left side of the pages are the selections from 
the Compact and the Subsidiary Agreements. The 
right-hand columns contain a discussion of the 
Implications of these excerpts. In addition, in boxes 
throughout PART Ill there are articles and excerpts 
from longer sources that relate to topics discussed. 
This booklet is not intended for scholars or law 
students, but for the use of the people most directly 
affected by any change in the political status of 
Micronesia-the Micronesians themselves, and for 
others who may be concerned and interested. 
Implications: 
1. Although Section 121 (a) states the Marshall 
Islands, Palau and the Federated States of Micronesia 
(FSM) will have full control over foreign affairs, the 
U.S. can veto any activity that is in conflict with U.S. 
military authority. Any foreign affairs action (possibly 
including business agreements or treaties with foreign 
countries) by the FSM, Palau or the Marshall Islands 
can be vetoed by the U.S. 
2. The Reagan administration in 1982 rejected the 
Law of the Sea Treaty, which developed out of 10 years 
of negotiations among 160 nations. The U.S. attitude 
toward the Law of the Sea makes it difficult, if not 
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From the Compact: 
Environmental Protection 
Section 161 
"The Governments of the United States, Palau, the 
Marshall ls/ands and the Federated States of Micronesia 
declare that it is their po/icy to promote efforts to prevent or 
eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and to 
enrich understanding of the natural resources of Palau, the 
Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia. 
In order to carry out this policy, the Government of the 
United States and the Governments of Palau, the Marshall 
ls/ands and the Federated States of Micronesia agree to 
the following mutual and reciprocal undertakings. 
"(a) The Government of the United States: 
(1) shall continue to apply the environmental 
controls in effect on the day preceding the 
effective date of this Compact to those of its 
continuing activities ... 
(2) shall apply the National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1969 ... to its activ1tres under the 
Compact and its related agreements as if 
Palau , the Marshall ls/ands and the Fed 
erated States of Micronesia were the U111ted 
States; 
"(e) The President of the United States may exempt any 
of the activ1t1es of the Government of the United States 
under thrs Compact and rts related agreements from any 
environmental standard or procedure which may be 
applicable . . if the President determines it to be in the para-
mount interest of the Government of the United States to 
do so, consistent with Title Three of this Compact and the 
obligations of the Government of the United States under 
111ternational law. Prior to any decision pursuant to this 
subsection, the view of the affected Government of Palau, 
the Marshall Islands or the Federated States of Micronesia 
shall be sought and considered to the extent practicable. If 
the President grants such an exemption, to the extent prac 
t1cable a report with his reasons for granting such exemp 
tron shall be given promptly to the affected Government . . 
Section 162 
"The Government of Palau, the Marshall Islands or the 
Federated States of Micronesia may bring an action for 
Judicial review of any administrative agency action or any 
activity of the Government of the United States pursuant to 
Sections 161(a), 161(d), or 16l(e) or for enforcement of the 
obligations of the Government of the United States arising 
thereunder. The United States District Court for the 
District of Hawaii and the United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia shall have jurisdiction over such 
action or activity .. 
"(b) actions brought pursuant to this Section may be ini-
tiated only by the Government concerned; 
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GLO$SARY 
EIS: Environmental Impact Statement 
EPA: Environmental Protection Agency 
NEPA: National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 
Implications: 
impossible, to analyze conflicts between the FSM and 
Palau constitutions' marine sovereignty claims and the 
policy of the U.S. government on this issue. The two 
subsidiary agreements on Marine Sovereignty 
(initialed in 1980 by the FSM and Palau) do modify the 
Palau and FSM constitutional claims for jurisd iction 
over archipelagic areas. But the extent of the 
modificat ion is ambiguous and subject to various 
interpretations depending on the fate of the Law of the 
Sea Treaty. While other nations are moving ahead to 
ratify the Treaty, there is a question as to what extent 
the U.S. will abide by the Law of the Sea Treaty. (For a 
thoughtful discussion on the relationship among the 
FSM and Palau constitutions, the two Marine 
Sovereignty agreements and the Law of the Sea, see 
International Law Professor, Roger Clark's: "The 
Current State of the T rust Territory Negotiations: Who 
has Tentatively Agreed to What?", August 1981, 34 
pages. Available from MSC). 
3. A 1981 U.S. Supreme Court decision on a case 
involving nuclear weapons storage in Hawaii, (catholic 
Action vs. Weinberger. et al) would appear to cancel 
the environmental protection gains in Section 161 (a) 
1, 2, 3, and the freedom of the FSM, Palau and the 
Marshall Islands to gain information on military and 
other facilities operated by the U S. (Section 163). 
Section 161 states the U.S. must abide by NEPA 
regulations, including preparing an Environmental 
Impact Statement (EIS) on proposed activities. In 
addition to providing information on U.S. projects. the 
EIS process allows for public involvement and review 
of activities that could be hazardous to people, the land 
and reefs. Overriding the Compact provisions. the U.S. 
Supreme Court ruled, in the Hawaii case, that the 
military does not need to file an EIS "on matters that 
are specifically authorized by Executive Order to be 
kept secret in the interest of national defense or 
foreign policy .. " Because of Micronesia's strategic 
importance to the U.S., it is likely that information 
relating to military plans in Micronesia will be 
classified, thus exempting U .S. activities from 
enviromental assessments and public review. 
(See Nuclear weapons and Waste.) 1 Note that 
individuals may not file court suits under Section 161 -
only the FSM, Palau and the Marshall Islands 
governments may. 
PART Ill 
From the Compact: 
Section 163 
"(a) For the purpose of gathering data necessary to 
study the environmental effects of activities of the Govern 
ment of the United States subject to the requirements of 
this Article, the Governments of Palau. the Marshall 
ls/ands and the Federated States of Micronesia shall be 
granted access to facilities operated by the Government of 
the United States rn Palau, the Marshall ls/ands and the 
Federated States of Micronesia, to the extent necessary for 
thrs purpose, except to the extent such access would 
unreasonably interfere with the exercise of the authority 
and responsibi/rty of the Government of the United States 
under Title Three (Defense) ... 
General Legal Provisions 
Section 173 
"The Governments of the Unrted States, Pa/au, the 
Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia 
agree to adopt and enforce such measures, consistent with 
this Compact and rts related agreements, as may be neces 
sary to protect the personnel, property, instnllations, ser 
vices, programs and official archives and documents main 
tained by the Government of the United States rn Palau, 
the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of 
Micronesia ... " 
GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNMENT RELATIONS • J1 
Implications: 
4. Additionally, Section 163 (a) allows the FSM, 
Palau and the Marshall Islands access to U.S. facilities 
for information, "except to the extent such access 
would unreasonably interfere with the exercise" of 
U.S. military activities. It appears. once again, that the 
decision as to what constitutes "unreasonable 
interference" rests with the U.S .. regardless of the 
importance such information may have for the FSM. 
Palau or the Marshall Islands. 
5. Compact Section 161 (e) grants the U S 
President the power to exempt any U.S activity from 
environmental protection laws or regulations (See 
Section E. Nuclear Weapons and Waste for the only 
exception to this) Any operation in "the paramount 
interest" of the U.S. may be exempted from these laws. 
The U.S. is required to consider the views of the 
Marshall Islands, FSM and Palau but only "to the 
extent practicable." 
6. Section 177 is important as the U.S.recognizes 
its responsibility not only to compensate people 
whose health and islands were harmed by nuclear 
testing, but also to provide continuing medical 
treatment The U.S "accepts responsibility for 
compensation owing to citizens of the Marshall 
Islands. the Federated States of Micronesia and Palau" 
(emphasis added). Perhaps this is an 
acknowledgement that other islands, in addition to the 
Marshal ls, are affected by the radioactive fallout from 
the 66 nuclear tests conducted at Bikini and Enwetak 
between 1946 and 1958. Nevertheless. only the 
Marshall Islands has signed a subsidiary agreement 
providing specific compensation (see page 32, Finan-
cial Provisions for the Marshall Islands agreement) 
Sources 
'Catholic Action vs Weinberger et al 102 S Ct 197 1981 
LAW OF THE SEA FORECASTS FUTURE CONFLICTS OF U.S. AND MICRONESIAN INTERESTS 
"The Joint Committee's experience regarding law of 
the sea is an important landmark. It was the first real 
assertion of Micronesian interests in an international 
forum ... It is a lesson in our future political relationship 
with the United States government... The law of the sea 
experience has demonstrated that in practice the 
United States cannot be expected to protect our exter-
nal interests. At the Conference, the U.S. did nothing 
to protect Micronesia's law of the sea interests and in 
fact obstructed Micronesia's efforts to protect itself ... 
"The heart of the problem is that the United States is 
a giant nation with a vast array of interests to protect. In 
exercising Micronesia's foreign policy as proposed in 
status negotiations, its interests would likely become 
one very minor part of a large, complicated equa-
tion ... Concerning law of the sea, for example, the U.S. 
has mining interests, petroleum interests. coastal and 
distant water fishery interests. military interests, and 
interests in maintaining the respect of other members 
of the world community, to name just a few .... If 
Micronesia's interests were ever seriously considered, 
they were discarded in the process of moulding U.S. 
law of the sea policy. 
"Under the circumstances. the U.S. can be expected 
to protect Micronesia's international interests only 
when they complement U.S. interests, which. in the 
nature of things is not likely to be often." 
Summary Report. Congress of Micronesia Joint Committee on Law of the Sea. 
January 1, 1975, p 24-25 
PAP.T Ill COMPACT 
B. FINANCIAL 
PROVISIONS 
Section 211 
"(u) 2 3 .Ouer this fifteen year perrod, the Gouernment 
of I he Marshall Islands f and 3 I he Gauer nm en I of the 
F·ederoted States of Mic ronesra} shull dedicute on auerage 
o/ 110 less than 40 per( en/ of these (bosic grunt) amounts" 
(to the "Capital Account" for the construction or ma1or 
1 eprn1 of cc1p1t ul rn/rasl rucl ure and pub/re and private 
"l't tur projects rdc>nlrfred rn the offrcral ouerall economic 
dec dopment pion): 
"(I>) The nnnuo/ e.\f>endrlure of the grant amounts 
-..penfied for the rnpil o/ account rn Seel 1011 211 ( ci) ( aboue) 
Ii~ the GoL,ernmenls of Pu/cw. I he Mm slwll Islw1ds and the 
feeler ol ed St al es of Mrn onesra slwll be in uccordcmce with 
offr< ro/ overall econo1111c deuelopmenl p/cms prou1ded by 
thl''il' Gouernmenls ond cone urred 111 by the Gouemment 
of the Unrted Stull''> prror lo the effectrue elate of this 
Compact These p/uns muy be amended from trme to lrme 
l>v the Gouemments of Pa/cw, the Mwsholl Islcmds or the 
f"ederoted Stoles of Mic ronesra. 
Section 212 
'(o) The Gouer nment of the United States shall 
unnp/ele in Palclll the capital inf rastruc lure projects set 
forth in a separate agreement u.,hich shall come into effect 
'.>rnw//oneous/y with this Compact. The separate 
ugreement shall a/so specify the plan for execution, timing 
ond management of project conslruc/1011, orrangemenls 
for the reuiew ond subsl1lul ion of priorities cmd projects. an 
operalrons mainlenonce plan . 
Section 221 
''(o) The Gouernment of the United States shall make 
ournlable to Palau, the Marshall Islands and the Federated 
Stoles of Micronesia .. the services and related programs: 
(I) of the US Weather Seruice; 
(2) of the Unrted States Federal Emergency 
Management Agency; 
(3) prouided pursuant to the Posta/...Act ... 
(4) of the United States Federal Auiation 
Administration; and 
(5) of the United States Ciuil Aeronautics Board or 
its successor agencies. 
Section 223 
"The citizens of Palau, the Marshall Islands and the 
Federated States of Micronesia who are receiuing post 
secondary educa/1onal assistance from the Gouernment of 
the United Stales on the day preceding the effectiue date of 
this compact shall continue to be eligible, if otherwise 
qualified, to rece1ue such assistance to complete their 
academic programs for a maximum of four years after the 
effect1ue date of this Compact. 
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0 Rubinstein 
GLOSSARY 
Capital Improvements/Infrastructure: roads, ports 
buildings, sewers, water system, etc. 
Implications: 
1 Section 211 (a) and {b) says that the 40% of the 
basic grants going to capital improvements and public 
and private sector projects shall be spent according to 
economic development plans provided by the 
Federated States of M1crones1a (FSM), Marshall 
Islands and Palau and "concurred in by the Govern-
ment of the United States prior to the effective date of 
this Compact ... "This raises questions about possible 
U.S. veto power over long range economic plans of the 
Marshall Islands, Palau and the FSM. If the U.S. does 
not agree with the development plans. will the money 
still be available? 
2 The U.S. has been criticized by U.N. experts and 
Micronesi::111s for its failure to develop a self-reliant 
economic base for the Micronesian governments. 
Some critics have said the U S deliberately neglected 
developing the economy to discourage the possibility 
of independence which would Jeopardize U.S. military 
plans Since 1947, all decisions regarding economic 
assistance and development priorities have been made 
in Washington, D C with no control by Micronesia. 
The product of this outside control is evident: As 
recently as the 1981 U.N. Trusteeship Council 
meeting, leaders from the FSM, Palau and the Marshall 
Islands pointed to serious economic problems 
plaguing their governments. Allowing the U.S. 
continuing control of development plans as in Section 
211 (b) appears to be an infringement on the rights of 
the FSM, Marshall Islands and Palau to self-determine 
their future economic policies. 
3. As 40% of the basic grants are to be used for 
programs described in the FSM, Palau and Marshall 
Islands official development plans, an evaluation of the 
Compact without assessing these development plans 
will be incomplete How was this percentage chosen? 
PAAT Ill COMPACT 
Palau Produce Market-L Learned-Sims 
From the Compact: 
Section 227 
"In recogn1t1on of the speoal deuelopment needs of the 
Federated States of M1crones1a, the gouernment of the 
United States shall make aua1lable U111ted States military 
Ciu1c Action teams for use 111 the Federated States of 
Micronesia under terms and conditions specified 111 a 
separate agreement. .. 
Section 231 
"Upon the thirteenth anniuersary of the effectiue date of 
this Compact, the Gouernment of the Unrted States and 
the Governments of Palau, the Marshall Islands cmd the 
Federated States of Micronesia shall commence 
negotiations regarding those prouisions of this Compact 
which expire on the fifteenth an111uersary of its effectiue 
date. If these negot1at1ons are not concluded by the 
fifteenth anniuersary of the effect11Je date of this Compact, 
the period of negot1at1ons shall ex.tend for not more than 
two additional years, during which time the prou1s1ons of 
this Compact 111cluding Title Three (Defense) shall remain 
in full force and effect During this additional period of 
negotiations, the Gouernment of the United States shall 
continue its assistance to the gouernments with which it 1s 
negotiating pursuant to this Section at a leuel which is the 
auerage of the annual amounts granted pursuant to 
Sections 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, and 216 during the first 
fifteen years of this Compact (See chart) 
Section 233 
"The Government of the Unrted States, 111 consultation 
with the Government of Palau, the Marshall Islands and 
the Federated States of Micronesia shall determine and 
implement procedures for the periodic audit of all grants 
and other assistance .. and of all funds expended for the 
services and programs prouided ... 
Section 236 
"Approual of this Compact by the Gouernment of the 
Unrted States shall constitute a pledge of the full faith and 
credit of the U111ted States for the full payment of the 
amounts specified .. The obligation of the United 
States ... shall be enforceable m the United States Court of 
Claims ... " 
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Implications: 
4 More than $500 million will be spent on capital 
improvements during the 15 years of the Compact. But 
large scale capital infrastructure cannot automatically 
be equated with meeting essential needs and spurring 
economic development (See box.) 
5 U S. military Civic Action teams (Seabees) will be 
made available to the FSM , according to Section 227, 
for construction and other development assistance 
Why are M1crones1ans not being trained for this work? 
6. Section 217 provides that all U.S grants. 
excepting military land use payments and grants for 
scholarships. health and maritime zone surveillance. 
will be adiusted for inflation each fiscal year by a 
maximum of 7%. As the annual inflation rate 1s 
currently above 10%, this means that the FSM, Ml, and 
Palau will actually lose money by 1982 inflation levels. 
7 The intent of Section 236 is to protect the grant 
assistance provisions of the Compact. as far as legally 
possible, from cuts dunng the U.S. Congressional 
appropriations process. It 1s not clear whether the "full 
faith and credit" pledge of the U S is legally effective. 
but at least 1t strengthens the political pos1t1on of the 
Marshall Islands, FSM and Palau governments (Clark 
- Who has Agreed to What?) 
LARGE SCALE PROJECTS 
INSURE DEPENDENCE 
Because of Micronesia's limited productive base, 
large scale infrastructure projects increase 
consumption without creating the corresponding 
production to pay for it. An example in Truk illustrates 
this: 60% of all electricity is used by the government 
and in private homes. This electricity is used by a small 
proportion of Truk's population mostly for air 
conditioning and lighting. Private businesses use 
about 34% of Truk's electricity for marketing their 
products, primarily in refrigerating perishable 
imported food. But only 6% of the electricity in Truk is 
used in processing and exporting local goods (for 
example, refrigerating fish for sale to local and foreign 
markets). This bias toward consumption over 
production further magnifies an already serious deficit 
in the balance of trade. 
Large scale projects, instead of encouraging self-
sustaining growth, only insure continued dependence, 
primarily because they require large operating and 
maintenance subsidies, create further trade deficits 
and afford no means of replacement. These are 
burdens beyond Micronesia's resources and 
necessitate the continuation of American aid.1 
1Henry Schwalbenberg. Compact Memo #6, "Capital Improvement Projects," 
Micronesian Seminar, Truk 1962 
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MARSHALL ISLANDS 
RADIATION COMPENSATION 
From the Compact: 
Agreement Between the 
Government of the United States 
and the Government of the 
Marshall Islands for the 
Implementation of Section 177 
of the Compact of 
Free Association 
PREAMBLE 
The GOL ernment of the United States and the Gouern· 
ment of the Marshall Islands.· 
.. .In recognition of the authontv and responsibility of 
the Gouernment of the Marshall ls/ands to prouide medical 
and health care to all of the people of the Marshall Islands; 
In recognition of the expressed desire of the Gouern· 
ment of the Marshall Islands to include in its integrated, 
comprehensiue and tm1versal medical health care system 
the health care and surveillance programs and radiological 
monitoring act1uities contemplated by United States Public 
Law 95 134 and United States Public Law 96 205; and ... 
Article I 
Section 1 
The Gouernment of the United States shall prouide on a 
grant basis $30 million to be paid as follows: 
(a) $4 million anmially for fiue years commencing on the 
effective date of this Agreement, and 
(b) $1 million annually for ten years commencing on the 
fifth anniuersary of the effect1ue date of this Agreement 
Section 2 
Before the first anniversary of the effect1ue date of this 
Agreement, the Gouernment of the United States shall 
honor the request of the Gouernment of the Marshall 
Islands to provide a Whole Body Counter, including 
training of an operator, to be located in a suitable facility 
chosen and supplied by the Gouernment of the Marshall 
ls/ands. 
Article II 
In recognition of certain unique needs and cir-
cumstances, particularly with respect to the people of 
Bikini, Enewetak, Ronge/ap and Utirik, resulting from the 
nuclear testing program, the Gouernment of the United 
States shall prouide· 
Implications: 
1. The U.S. will provide the Marshall Islands 
Government (MIG] with $30 million over 15 years for 
medical treatment and monitoring program for 
radiation affected people the medical program will 
apply to 
2. For the Enewetak people, the agreement 
provides; 
$500,000 to the MIG to continue planting and 
agriculture activities on Enewetak. 
free food supplies for one year, and then a sum 
of $7.2 million will be given to the MIG for 
continuing the food program for 10 years, 
$16 million in a fund provided over a five year 
period: 
3 For the Bikini people, the agreement provides; 
free food supplies for one year and then a sum 
of $9 million will be given to the MIG for 
cont inuing the food program for 1 O years, 
$25 m1ll1on in a fund provided over a five-year 
period. 
A U.S. commitment to provide funds for the 
resettlement of B1k1n1 Atoll .at a time which 
cannot now be determined 
4. For the Rongelap people , the agreement 
provides 
$15 million in a fund to be provided over a five 
year period. 
5. For the Utirik people, the agreement provides: 
$10 million in a fund over a five year period. 
6. For the Marshall Islands Government, the 
agreement provides: 
• $34 million in a fund over a f ive year period, to 
be used· 
- $4 million to (a) settle land claims on 
Kili/Jaluit/Ujelang & Ejit Island (b) conduct 
a radiological survey of the Marshal l islands 
within two years, 
- $30 million to compensate all claims not 
specified in the agreement, for people living 
on atolls other than Bikini, Enewetak, 
Rongelap & Utink, 
PART Ill COMPACT 
From the Compact: 
Section I 
A direct grant of $500,000 to the Government of the 
Marshall Islands to continue the planting and agricultural 
maintenance program at Enewetak Atoll. 
Section 2 
Food supplies until the first anniversary of the effective 
date of this Agreement to enable the Government of the 
Marshall Islands to continue the existing food programs 
established for the people of Enewetak at Enewetak Atoll 
at the level provided during the year preceding the effective 
date of this Agreement. On the first annrversary of the 
effective date of this Agreement, the Government of the 
United States shall pay into the distribution to be 
established in accordance with Section 4(8)(2) of 
this Article the sum of $7.2 million, which sum shall be 
devoted exclusively to the continuation of the Enewetak 
people's food programs for a period of not less than 10 
years. 
Section 3 
Food supplies until the first anniversary of the effective 
date of this Agreement to enable the Government of the 
Marshall Islands to continue the existing food programs 
established for the people of B1ki111 at Kili Island and for the 
people of Bikini at other locations as may be determined by 
the Government of the Marshall ls/ands, at the level 
provided during the year preceding the effective date of this 
Agreement. On the first anniversary of the effective date of 
this Agreement, the Government of the United States shall 
pay into the distribution to be established in accordance 
with Section 4(B)(l) of this Article the sum of $9.0 million, 
which sum shall be devoted exclusively to the continuation 
of the Bikini people's food programs for a period of not less 
than 10 years. 
Section 4 
The sum of $66 million (the distribution) for the benefit of 
the people of Bikini, Enewetak, Rongelap and Utirik. 
(a) The Government of the United States shall provide 
$33 million of the distribution by the first anniversary of this 
Agreement and $6. 6 million annually thereafter for each of 
the next five years. 
(b) The annual amounts shall be paid to owners in pro-
portion to their respective percentage share of the total 
distribution. The distribution shall be owned as follows: 
(1) by the people of Bikini, $25 million; 
(2) by the people of Enewetak, $16 million; 
(3) by the people of Rongelap, $15 mi/Iron; 
(4) by the people of Utirik, $10 mi/Iron; 
(c) No owner of any portion of the distribution shall have 
control over any other portion. 
(d) The distribution and any earnings derived therefrom 
may be used for special needs, including education and 
island rehabilitation, as each owner may dictate, and dis· 
tributed or reinvested as each owner may determine. 
(e) The distribution and any earnings derived shall not 
be taxable by the Government of the United States, to the 
extent that: 
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Implications: 
7. Approval of the Compact, which includes this 
subsidiary agreement, will absolve the U.S. from any 
past or future claims that may arise as a result of 
nuclear testing. In other words, if the compact is 
approved, people give up their right to sue for 
compensation in the courts- this includes any lawsuits 
that are currently in courts. If the Compact is not 
approved, then it will still be possible to file lawsuits in 
the future. 
8. The U.S. is offering to the Marshall Islands 
Government a $30 million medical program and about 
$100 million in compensation to the people of 
Rongelap, Utirik, Bikini and Enewetak and the MIG. 
The U.S. will have no further responsibility for medical 
aid or for compensation claims after the Compact is 
approved.The lawsuits that have been or are in the 
process of being filed for people in the Northern 
Marshall Islands are seeking much greater 
compensation amounts - approximately $6 billion. 
There is no guarantee of winning through the courts, 
but the lawsuits are asking for much more and include 
people from approximately 16 atolls and islands; while 
the agreement names only four atolls. 
9. If the U.S. Congress ratifies these agreements. it 
thereby signifies its intent to appropriate the annual 
amounts, but no Congress can bind a future Congress 
on appropriations. 
-
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From the Compact: 
(I) those earnings denue from inuestment in 
111slrw11ents of the Gouernment of the United Stoles and 
other 1nuestments as moy otherwise be mutuolly ogreed; 
ond 
(2) the di~tnbut1on remains intact in an institution ir. 
the U111ted States . This provision 1s without pre1ud1ce to the 
obi/1tv of the owners lo redistribute all or a portion of the 
d1 .... 1nb1111on and its emnings to 111d1u1dtwls or other entities 
The 1ed1strib11tion trnnsoction itself shall not be taxable by 
the Gmwr111ne11/ of I he U111ted States. but. after redis · 
I 11b11t1011. the earnings of such redistributed funds shall be 
to\ olile. 
Article Ill 
The slim of $34 m1/11011 for utilization by the Government 
of tlw Morsha/l lslands in implementation of its programs 
011d seru1ces related to the consequences of the nuclear 
testing program. The Gouernment of the Marshall Islands 
...,/Jo// allocate. as it moy deem proper, this d1stribut1on 
omong the following three categories of programs: 
Section I 
The Slim of $4 m1/11011 to be poid on the effective date of 
this Agreement · 
(o) As compensation for t1se of lands on which the 
people of the Marshol/ Islands have been resettled as a 
result of the nuclear test1r1g program. The Government of 
the Mwsha/l lslands shall t1se such compensation to settle 
all clwms to ownership of such lands, including its claim to 
r11l>/1c lands m Ki/1 Island. Lhelong Island, Ejit Island and 
pmc els of land known a ; "Kojokor We to" in Jaluit Atoll. 
Det<>rm1nat1on ond settlement of such claims shall be in 
on ordonce with the constitut1onal processes of the 
Mm-,Jwll Islands. 
(h) To conduct a survey and analysis of the radiolog1cal 
status of the Marshall Islands withrn two years after the 
c>ff<'c t1ue date of this Agreement. If requested by the Gou· 
ernment of the Marshall Islands, the Gouernment of the 
Ur11ted States may provide such technical assistance for 
this pt1rpose as 1s mutt1ally agreed. 
Section 2 
The sum of $30 million shall be paid to the Government of 
the Marshall Islands to compensate for all claims resulting 
from the nuclear testmg program which are not otherwise 
compensated pursuant to this Agreement. The Govern· 
ment of the Marshall Islands shall establish and implement 
procedures m accordance with its constitutional processes 
for the settlement of these claims. When oil claims have 
been duly considered by the Government of the Marshall 
Islands, the Government of the Marshall Islands shall 
certify to the Government of the United States that it has 
completed its constitut 1onal processes for the settlement of 
all claims. Upon such certification the Government of the 
Umted States shall pay the total sum to the Government of 
the Marshall Islands. Any portion of this sum which is not 
distributed for the compensation and settlement of all 
claims shall reuert to the Gouernment of the Marshall 
Islands. 
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From the Compact: 
Article IV 
The Government of the Umted States reaffirms its 
commitment to provide funds for the resettlement of Bikmi 
Atoll by the people of Bik1rn at a time which cannot now be 
determmed. 
Article VI 
The Government of the Marshall Islands shall have the 
exclusive responsibility, w1d the Government of t he United 
Stales shall be relieued of any responsibility, for the utiliza· 
t1011 of oreas in the Marshall Islands affected by the nuclear 
test111g program. The Gouernment of the Morsha/l lslands 
affirms that the assistance to be prou1ded by the 
Government of the United States m the exercise of such 
respons1b1/ity 1s set forth in full in this Agreement. 
Article IX 
Section I 
This Agreement constitutes the full settlement of all 
claims, past, present and future, of the Government of the 
Marshall Islands and its citizens and nationals which are 
based upon, arise out of, or are in any way related to the 
nuclear test mg program, and which are against the United 
States, its agents, employees, contractors and citizens and 
nationals, and of all claims for eqt1itable or other 1udic1al 
relief 111 connection with such claims including any of those 
claims which may be pending or which may be filed m any 
court or other judicial or adm1mstrotive forum, mcludmg 
the courts of the Marshall Islands and the courts of the 
United States and its political subdivisions. 
Section 2 
The Government of the Marshall Islands shall termmate 
any legal proceedings m the courts of the Marshall Islands 
against the United States, its agents, employees, 
contractors and c1t1zens and nationals, involving claims of 
the Government of the Marshall Islands, its c1t1zens and 
nationals, arismg out of the nuclear testing program and 
shall nullify all attachments or any 1udgments attained 
relatmg to such proceedings. 
Article X 
Subject to Article Vil/, m consideration for the payment 
of the amounts set forth m the Agreement, the Government 
of the Marshall Islands, on behalf of itself and its citizens 
and nationals, shall indemnify and hold harmless the 
Umted States, its agents, employees, contractors and 
citizens and nationals, from all claims set forth in Article IX 
of this Agreement, and all actions or proceedmgs which 
may hereafter be asserted or brought by or on behalf of the 
Government of the Marshall Islands, its citizens and 
nationals, m any court or other judicial forum based on, 
arising out of or in any way related to the nuclear testing 
program. 
PART Ill COMPACT FINANCIAL PROVISIONS• 37 
FINANCIAL PROVISIONS 
Funds to be provided to the Federated States, Marshall Islands and Palau during the 15 
year life of the Compact of Free Association: 
Palau 
Basic Grants1 $100,000,000 
Infrastructure 
Maintenance 
C ivic Action 
Team Operation' 
Military Land Use3 
Energy Production 1 
Communications 
Equipment' 
10,000,000 
5,500,000 
28,000,000 
3,750,000 
Totals2 $147,250,000 
1 All of these figures will be adjusted for inflation by a 
maximum of 7% a year (Section 217). and are from 
Compact Section 211, 212, 213, 214, and 215. 
2 In addition, during the first 15 years of the Compact 
(according to Section 216) the U.S. will provide to the 
Governments of Palau, the Marshall Islands and the 
Federated States of Micronesia, the following total 
grants, to be divided by a formula to be agreed upon by 
the three governments: 
(a) maritime zone enforcement 
(b) health and medical programs 
(c) scholarship fund 
$15 million 
$30 million 
$45 million 
3 $5.5 million for Palau is approximately $11 per acre 
per year, based on all exclusive/ non-exclusive/ joint 
use land: 
32,000 acres Babetdaob 
40 acres Malakai harbor 
1,240 acres Aira1 /Angaur airports 
Federated States 
Marshall Is. of Micronesia 
$336. 500, 000 $755,000,000 
14,000,000 
28,500,000 
28,000,000 42,000,000 
7,500,000 15,000,000 
$400,500,000 $826,000,000 
For years 16-50 of the Palau Military land Use Agree-
ment. the U.S. will provide to the Government of Palau 
$1 million annually for military impact assistance 
Depending on the magnitude of U.S use of military 
facilities in Palau, the U.S. may provide the Govern-
ment of Palau with additional compensation , i.e., any 
amount from nothing to a limit of $9 million a year. 
For years 16-50 of the Kwajalein Military Use Agree-
ment, the U.S. will provide to the Marshall Islands 
Government: 
(a) a fixed amount for military impact assistance 
of $1 .9 million annually; there is no specifica-
tion that these funds be provided to Kwajalein 
Atoll landowners. $1 .9 million is less than 1h the 
amount the U.S. is currently paying under the 
1981-82 Interim Use Agreement. 
(b) $7 1 million annually as a general economic 
aid grant, to be ad1usted for inflation by a 
maximum 7% a year. 
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From the Compact: 
Article XI 
All claims described in Articles IX and X of this 
Agreement shall be terminated. No court of the United 
States shall ha1.Je jurisdiction to entertain such cl01ms, and 
ony such claims pending in the courts of the United States 
shall be dismissed 
Article XII 
Section 1 
This Agreement shall come into effect simultaneously 
with the Compact and in accordance with the procedures 
ser forth 111 Section 411 of the Compact. 
Section 2 
This Agreement may be amended at any time by mutual 
lOnsent of the Go1.Jernment of the Marshall Islands and the 
Government of the United States. 
C. ENDING THE 
COMPACT 
From The Compact: 
Section 451 
"Should termination occur (by mutual agreement) 
economic assistance by the Government of the US shall 
continue on mutually agreed terms." 
Section 452 
"Should termination occur (by the US.) the following 
provisions of this Compact shall remain in full force and 
effect until the fifteenth anniversary ... of this Compact, and 
thereof ter as mutually agreed: 
(1) Article 6 (environmental protection) and Section 
172, 173, 176 and 177 (Legal Provisions); 
(2) Article 1 Section 233 of Title Two (Economic 
Grant Assistance), 
(3) Title Three (Defense and Security provisions); and 
(4) Article 2, 3, 5, and6of Title Four (Dispute Resolution, 
Amendment, Term111at1on and Definition of Terms) . 
Section 453 
"(a) should termination occur (by the FSM. Palau or the 
Marshall Islands) the follow111g prov1s1ons of this Compact 
shall remain in full force and effect until the fifteenth 
anniversary of the effective date of this Compact · 
(1) Article 6 (Environmental Protection) and Sections 
172, 173, 176 and 177 (Legal Provisions); 
(2) Title Three (Military Prov1s1ons), and 
(3) Articles 2, 3, 5, 6 of Title Four (D1sputf' Resolution, 
Amendment, Termmation and Definition of Terms) 
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Implications: 
ENDING THE COMPACT 
1. The termination provisions raise a number of 
points which relate to both money and military issues. 
2. Section 452 and 453 provide that if either the U.S. 
or the Federated States of Micronesia, Palau or the 
Marshall Islands decide to terminate the Compact 
before the 15 year period 1s up, the U.S 1s still 
obligated to continue economic assistance. This is a 
significant change as earlier Compact drafts permitted 
the U S to cut funds to 50% of amounts promised to 
any of the governments that terminated early . Section 
453(b) provides, however, that if the Marshall Islands, 
FSM or Palau terminates, during the remaining period 
funding levels are to continue "without diminution." 
Most of the grants will be adjusted for inflation by 7% 
as set out in Section 217 of the Compact 
3. As the right to terminate the Compact unilaterally 
at any time -- a power sought by the Micronesian 
negotiators since the start of the status negotiations --
is severely limited by Section 453(a). which states, 
among others. that the Military provisions "shall 
remain in full force and effect until the fiftenth 
anniversary ... of this Compact." It would appear that it 
is impossible to terminate the defense and other 
provisions before 15 years. 
4. Moreover, Section 454 states that the "separate 
agreements" concerning military land use and 
operating rights "shall remain in effect in accordance 
with their terms ... " These separate military use 
agreements have been or are being negotiated with the 
FSM, Palau and the Marshall Islands. The Government 
of Palau, in November1980, initialed an agreement 
granting the U.S 100 year military denial powers. In 
May 1982, the Government of the Marshall Islands 
signed a "Mutual Security" agreement, giving the U.S. 
permanent military denial rights. The U.S. is pressing 
the FSM to accept a similar arrangement, but as of 
June 1982, the FSM still refuses to agree to long term 
military denial rights . 
5. The U.S permanent demand for 100 years denial 
rights raises an important economic issue: because 
the Compact provides for funding only for a period of 
15 years, the denial provision could undermine the 
future bargaining power of the Marshall Islands, FSM. 
or Palau. The principal U.S. interest in Micronesia is 
strategic and the denial provision fullfills US. military 
ob1ectives of preventing any other nation from using 
the islands. without specific provisions for 
compensation of the FSM, Palau or Marshall Islands 
governments. (For Palau and the Marshalls additional 
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From the Compact: 
(b): Upon receipt of notice of termination (by the FSM, 
Palau, M.l) ... the government of the US. and the Govern 
ment so termrnating shall promptly consult with regard to 
their future relationship. These consultations shall 
determine the level of economic assistance which the 
Government of the US. shall provide to the Government 
so terminating . . provided that the annual amounts 
specified in Sections 211, 212(b), 214, 215 and 216 
shall continue without diminution 
Section 454 
"Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Compact· 
"(b) The separate agreements (military land use and 
operating rights) shall remain in effect in accordance with 
their terms which shall also determine the duration of 
Section 213 (Military Use payments)." 
From the Compact: 
MARSHALL ISLANDS-
U.S. MUTUAL SECURITY 
AGREEMENT 
Article 4(a): "If the Government of the United States 
determines that any third country seeks access to or use of 
the Marshall islands by military personnel or for military 
purposes, the Government of the United States has the 
authority and responsibility to foreclose such access or 
use, except in instances where, following the consultations 
referred to in paragraph b. (below) ... the two governments 
otherwise agree ... 
"(b): The Government of the Marshall Islands, in 
recognition of the obligations undertaken by the 
Government of the United States ... shall consult with the 
Government of the United States in the event a third 
country seeks such access or use. 
Article 5: "The Government of the United States and 
the Government of the Marshall Islands recognize that 
sustained economic advancement is a necessary 
contributing element to the attainment of the mutual 
security goals expressed in this Agreement. The 
Government of the United States reaffirms its continuing 
interest in promoting the long-term economic 
advancement and self sufficiency of the people of the 
Marshall Islands. 
Article 7: "This Agreement shall come into effect upon 
the expiration or termination of Title Three (Security and 
Defense) of the Compact of Free Association. 
Article 8: "This Agreement shall remain in full force 
and effect until terminated or otherwise amended by 
mutual consent." 
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financial compensation is provided for 50 years and 30 
years, respectively. (See Financial Provisions.) 
6. Will the U.S. return to early 1960's funding levels 
after the 15 year duration of Compact funding levels 
expire? 
7. While Section 443 grants the FSM, Palau and the 
Marshall Islands the power to terminate the Compact 
at any time, the military use and denial subsidiary 
agreements all last longer than the Compact and can 
not be affected by the FSM, Palau and the Marshalls if 
they choose to terminate the Compact If the Compact 
is approved, the military denial provisions for Palau 
will be in effect for 100 years. 
Implications: 
1. The Mutual Security Agreement grants the U.S. 
permanent military denial power over the Marshall 
Islands. Denial is the power to foreclose or deny 
access to the Marshall Islands to milita.ry personnel of 
any third country. 
2. Article 7 states that this Agreement comes into 
effect when the Compact Defense Title expires at the 
end of the Compact's 15 year life. The Marshall Islands 
Government does not retain the power to terminate 
this Agreement. Article 8 allows for amendment or 
termination only by mutual consent of the U.S. and 
Marshall Islands. Therefore. this Agreement provides 
the U.S. with permanent military denial power in the 
Marshalls. In view of the strong interest of the US. 
since World War II in keeping Micronesia exclusively 
for the U.S .• it is unlikely in the forseeable future that 
any U.S. Administration would decide to terminate this 
Agreement. 
3. The Military Use Agreement for Kwajalein Atoll is 
for 15 years and the U.S. has the option to renewfor35 
years more. Payments are specified for the use of the 
missile range during that time. Article 5 of the Mutual 
Security Agreement does not bind the U.S. to promote 
the economic advancement of the Marshallese, it 
merely notes the U.S.'s "continuing interest" in the 
long term economic advancement and self-sufficiency 
of the Marshallese. The lack of economic development 
throughout Micronesia under the Trusteeship 
Agreement which bound the U.S. to "promote the 
economic advancement and self-sufficiency" of the 
people is not a hopeful precedent. 
4. The permanent denial power granted in the 
Mutual Security Agreement could weaken or 
undermine the Marshall Islands' future bargaining 
position when the Compact funding levels expire. 
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D. MILITARY PROVISIONS 
LAND USE AND OPERATING RIGHTS 
GENERAL 
From the Compact: 
Authority and Responsibility 
Section 311 
"(a) The Gouernment of the United States has full 
outhority and responsibility for security and defense 
mat cers rn or relatrng to Palau, the Marshall ls/ands and the 
Federated States of M1crones1a. 
"(b) This authority and responsibility includes: 
(1) the obligation to defend Palau, the Marshall 
Islands and the Federated States of 
M1crones1a and their peoples from attack 
or threats thereof as the United States and 
its citizens are defended; 
(2) the option to foreclose access lo or use of 
Palau, the Marshall Islands and the 
Federated States of Micronesia by military 
personnel or for the military purposes of 
any third country; and 
(3) the option to establish and use military 
areas and facilities in Palau, the Marshall 
ls/ands and the Federated States of 
M1crones1a, sub1ect to the terms of the 
separate agreements referred to rn 
Sections 321 and 323 ... 
Section 312 
"'Sub1ect to the terms of any agreements negotiated .. the 
Gouernment of the United States may conduct within the 
lands, waters and airspace of Palau, the Marshall ls/ands 
and the Federated States of Micronesia the actiu1ties and 
operations necessary for the exercise of its authority and 
responsibility under this Title. 
Section 313 
"(a) The Gouernments of Palau, the Marshall ls/ands 
and the Federated States of Micronesia shall refrain from 
actions which the Gouernment of the United States deter-
mines, after appropriate consultation with those Gouern 
ments, to be incompatible with its authority and responsi-
bility for security and defense matters 1n or relating to 
Palau, the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of 
M1crones1a .. 
Implications: 
1. Although the United States has officially 
expressed future military interest in only Palau and the 
Marshall Islands, Section 354(b) notes the "existence 
of separate agreements with each" of the 
governments. The Compact military provisions only 
generally outline U.S. defense plans. It is the Military 
Use and Operating Rights Subsidiary Agreements 
which will define U.S. military power in the Marshall 
Islands, Palau and the Federated States of Micronesia 
(FSM). Thus. a thorough review of these separate 
agreements is necessary for understanding. 
2. In 1980, the U.S. demanded military denial rights, 
outlined in Section 311(b). in perpetuity - forever. 
Because this angered the Micronesian negotiators, the 
U.S later set a 100 year minimum time requirement for 
denial rights. The Compact itself, according to Section 
354(a) is a 15 year agreement. but the 100 year denial 
provisions the U.S. is demanding will change all this if 
approved by people in the FSM and Palau (the 
Marshall Islands has agreed to permanent denial) 
With most of the U.S. economic aid lasting only the 15 
year duration of the Compact, a permanent or 100 year 
denial prov1s1on could jeopardize the future 
bargaining position of the Marshall Islands, FSM and 
Palau. 
3. Section 312 provides the U.S. with power to 
conduct military activities in the FSM, Palau or 
Marshall Islands as long as they are deemed 
"necessary" for carrying out its "defense 
responsibility." Even if there is disagreement between 
the U.S. and the Marshall Islands or Palau over military 
operations, the U.S., under the terms of the Compact, 
is given authority to determine what are "necessary" 
activities. 
Section 312 not only allows the U.S. to conduct 
military maneuvers in the lands and waters of the 
Federated States of Micronesia. Palau and the 
Marshall Islands. but Section 315 gives the U.S. 
authority to bring foreign military personnel and 
warships for joint exercises into Palau, the FSM and 
the Marshalls. The island governments are given little 
power to control U.S. and foreign military operations 
in their islands according to Section 315. 
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From the Compact: 
Section 315 
"The Gouernment of the United States may inuite 
members of the armed forces of other countries to use 
military areas and facilities in Palau, the Marshall Islands or 
the Federated Stales of Micronesia, in con1unct1on with 
and under the control of United States Armed Forces. Use 
by units of the armed forces of other countries of such mili-
tary areas and facilities, other than for transit and ouer 
flight purposes, shall be sub1ect to consultation with and, rn 
the case of major units, approual by the Gouernment of 
Palau, the Marshall Islands or the Federated States of 
Mrcronesra ... 
Section 321 
Defense Facilities and 
Operating Rights 
"(a) Specific arrangements for the establishment and 
use by the Gouernment of the United States of military 
areas and facilities in Palau, the Marshall Islands or the 
Federated States of Micronesia are set forth in separate 
agreements which shall come into effect simultaneously 
with this Compact . . 
Defense Treaties and International 
Security Agreements 
Section 331 
" ... The Gouernment of the United States, exclusruely, 
sha/l assume and en1oy, as to Palau, the Marshall Islands 
and the Federated States of Micronesia, all obligations, 
responsibilities, rights and benefits of: .. . 
"(b) Any defense treaty or other international security 
agreement to which the Gouernment of the United States rs 
or may become a party which it determines to be applicable 
in Palau, the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of 
Micronesia, such a determination by the Gouernment of 
the United States shall be preceded by appropriate consul 
latron with the Gouernment of Palau, the Marshall Islands 
or the Federated States of Micronesia ... 
Section 354 
"(a) ... The prouisions of I his Tit le are binding for a period 
of fifteen years from the effecliue date of this Compact and 
thereafter as mutually agreed ... 
"(b) The Gouernment of the United States recog 
nizes ... in uiew of the existence of separate agreements with 
each of them pursuant to Sections 321and323, that, euen if 
this Title should terminate, any attack on Palau, the 
Marshall Islands or the Federated States of Micronesia 
during the period in which such separate agreements are in 
effect, would constitute a threat to the peace and security 
of the entire region and a danger to the United States. In the 
euent of such an attack, the Gouernment of the United 
States would take action to meet the danger to the United 
States and to Palau, the Marshall Islands and the 
Federated States of Micronesia in accordance with its con· 
stitutional processes." 
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GLOSSARY 
RIMPAC: Rim of the Pacific exercises. War games 
involving the U.S., Australia, New Zealand, Canada. 
Japan, which nave taken place since the early 1970s. 
ASW: Anti-submarine warfare. 
Implications: 
4. Only the use by the U.S. of military areas and 
facilities (Section 315) in the FSM, Palau or the 
Marshall Islands calls for consultation with the three 
governements. It appears that consultation with or 
approval of the FSM, Palau or Marshall Islands 
governments is needed for U.S. war training in the 
ocean surrounding the islands. From a geographical 
perspective, the FSM, Marshall Islands and Palau are 
more convenient than Hawaii for military training of 
Japanese, Australian, New Zealand or Asian naval 
forces. The only restriction placed on use of Palau, the 
Federated States of Micronesia and the Marshall 
Islands for training of foreign military is that "major 
units" must be approved by the governments of Palau, 
FSM and the Marshall Islands. No definition, however, 
is provided for "major units" in the Compact or Military 
Use and Operating Rights subsidiary agreements. 
Moreover. training involving anything less than "major 
units" requires only that the U.S. consult with the 
Micronesian governments. The Compact could 
stipulate that all foreign military training in must be 
approved by the Marshall Islands, Palau or the FSM but 
it does not. 
5. Section 331 (b) gives the U.S. authority to apply 
international defense treaties to Micronesia. The FSM, 
Palau and Marshall Islands governments must be 
"consulted" by the U S. but have no decision making 
power in the matter. Therefore, even if an international 
security treaty was viewed as contrary to the interests 
of people in Micronesia or an international treaty 
contravenes the FSM, Palau or Marshall Islands 
Constitution, the U.S. nevertheless retains the 
authority to apply such a treaty to the FSM, Palau or 
the Marshall Islands 
6. Military use of land and waters for training 
purposes can conflict with farming, fishing and other 
commercial activities of people in the Marshall Islands, 
FSM and Palau. The war training operations of the 
RIMPAC nations are an example of potential military 
activities the could be carried out in and around 
Micronesian waters. In 1982, RIMPAC exercises 
included the navies of Japan, the U.S., New Zealand, 
Australia and Canada, involving approximately 40 
warships, 200 aircraft and 20,000 Navy personnel. 
Training for all possible war situations included: 1) 
surface strike exercises; 2) marine submarine spotting 
and attacks; 3) air defense exercises; 4) electronic 
warfare. 1 During military war practice, accidents often 
occur. 
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As recently as 1981 , Japanese commercial 
fishermen reported thousands of dollars of damages 
as U.S. and Japan Navy warships on training 
PRIOR CONSULTATION· JAPAN'S EXPERIENCE 
There was the collision between a U.S. submarine 
and a Japanese freighter, and the Japan-U.S. com-
munique foul-up, followed by the foreign minister's 
resignation, coinciding with the suspected cutting of 
Japanese fishing nets by U.S. naval craft. And as if 
there were not enough hitches in Japan-U.S. relations, 
from Cambridge, Mass., came the authoritative voice of 
Professor Edwin 0. Reischauer, a former U.S. 
ambassador to Japan, about the apparent double talk 
the government of Japan had been giving the people. 
The elements of conflict in this case may be sorted 
out as follows: When the new security treaty went into 
effect in 1960, Japan wanted to make sure that no 
nuclear weapons would be brought into Japanese 
territory. Hence the notes exchanged between the two 
governments ... in which both agreed "major changes in 
the deployment into Japan of United States armed 
forces, major changes in their equipment...to be 
subjects of prior consultation with the Government of 
Japan." 
When such consultation was sought, theoretically, 
Japan was able to veto it, though in fact there has never 
been an instance of this agreement being invoked. A 
few years afterward, public opinion rose against the 
possibility of U.S. sea craft and aircraft which carried 
nuclear weapons, entering Japanese territory without 
"prior consultation." To calm the anti-nuclear sen-
timent, the government adopted the triple nuclear 
principle, which said Japan would not "manufacture, 
possess or bring in" nuclear weapons. What has posed 
problems is the third: not "bringing in" nuclear 
weapons ... 
How strictly is this stricture to be observed? Does it 
deny U.S. sea vessels and aircraft access to their own 
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maneuvers ripped apart more than 6,000 long line 
fishing nets. "I cannot understand why U.S. naval 
vessels are freely cruising around Japan, causing 
damage to our people," commented Japan Foreign 
Minister Sunao Sonoda about the joint naval drill 100 
miles off the coast of Japan.2 
7. Sections 311 and 354 note the U.S. will defend 
Palau, the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of 
Micronesia if there is an attack on the islands. 
Ironically, it is the U.S. military presence which makes 
Micronesia a target for an attack. Just as Japanese 
military bases in the Federated States, Marshall 
Islands and Palau drew the most devastating attacks 
from U.S. military forces during World War II , today 
U.S. bases and nuclear-powered and weapons-
carrying submarines and warships will be priority 
targets in a nuclear war. 
"'RIM PAC 82 Demonstrates Military Alliance of 5 Pac1f1c Rim Countries'', Han 
Genpatsu News, Tokyo January, 1982 
'"Tokyo Chides US Navy", Honolulu, Advert1SBr, May 18, 1981 
bases in Japan even in transit or for short visits for such 
purposes as repairs and rest and recreation for their 
crews? The official position of the government, as 
indicated domestically, had been a categorical no. 
On the other hand the U.S. has all along believed that 
the "prior consultation" requirement did not apply to 
these short visits or passages through Japanese terri-
torial waters. This has never been said officially in 
Washington, but this is what Professor Reischauer 
wanted to tell the people of Japan ... lf what [he] ... says 
is true, it means the government has been lying to the 
people ... 
But Professor Reischauer suggested another pos-
sibility: different interpretations of the Japanese ex-
pression and its supposed English counterpart. The 
Japanese word is " mochikomi" (bringing in) .. the 
English word is "introduction" ... ln U.S. usage, 
according to Professor Reischauer, " introduction" 
meant not mere transportation of something into 
Japanese territory but deployment of weapons in 
Japan ... 
The Japanese interpretation on the other hand, is 
all-inclusive, meaning any transfer of a nuclear 
weapon into any point in Japanese territory for any 
length of time. That U.S. armed forces have been 
acting according to this interpretation of the term 
"introduction" and of the "prior consultation" 
agreement received testimony from Admiral Gene R. 
LaAocque (Aet.) in September 1974 [who) pointed out 
the obvious impossibility of a U.S. aircraft carrier 
unloading its nuclear arsenal in the middle of the 
ocean before docking at Yokosuka. This week, he en-
dorsed Professor Reischauer's statements .... 
By Kiyoaki Murata. J~en T1mn, May 22. 1981 
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LAND USE AND OPERATING RIGHTS 
PALAU AGREEMENT 
From the Compact: 
Land Use and Operating 
Rights Within Defense Sites 
Article IV 
"1. The defense sites prou1ded by the Gouernment of Palau 
to the Gouernment of the United States described in the 
attached annexes are designated for the following 
categories of uses: 
"(a) Exc/usiue-use areas areas which are reserued 
exc/usiue/y for use by the Gouernment of the United States, 
subject to the /imitations set forth in this Agreement; 
"(b) Joint-use areas areas which may be used 1omtly 
by the Gouernment of Palau and the Gouernment of the 
United States, subject to the /1m1tations set forth in this 
Agreement; 
"(c) Nonexclusiue-use areas areas for intermittent 
use by the Gouernment of the United States, sub1ect lo the 
/imitations set forth in this Agreement ... 
[Exclusive-Use Areas: 
I. Malakai Harbor: 40 acres of dry and sub-
merged land 
2. Ngardmau: 1,400 acres 
3. Ngaremlengui: 600 acres 
4. Airai Airport: 65 acres 
5. Angaur Airport: 65 acres-Ed.) 
Military Use And 
Operating Rights Within 
Exclusive-Use Areas 
Article V 
"1. The Gouernment of the United States has access to 
and unrestricted control of all exc/usiue use areas, includ-
ing the right to control entry to and exit from any or all 
exclus1ue use areas and the right to take reasonable and 
necessary measures for their establishment, use and 
operation. The Gouernment of the United States may take, 
within the exclus1ue-use areas and within the seabeds, 
water areas and air space ad1acent to or in the uicm1ty of 
the exclusiue-use areas reasonable and necessary 
measures for their use, security and defense. These 
measures include the right: 
"(a) To maintain the exclus1ue-use areas and to 
construct structures and 1mprouements thereon, 
"(b) To improue and deepen the harbors, channels, 
entrances, and anchorages, to dredge and fill, and 
generally to fit the premises to their intended use, 
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EXCLUSIVE-USE IMPLICATIONS: Palau Defense Map 
1. Because of this authority the U.S. has the power 
to control the movement of people and boats in 
Malakai Harbor, in and around the ammunition storage 
and base support centers on Western Babeldaob and 
the exclusive use sections of the Airai and Angaur 
airports. "Exclusive Use" by definition means the 
Palauans will be excluded from these areas. 
2. Article 5, Section 1(b) gives the U.S. the power to 
dredge, fill, deepen and improve all the channels, 
entrances and anchorages in Malakai Harbor and 
adjacent to the sites in Ngeremlengui and Ngardmau. 
Dredging and filling are activities that can lead to 
serious environmental disruption of reef and marine 
areas. The Agreement gives the U.S. authority to " ... fit 
the premises to their intended use." Although the 
Compact establishes environmental controls, it also 
permits the President to waive these (Compact Section 
161 (e)) Section 314(e) of the Compact appears to offer 
Palauans protection by preventing the U.S. President 
frorr. exempting U.S. activities from environmental 
laws -- however, this applies only to the nuclear 
provisions in the Compact Section 314 and not to the 
Military Use Agreement. 
3. "Minimize" damage to lands and reefs and "avoid 
unreasonable" harm to the environment are 
ambiguous terms used in Article 5, Section 2. Nor are 
Palauans given any means for overseeing or enforcing 
the U.S "best efforts" to protect the lands and reefs. 
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"(c) To control, so for as may be required for the efficient 
operation of the exclus1ue use areas, anchorages and 
moorings, the movements of ships and waterborne craft, 
aircraft operations and land movements ... 
"2. In conducting activities in exclusive-use areas, the 
Government of the United States shall use its best efforts 
to: 
"(a) Avoid interferences with commercial activities in 
Palau; 
"(b) Avoid interferences with access by fishermen to 
shoreline areas; ... 
"(e) Minimize damage to the terrain and to reef areas; 
"(f) Avoid unreasonable harm to the environment, 
including water areas ... 
"3. The Government of Palau may use any exclusive-use 
area in any manner consistent with paragraph 4 of this 
Article. The Government of the United States may con-
d1t1on, limit or withdraw, temporarily or permanently, such 
authorization at any time ... 
"4_ Use by the Government of Palau, which may include 
making exclusive-use areas available to persons or entities 
authorized by the Government of Palau, shall be com-
patible with planned military act1v1t1es and the rights of the 
Government of the United States set forth in this 
Agreement . " 
Military Joint Use Okinawa- J1shu Koza 
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4. Because the base support sites in Ngardmau and 
Ngaremlengui will include weapons storage and very 
likely nuclear weapons stockpiling, these will be 
sensitive areas. requiring strict security, armed 
guards, double fencing and special lighting. 
5. Annex B of this Agreement lists maps showing 
"potential" construction of causeways from the 
Ngardmau and Ngaremlengui bases to piers outside 
the reefs for military vehicles including trucks with 
shipments of ammunition and other base support 
supplies. 
KWAJALEIN: AN exa.USIYE-USE ISLAND 
One of the ironies of the Kwajalein Missile Range is 
that the Marshallese are not permitted to live on, or 
spend the night on, Kwajalein Island. While American 
employees of the Missile Range live on Kwajalein, the 
Marshallese who own the land are not allowed to do so. 
Instead. they must commute by boat from Ebeye, three 
miles away. Nor are the Marshallese employees or 
other Micronesians allowed to use most facilities on 
Kwajalein. They cannot send their children to the 
schools on Kwajalein, as do the American employees, 
even though there is no high school for the thousands 
of young people on Ebeye. 
The Marshallese, even those employed as clerks in 
stores on Kwajalein, are not allowed to purchase foods 
or other materials. Thus a Marshallese clerk can sell 
goods to an American but cannot buy those goods for 
him or herself. Nor are they allowed to use the 
elaborate KMR hospital, except under unusual 
circumstances. Instead they must use the hospital on 
Ebeye, provided by the Trust Territory government, a 
grossly inferior, understaffed facility. 
Konrad Kotrady, M.0., told a U.S. House 
Subcommittee Hearing in 1976: "The Army's position 
was summed up to me one day when a high level 
command officer at Kwajalein remarked that the sole 
purpose of the Army at Kwajalein is to test missile 
systems. They have no concern for the Marshallese 
and it is not of any importance to their being at 
Kwajalein. " 
A true statement, but one which indicates that the 
U.S. has pigeonholded its responsibilities. By placing 
the Territory under the jurisdiction of the Interior 
Department, the U.S. has relieved all other agencies of 
any need to uphold the U.S. commitment to "accept as 
a trust the obligation to promote to the utmost the wen-
being of the inhabitants." 
-William Alexander, 1982. 
PART Ill COMPACT 
From the Compact: 
[Joint-Use Areas: 
I. All anchorages in Malakai Harbor; 
2. Roads connecting the two exclusive-use 
areas in Ngardmau and Ngaremlengai ; 
3. 555 acres in and around Airai Airport; 
4. 555 acres in and around Angaur 
Airport-Ed.] 
Military Use and Operating 
Rights Within Joint-Use Areas 
Article VI 
"I The Government of the United States shall have 
access to and use of joint use areas, including the right to 
take reasonable and necessary measures for their estab 
lishment, operation and maintenance. 
"(a) After consultation with the Government of Palau, 
the Government of the United States may take, w1th1n 
these areas and within the seabeds, water areas and arr 
space adjacent to or in the vicinity of these areas, 
reasonable and necessary measures for their use, security 
and defense . 
"2. In times of emergency, after consultation with the 
Government of Palau, the Government of the United 
States may, so far as may be reqwred for the efficient 
operation of those ;oint use areas and for the duration of 
the emergency, control the use of anchorages and 
moorings, the movement of ships and waterborne craft, 
aircraft operations and land movements .. 
"4. The Government of Palau may use any ;oint use area, 
including making such area available to persons or entities 
authorized by the Government of Palau, in any manner 
compatible with the rights of the Government of the United 
States set forth in this Agreement. The Government of 
Palau shall notify the Government of the United States of 
any intended use of such area and the Government of the 
United States shall not interfere with such use unless it is 
incompatible with the ability of the Government of the 
United States to carry out its military m1ss1on ... 
Annex D 
2. (The U S. rs granted) "Joint use of entire 01rfield area 
including right to extend runway to 12,000 feet, and the 
right to improve to meet military requirements and specifi· 
cations. If any extension of the runway displaces existing 
taro growing area, the Government of the United States 
shall provide for the construction of a comparable taro 
growing area on such land as is provided for that purpose 
by either the owner of the displaced taro-growing area or 
by any government entity in Palau. Any runway extension 
shall provide for land access between the lands on either 
side of the defense site." 
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ENVIRONMENTAL EXPLOITATION ANO LONG 
TERM DAMAGE 
"Current beneficial uses of the Kwajalein Atoll by 
KMR have been achieved at varying degrees of long 
term and possibly irreversible exploitation of the 
environment such as dredging and quarrying for build-
ing materials, landfilling for more dry land, and 
pumping the groundwater lens and covering the 
natural surface with concrete to obtain fresh water. 
Covering the soil with impermeable surfaces has 
reduced infiltration of rainfall in the subsurface fresh-
water lens and may reduce total natural capacity of 
groundwater resources. Compaction of soils and 
destruction of natural soil horizons has made future 
cultivation difficult or impossible without expensive 
soil rehabilitation and replenishment. The flat, natural 
green forest horizon has been replaced with an 
artificial, grey white horizon of towers, poles and 
buildings." 
-"Environmental Impact Assessment of Kwajalein Missile Range 
Operations." U.S. Army, August, 1980 
Implications: 
1. Article 6, Sections 1and2 appear to grant the U S 
generally the same privileges to control Palauans' exit 
from, entry to and movement around these "joint use" 
areas, as is given to the U.S. under the "exclusive-use" 
section. The U.S. is obligated only to "consult" with the 
government of Palau and regardless of whether or not 
the government of Palau approves, the U.S. can -- in 
the four joint use areas-- take "necessary measures for 
their use, security and defense," Under this provision. 
normal every day activities of Palauans who live or 
work in or near these areas can be restricted 
2. If the U.S. determines that the act1v1t1es of 
Palauans or the Palau government are "incompatible" 
with its military mission then the U.S. can prevent local 
use of these lands and waters. Moreover, according to 
Section 4 Palauans would not have normal access to 
these Joint-use areas. the Palau government 1s 
required to "notify the Government of the United 
States of any intended use of such areas." 
3. The proposed extension of the Angaur runway, 
outlined in Annex D, Section 2, will disrupt current 
taro-farming activities there. Anticipating this, the 
Agreement specifies that the military will provide for 
the "construction of a comparable taro growing area" 
for the displaced Palauans. The three-square-mile 
area is the best for taro growing on this very small 
island. There seems to be a conflict with the policy of 
promoting increased "self-sufficiency" 1n which the 
U.S. "reaffirms its continuing interest" (Section 454). 
PART Ill COMPACT 
VIEQUES AND THE U.S. MILITARY 
"A People for Whom World War II Has Not Ended" 
Vieques ("small island") is an 18-mile long and 3%-
mile wide island off the coast of Puerto Rico. Between 
1938 and 1945, the United States Navy acquired 26,000 
of the island's 33,000 acres (52 sq miles) for war 
"games" involving naval gunfire, close air support, air 
to ground maneuvers and amphibious exercises. 
Additionally, ammunitions are stored in hollowed-out 
mountains. For these purposes, land and the best 
fishing grounds are restricted to the use of the Navy. 
The Military Use and Operating Rights Subsidiary 
Agreement gives the U S many of the same powers the 
US military has in Vieques, Puerto Rico Just as it 
uses V1eques, the U.S. will have the authority to use 
Palau for war-training exercises. The full extent of 
these training ( or war game) "activities" is not 
specified in the Compact. nor do the "environmental 
protection" and "health and safety" provisions insure 
Palau ans control of U S military activities. Is the future 
of Palau the history of Vieques since the military 
arrived? 
Some people of Vieques have spoken about their 
experiences with the U.S. military: 
" I took my 11 -year old son spearfishing at depths of 
30. 40, 50 feet. I had to do it to survive. And in that 
struggle to survive, looking to make an honest living, 
for me the Navy was a permanent obstacle .. 
" I remember one day we were coming 1n from fishing 
when the sea got rough and we had to come ashore in a 
place called "The Tanks," in a Restricted Area . A 
soldier came up pointing a heavy gauge shotgun at me. 
While I was trying to save my family this soldier pointed 
that thing at me, saying I had to leave the boat there 
and go immediately as his prisoner to the camp. 
"I told him ... that he had to help me tie up the boat . 
Afterwards I would go to Washington if I had to but 
right now I couldn't accommodate him .. . But he still 
didn't help me. He waited until we tied up the boats and 
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US m1l1tary in war tra1n1ng on V1eq ues PRISA 
then put us on a truck and took us captive. 
"The captain who took charge treated us so 
discourteously that I told him, 'Just a minute Don't 
speak to me in such an offensive way. I'm no soldier, 
I'm a civilian, and you as an officer have to treat me 
well . 
"Among the people of Vieques, I as a Christian, belong 
to the movement against the U.S. Navy, for I have 
always lived in Vieques, and since the Americans 
came, to live here has been a horrid torment.. ."-Angel 
Ventura Cintron1 
"I am a Catholic .. We no longer believe that kneeling 
in a church , within four walls and a roof, asking God, 
asking Jehovah to get the Navy out is going to make 
the Navy leave. People themselves must begin to act ... 
"The violence of the Navy is permanently damaging, 
unforgiveable. It destroys coral reefs , it is destroying 
the land, it kills cattle and wildlife--especially birds--
which is in danger of extinction because of the 
violence with which it rapes our island of Vieques. 
Besides all this, what it does is training for war--to 
destroy lives. Now, many do not want to see this latter 
violence"- Angel Guadalupe1 
"We have witnessed many accidents. Once, fou r of 
us were walking together when suddenly there was an 
explosion We had stepped on something My brother, 
who was 13 years old , was shattered to pieces. In my 
case, My right arm 1s useless and my left leg was also 
badly hurt. You could see as far as the bone on 1t. Our 
other two companions were also seriously injured."2 
"Just a few days ago some fishermen in two fishing 
boats, 18-feet long, went out to fish their traps and a 
Navy helicopter immediately came to force them out. 
These helicopters fly very low causing very large 
waves to rise. Those fishermen did not only lose their 
catch and traps but almost sank."2 
'V1eques and Chnst1ans. Pnsa (National Ecumen ical Movement of Puerto 
Rico) 1981 
'"'A People for Who m World War II has Not Ended." Ecumenical Program for 
lnter·Amencan Co mmunication and Action (EPICA). Washington.DC 1978 
PART Ill COMPACT 
From the Compact: 
[Non-Exclusi\/e Use Areas: 
a) 30,000 acres in northern Babeldaob; 
b) 4 beach access rights of way in or near 
Ngiwal, Ulimang, Melekeok and 
Keklau-Ed.] 
Military Use and Operating 
Rights Within 
Non-Exclusi\/e-Use Areas 
Article VII 
"1. The Government of the United States shall notify the 
Government of Palau, as far in advance of the tentative 
date of planned use as is practically possible, but not less 
than 90 days, except in an emergency or as mutually 
agreed, of its intention to use any area designated for non 
exclusive-use. 
"(a) The notification shall: 
(1) Identify the specific area or areas to be used, 
which shall be the minimum area necessary to carry out the 
intended use; 
(2) State the projected dates during which the use 
will occur; and 
(3) Provide a description of the use to be made of 
the area. 
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Implications: 
1. The U.S. wants "intermittent" use of 30,000 acres 
on Babeldaob for a jungle warfare training site. If the 
Government of Palau objects to U.S. plans for military 
training on Babeldaob (or elsewhere) it may submit its 
objection to the U.S. but the Palauans do not have veto 
power over U.S. military operations. 
2. The 30,000 acre military site on Babeldaob is 
designated non-exclusively to the U.S. suggesting that 
Palauans will have use of this area. Article 7, Section 2 
provides, however, that during military operations the 
U.S. will have the same powers it has in the "exclusive 
use" areas. The U.S. will have the power to exclude 
Palauan use of approximately 50% of Babeldaob 
during training exercises. 
3. Article 7, Section 5 states that Palauans will have 
"full and free" use of the 30.000 acres on Babeldaob. But 
Palauans will only be able to build permanent 
structures after "consultation" with the United States 
4. The four beach access rights of way near 
Melekeok, Ngiwal, Ulimang and Keklau will be used for 
landing men, tanks, amphibious landing craft and 
other equipment used during training maneuvers on 
Babeldaob. 
THE HUMAN COSTS OF THE U.S. BASES IN THE PHILIPPINES 
The first and perhaps the most obvious negative 
impact of the bases is the presence of nuclear carriers 
and weapons which act as an invitation to attack from 
enemies of the U.S., irrespective of Philippine interest 
in the conflict. 
The complex of U.S. bases in the country, for all 
practical purposes, constitutes a "state within a state." 
invoking "extra-territorial rights," U.S. base officials 
have consistently placed U.S. servicemen who have 
committed serious crimes in the Philippines, such as 
killing of Filipino citizens, beyond the reach of 
Philippine criminal courts. Between 1947 and the 
present more than 40 Filipinos have been shot to death 
by American base guards or died as victims of U.S. 
"war games." 
It is argued that the bases have a major and positive 
impact on the Philippine economy, with many Filipinos 
employed and large amounts spent by the U.S. govern-
ment in the country, as well as millions more in 
economic aid and loans that come with the military 
base arrangements. 
But the U.S. base economy in the Philippines is 
consumptive and service-oriented rather than capital 
investment. Thus, the.y do not contribute directly 
towards building the productive capacity of the 
country (industrially or agriculturally). Furthermore, 
the role of base expenditures in the Philippine 
economy appears even more questionable when one 
considers the major types of "economic activity" they 
stimulate. 
Perhaps the most important of these are prostitution 
and related "entertainment" for U.S. base personnel. 
For example, the economy of Olongapo City near 
Subic Naval Base is almost totally dependent on 
prostitution and entertainment, and it expands with 
war and contracts with peace. As one observer noted, 
the end of the Vietnam War "spelled disaster." 
Mixed-blood children and old prostitutes aban-
doned by their American father or "husband" are a 
pitifully common sight. Babies are often found floating 
in Subic Bay. 
The other "growth industry" stimulated by the bases 
is the procurement and sale of illegal drugs to U.S. 
servicemen. Heroin and marijuana sales enjoy a 
greater concentration in the areas surrounding the 
bases than in any part of the country. Indeed, some 
Filipino observers noted that the increased con-
sumption of marijuana and heroin among Filipinos has 
been a spin-off of the American bases' drug traffic. 
This has led to increased criminal activities regarding 
illegal drugs, 
In sum, the claim that the U.S. bases are a boon to 
the Philippine economy is a dubious one. They 
constitute a flimsy pillar for a developing economy. 
U.S. bases bring with them serious social and political 
problems that are too costly for the country as a whole. 
By Dean Alegado, a teacher to Ethnic Studies at the University of Hawaii 
PAP.T Ill COMPACT 
From the Compact: 
"(b) The Government of Palau may, within 30 days after 
receipt of the notificot1on, seek clarification or express 
reservation concernrng the planned activity and the part 1es 
shall consult as necessary to resoli..Je any di// erences. The 
Government of the United States will make every 
reasonable effort to adjust the planned use to take into con· 
s1derat1on the reservations expressed by the Government 
of Palau. Unresolved issues will be handled in accordance 
with" (the Joint Committee on DispLites, Compact 
Section 351). 
"2 Dunng periods of use the Government of the United 
States may, within non exclusive use areas, control, so far 
os mo.v be required for efficient conduct of the planned use, 
the use of anchorages and moorings, the movement of 
sh rps and waterborne era/ t, aircraft operations and land 
movements. 
"3 In conducting activities rn non exclusive use areas, the 
Got•emment of the United States shall, in consultation with 
the Government of Palau, use its best efforts to.· .. 
"(e) Minimize damage to the terrain and to reef areas 
mid restore. where practicable. such areos to their prior 
::-.tote. 
"(/) Avoid unreosonob/e harm to thf> environment, 
rndudrng water areos, 
"(g) Avoid oct1v1t1es which would adversely offect the 
well berng of the residents of Pa/mi; 
"(h) Avoid residential areas: and 
"(1) Avoid hrstonca/ and religious sites 
"4 After each use of o non exclusive orea, the Govern · 
ment of the United States shall take all mec1sures to ensure, 
rnso/or as may be proctrcable. that euerv hazord to human 
life, health and safety resulting from such use rs removed 
from cmy such area. 
"5 Except as provided rn I his Agreement, the Government 
o/ Polw1 shall have full and free use oft he non e.\c/us1ve·use 
wc>c1s. including making such areas available to persons or 
entrtws authorized bv the Government of Palau. provided 
tlwt the Government of Palau shall undertake or permit 
/><'t mwwnt construe Iron in such areas only after consult a· 
Iron wrth the Government of the Unrted States " 
Article VIII 
"I. Any act1vit1es earned out by the Government of the 
United States under the terms of this Agreement shall be 
conducted in accordance with environmental standards 
established pursuant to Article VI of Title One of the 
Compact and its related agreements. Any disputes, 111clud· 
rng actions contemplated under Section 162 of the 
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Implications: 
5 Regardless of whether or not full scale military 
operations are conducted regularly on Babeldaob, the 
U.S. is not required to avoid damaging the land and 
reefs during times of land use. It only needs to use its 
"best efforts" (Article 7, Section 3). Who decides what 
best efforts are? The U S. is primarily concerned with 
carrying out its military mission in Palau and the 
mllitary's interpretation of "best efforts" is likely to 
contrast with that of Palauans who, using the land and 
ocean for subsistence, place a different value on the 
land. 
6 In the event land, reefs and historic sites are 
damaged, the military is required to restore them to 
their original state only "where practicable." And the 
military decides what is "practicable." Palauans know 
that damaged reefs and historic sites cannot be 
restored to their original state. Military activ1t1es that 
will harm the environment and endanger people could 
have been banned by the agreement, but they were 
not. 
KWAJALEIN 1982: OPERATION HOMECOMING 
In June, 1000 landowners resettled 8 of 
their islands used by U.S. military , pro-
testing unbearable Ebeye living conditions, 
'Il\e Army arrested leaders, searched workers, 
confiscated food, banned Marshallese from 
the bank, and cut phone communication. Many 
see this as a preview of treatment they will 
receive from the military under the Compact. 
RESTRICTIONS ON SOVEREIGNTY 
Article 8, Section 7. does not l1m1t the number of 
American military personnel who are "required" in 
Palau for operation of the military bases. While it pre-
vents soldiers specifically coming to Palau for Rest 
and Recreation. 1t allows "limited" numbers of m1l1tary 
personnel into Palau who are there on ships, sub-
marines or airplanes. or other "temporary" duty (The 
entire crew aboard U S. nuclear submarines 1s 
approximately 125, while the crew size on board a 
frigate is about 230 ) No controls are placed on the off-
duty activities of American soldiers in Palau under 
these circumstances According to the Status of 
Forces Agreement (SOFA). the Palau Government has 
no legal jurisdiction over U.S. personnel for: 
"(1) offenses committed within Defense sites. 
including non-exclusive-use areas ... 
"(3) offenses arising out of the performance of offi-
cial duty, 
"(4) offenses committed by United States 
personnel who are attached to or embarked in 
aircraft or vessels transiting Palau ... : 
... 
PART Ill COMPACT 
From the Compact: 
Compact, involving the compliance of these activ1t1es with 
those standards shall be resolved exclusively by negotia· 
tion between the Government of the United States and the 
Government of Palau notwithstanding Section 162 of the 
Compact ... 
"5. At the time the Government of the United States not1 
fies the Government of Palau that 11 no longer has a reqwre 
ment to retain a particular exclusive use or ;oint use area, 
the Government of the United States shall take all 
measures to ensure, insofar as may be practicable, that 
every hazard to human life, health and safety resulting from 
such use 1s removed from any such area 
"7. The Government of the Urnted States may station in 
Palau United States personnel required 1n its use of the 
defense sites authorized under this Agreement. Except for 
United States personnel stationed in Palau pursuant to this 
Agreement or limited numbers of Urnted States personnel 
in Palau on official duty in connection with naval port visits, 
aircraft transits or other temporary duty, the Government 
of the United States shall not permit United States 
personnel to make use of Palau for purposes of leave, rest, 
relaxation, recuperation or any similar use, without the 
consent of the Government of Palau . 
"9. The Government of the United States and the Govern 
ment of Palau recogrnze the relationship between the 
economic development and related programs of the 
Government of Palau and the military use and operating 
rights of the Government of the United States in Palau pur 
suant to the Agreement. Taking into cons1derat1011 this 
relationship, the Government of the Urnted States shall 
provide to the Government of Palau on a grant basis $1 
million annually commencing on the fifteenth anrnversary 
of the effective date of this Agreement and continuing for 
the duration of this Agreement Should the Government of 
the United States, in any year after the fifteenth 
anrnversar_y of the effective date of this Agreement. exer 
cise military use and operating rights within defense sites 
pursuant to this Agreement, 1t shall provide to the 
Government of Palau for that year additional grant 
assistance in an amount to be mutuolly agreed taking into 
account the degree of such use. Such additional grant 
assistance shall not exceed $9 million in any year ... 
"I I. The Government of the U111ted States may invite 
members of the armed forces of other countries to use 
defense sites pursuant to this Agreement, in conjunction 
with and under the control of the United States Armed 
Forces. Use by units of the armed forces of other countries 
of such defense sites, other than for transit and overflight 
purposes, sholl be sub;ect to consultation with and, in the 
case of ma1or u111ts. opproual by the Government of Palau." 
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Implications: 
This section of SOFA concludes by saying the Palau 
Government has no legal jurisdiction over any felony 
offenses committed by Americans . 
7 Article 8, Section 11 allows the U.S to bring into 
Palau foreign military personnel for training The 
Babeldaob jungle warfare training site can be used to 
train foreign military personnel from Asian nations just 
as the U.S. Army's School of the Americas in Panama 
has been used to train thousands of soldiers from 
repressive Latin American military governments U.S. 
allies such as South Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines 
-- all repressive dictatorships with records of serious 
human rights violations -- may in conjunction with the 
U S. use Palau as a training area. Palau has veto power 
over "major units" only, but "major units" is not 
defined. Palauans will be faced with an important 
moral question: Do they want to be viewed by other 
nations as giving support to un-democratic Asian 
dictatorships which are allies of the U.S.? 
8. Even if U.S. use of Babeldaob is indeed 
occasional, Palauans are still faced with prospect of 
military troops assaulting the beaches on Eastern 
Babeldaob in war games with amphibious landing 
craft. This is why the U.S. wants beach "access" rights 
through beaches near Ngiwal, Melekeok, Ulimang and 
Keklau for training on Babeldaob. During these 
operations, parts of Babelodaob can be off limits while 
military personnel are training for jungle warfare and 
using live ammunition. 
PALAU AND MICPAC 
The Compact has a direct relationship to an infor-
mal, furtive U.S.-Japan scheme to establish a 
Micronesian-Pacific Defense Force (MICPAC) 
commanded by an American admiral and Japanese 
deputy with headquarters in Yokosuka (Japan) or 
Guam. In return for supplying sea and air anti-
submarine warfare (ASW) forces for MICPAC, Japan 
would expect to increase her investment in Micronesia 
and construct an oil transshipment port in Palau~ 
complete with refinery and storage areas. RIMPAC 
exercises are considered to be the implementation of 
MICPAC. 
In a 1975 report U.S. Navy Captain N.R. Gooding of 
the National War College referred to Japanese ASW 
planes being stationed on Babeldaob. Such small con-
tingents of foreign military could be invited into Palau 
under terms of the Compact. Japan currently has 45 
Orion ASW aircraft ordered from Lockheed and has 
announced where only half of them will be stationed. It 
is likely that at least one squadron is destined for 
Babeldaob. U.S.-owned Orion subchasers would also 
undoubtedly make periodic visits. The Orion is 
designed to carry nuclear depth bombs. 
By Robert C. Aldridge. 1981 
PART Ill COMPACT 
From the Compact: 
Effective Date, 
Amendment and Duration 
Article IX 
" I. Thr~ Agreement shall come into effe ct simultaneously 
wrth the Compact . Thereafter, the Government of the 
United States may rnrtiale use of any of the defense sites or 
cireas designated in this Agreement by giving the Govern· 
ment of Palau notice of its intention to do so. Such notice 
shall be given at leas t one year rn advance, except where 
military requirements make this impracticable, rn which 
case notification shall be given as far rn advance as 
possible 
"4. Notwithstanding paragraph 3 of this Artic/e ... Section 
311 (b)(2) .. of the Compact shall remain in effect for a 
term of one hundred years ... " 
U.S. MILITARY BRINGS JOB DISCRIMINATION AND 
URBANIZATION PROBLEMS 
The impact of the United States on the people of 
Micronesia began with the Pacific campaign of World 
War II. In the Marshalls, liberated from Japanese con-
trol in 1944, the U.S. military immediately began to hire 
Marshallese to perform manual labor on Kwajalein in 
support of the war effort. The indigenous work force 
has fluctuated from a low of perhaps 175 to a high of 
about 600. This figure does not include the 200 or so 
Micronesians (mostly Marshallese) who work as 
domestics tor the Americans on Kwajalein. Aside from 
work as maids and gardeners, the types of work 
available to the Micronesians have been of low 
prestige by U.S. standards. Drivers (trucks, taxicabs). 
janitors, manual laborers, garbage collectors, cooks, 
busboys, bartenders, bakers are typical jobs held by 
the Micronesians. In addition, some hold jobs in 
offices, doing clerical work. Few of these jobs provide 
the training or experience wh ich would enable the 
employees to compete on an open labor market. 
Employment of Micronesians on Kwajalein has over 
the years been at the center of a number of problems, 
and the focus of many dissatisfactions. For example, 
the pay scale for Micronesians on the Range repre-
sents the highest pay rate available in all Micronesia. 
Consequently. the Range provides a great attraction to 
islanders from all over the Pacific. Yet at the same time 
there is substantial evidence that the Army's logistical 
contractor has been in violation of federal equal pay 
for equal work laws, systematically discriminating 
against the Micronesian workers. In 1976, testimony 
given before a subcommittee of the U.S. House of 
Representatives revealed that of a random sample of 
Micronesian workers on KMR. 90% felt discriminated 
against by the Americans. Three quarters of those 
sampled were able to identify specific non-
Micronesians (Americans) who performed the same 
work for higher pay. Many Micronesians expressed 
anger at the lack of Micronesian supervisors in the 
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SEGREGATION ON KWAJALEIN 
Ataji Balos, then a member of the Congress of 
Micronesia, pointed out in July 1976: 
"On July 4, 1976, only a matter of hours after Trust 
Territory Acting High Commissioner Peter Coleman 
had finished telling the United Nations Trusteeship 
Council there was no segregation at Kwajalein (a 
statement he would not dare make on Ebeye), the com-
mand of Kwajalein Missile Range celebrated the 
American Bicentennial by closing Kwajalein Island to 
any Marshallese ... So American independence was 
celebrated at Kwajalein Atoll by enforcement of all out 
and total segregation." 
Testimony before US House of Representatives Subcommittee on Terri torial 
and Insular Affairs Oversight Heanngs on the Marshall Islands, July 1976. 
KMR work force. Many were also angry at having to 
train inexperienced and higher paid Americans to be 
their supervisors. 
With a population of 7049 (1975 census) living on an 
island of 66 acres. Ebeye is more densely populated 
than any other Pacific island. This urbanization is 
primarily a product of immigration from the outer 
islands for a variety of purposes, all of which are 
caused by the presence of the U.S. military. 
Whereas the outer islands still subsist to a large 
extent on traditional, local foods, on Ebeye 95% of the 
food must be purchased. Money is of crucial impor-
tance, and affects the lives of the people in many ways. 
For example, on Ebeye the household includes fewer 
people, as the traditional extended family is 
"nuclearized" by the scarcity and importance of 
money. Most Ebeye households have outstanding 
loans, as well as debts under their credit accounts. 
Traditional customs of mutual aid, such as hospitality 
to clan-mates and food-sharing with passersby, do not 
function on Ebeye. No activities exist which involve the 
entire community. as do many activities on the outer 
islands. People live on land to which they have no 
traditional rights, and feel no responsibility to their 
neighbors. their traditional leaders, the community. 
The children do not learn the traditional customs. 
Young people form street gangs, and drink beer in vast 
quantities. The crime rate, associated with alcohol 
consumption and frustration, has risen rapidly. The 
young are neither prepared for the old ways, nor are 
they trained in any significant way for the new. Girls 
and women (the youngest interviewed was 11 years 
old) sell their bodies to the Americans on Kwajalein. 
Suicide, which is very rare in Marshallese history, has 
become a serious problem. On Ebeye, it is performed 
primarily by young men between 15 and 30 years of 
age, with the commonest method being hanging. 
By William Alexander, 1982 
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LAND USE AND OPERATING RIGHTS 
KWAJALEIN 
KWAJALEIN ATOLL 
From The Compact: 
Article 4, #1: " ... The Government of the United States 
has free access to and unrestricted control of the defense 
sites.including the right to control entry and exrt from any 
or all defense srtes and the right to take necessary 
measures for their establishment, use and operation. The 
Government of the United States may take, within the 
defense sites and within the seabeds, water areas and arr 
space adjacent to or in the vic1nrty of the defense sites, such 
measures as are necessary for the use, security and 
defense of the defense srtes. These measures include the 
right: 
"a) To maintain the defense srtes and to construct 
structures and improvements thereon; 
"b) To improve and deepen the harbor, channels, 
entrances, and anchorages, to dredge and fill and generally 
to fit the premises to their intended use; 
"c) To control anchorages and moorings adjacent to or 
within the vicinity of the defense sites, and movements of 
ships and waterborne craft, to, from and within the defense 
sites; 
"g) To install, maintain, use and operate defense-related 
oceanographic, aeronautical, space communications. and 
other military or sc1ent1Jic systems and eqwpment.. " 
Article 4, #2 "In conducting its activities rn the defense 
sites, the Government of the United States shall use its best 
efforts to: 
"a) Avoid interference with commercial activities 
including the exploitation of living and non living resources 
of the sea; 
"b) Avard interference with navigation, aviation, 
communrcation and land or water travel in the Marshall 
Islands; 
"c) Minimize damage to the terrain and to reef areas; 
"d) Avoid harm to the environment, including water 
areas; 
"e) Avoid act1vit1es which would adversely affect the well 
being of the residents of the Marshall Islands. 
Article 4, #3: "In order not to interfere with operation 
of the defense sites or pose safety hazards to individuals in 
the area. the Mid-Atoll Corridor area defined in Annex A, 
except for the islands of Meck, Enrwetak, Omelek, 
Ge/lrnam, Gagan. l//egrnni and Legan, rs a dosed area 
except when the Government of the United States 
announces that the ronge rs temporarily open. 
It ....... 
~-. .. 
... 
Roi Namur 
.~ 
' f 't .... ··~. 
.. 
W-1 WARNING AREA 
A TOLL WARNING AREA 
-
KWAJALEIN ATOLL 
Implications: 
~ ,. " ::.,l Ebeye 
=...I Kwajaleln 
1. As in the Palau Military Use Agreement, Article 4, 
Section 1 grves the U.S. the power to control the 
movement of people and boats in all parts of Kwajalein 
Atoll. The same restrictions on Marshallese use of Kwa-
jalein that apply in 1982 will be effective activities 
such as fishing ana farming will be prohibited if the 
U.S. decides it is a "necessary measure 
for ... operation"of the missile range. 
2. Since the 1960s, Marshallese protest occupations 
of "off limits" islands - often delaying or cancelling 
missile tests - have been the only power Kwaialein 
landowners have had to force U.S action on critical 
health and social problems on Ebeye and on compen-
sation. There are no specific provisions in this agree-
ment which attempt to deal with the degraded living 
conditions on Ebeye and other problems resulting 
from the establishment of the Kwajalein military base. 
The Marshall Islands government, therefore, is in the 
position of cutting off the Kwajalein landowners' only 
effective way so far of asserting their rights . 
3 Article 4, #1 provides the U S. with authority to 
construct new and additional military radar, commu-
nications and other equipment on 8 islands within the 
Mid-Atoll-Corridor area and Kwajalein, Ror-Namur. 
Ennugarret and Ennylagegan Islands 
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From the Compact: 
G Johnson- Ebeye 
Article 4, #4: "The Gouernment of the United States 
may invite members of the armed forces of other countries 
to use defense sites pursuant to this Agreement, in conjunc-
tion with and under the control of the United States Armed 
Forces. Use by units of the armed forces of other countries 
of such defense sites, other than for transit and overflight 
purposes, shall be subject to consultation with and, in the 
case of ma1or units, approval by the Gouernment of the 
Morsha/l Islands. 
Article 6.· "Regularly constituted military units of the 
Armed Forces of the United States and civilian security 
guards of the Armed Forces of the United States or security 
personnel under contract to the Government of the United 
States shall have the right to police the defense sites, and 
may take all appropriate measures to ensure the 
maintenance of law and order in the defense sites. United 
States m1/1tary police or civilian security guards shall not be 
used outside the defense sites for law enforcement 
purposes, except as may be agreed with the Government 
of the Marshall Islands ." 
Article 7: "The Government of the Marshall Islands 
and the Government of the United States shall each 
designate representatives to a Community Relations 
Council, the purpose of which will be to identify and 
consider all matters affecting relations between the defense 
sites and local Marsha/Iese communities and to 
recommend actions as appropriate." 
Article 8, #2: "In the employment of local hire 
personnel, the Armed Forces of the United States and 
United States contractors shall provide equal pay for equal 
work. 
Article 9, #2: " ... Unless otherwise provided, all issues 
or disputes that may arise under this Agreement which 
cannot be resolved locally shall be referred to the Joint 
Committee established by Sectio• 351 and resolved in 
accordance with that Section. 
Article 9, #4: "Consistent with the laws and 
regulations of the United States, and to the extent that 
emergency medical services can be made available, the 
Government of the United States at its Kwajalein Island 
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lmpllcatlona: 
4. The U.S. is required only to use its "best efforts" 
to avoid damaging the reef areas and the environment 
in "defense sites" in the Marshall Islands. "Best .... 
efforts ... to minimize damage" to the environment is a 
weak term if the interests of protecting the Kwajalein 
people and environment are paramount. The • 
Marshallese are given no means for ensuring that the 
U.S. does use its "best efforts" to protect the reefs and 
land and to avoid interfering with normal activities of 
Marshallese in the entire Marshall Islands. 
5. Marshallese will continue to be excluded from the 
Mid-Atoll-Corridor islands except when the U.S. 
announces that these islands are temporarily open. In 
the past, Marshallese have officially been permitted to 
use these islands only 15 days four times a year. 
6. The Community relations Council (Article 7) is 
entirely advisory. It will have authority only to 
"recommend action", not to carry out actions. Pre-
vious advisory committees and numerous government 
studies recommending action have had little or no 
influence on improving the Ebeye condition. It appears 
that this provision is unlikely to be more effective. 
7. According to Article 8, #2, after 30 years of wage 
discrimination, the Marshallese Kwajalein Missile 
Range employees may at last get equal pay for doing 
equal work. 
8. All future disputes, according to Article 9, #2, will 
go to the Joint Committee for Military Dispute, estab-
lished by Compact Section 351. The Marshal Iese living 
on Ebeye face the prospect of continuing treatment as 
second class citizens in their own homeland with little 
or no ability to force corrective action through the 
U.S.-dominated dispute process. 
9. Article 9, #4 provides that "to the extent that 
emergency medical services can be made available, 
the Government of the United States shall undertake to 
provide such emergency services" to Marshallese. 
This appears to make the provision of emergency 
medical care discretionary rather than an obligation 
on the U.S. Lack of proper medical care on Ebeye and 
lack of access to the Kwajalein hospital combined with 
the bacteria count in the lagoon (25,000 times U.S. 
Public Health Service standards) and lack of sanitary 
facilities means that every year epidemics sweep 
Ebeye. This agreement does not provide for changes 
or improvements in health care delivery to the 
Marshal Iese. 
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From the Compact: 
defense site contractor-operated medical facility shall 
undertake to prouide such emergency seruices to citizens 
and nationals of the Marshall Islands on a reimbursable 
basis under terms and conditions agreed upon between the 
Signatory parties." 
Article 10, Section 2 · This Agreement may be 
amended or terminated at any tm1e by mutual consent. 
Article 10, Section 3 · This Agreement shall remarn 
in effect for an initial term of fifteen years. The Gouernment 
of the United States shall haue the option to extend this 
Agreement for two successiue periods beyond the initial 
term. The first extension period shall be for fifteen years 
and the second extension period shall be for twenty years. 
Kwa1alein Island where 3.000 Americans live 
MILIT AAY PROVISIONS, Marshall Islands • 53 
"Even if the U.S. increases the monetary compen-
sation paid to the Kwajalein Atoll people, money can 
never be a substitute for the value of an island. More 
money is not the answer. Other kinds of compensation 
should have included better medical care, decent 
living conditions and better schools and a high school. 
Not only are these basic rights that the Marshallese are 
entitled to, but the U.N. Trusteeship Agreement obli-
gates the U.S. to 'protect the rights and fundamental 
freedoms of all elements of the population without 
discrimination' and to 'protect the health of the 
inhabitants .... ' 
Ironically, the Trusteeship obligations have been 
ignored and Marshallese well being sacrificed in the 
name of U.S. 'national defense interests."' 
Oarlene Ke1u, 1982 
Ebeye Island where over 8.000 Marshallese live 
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NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND WASTE 
GENERAL 
From the Compact: 
Authority ancl Responsibility 
Section 314 
"(a) Unless otherwise agreed, the Government of the 
United States shall not, m Palau, the Marshall ls/ands or 
the Federated States of M1crones1a 
(I) test by detonat10n or dispose of any nuclear 
weapon, nor test, dispose of, or discharge any 
toxic chemical or b10/og1ca/ weapon, or 
(2) test, dispose of. or discharge any other rad1oac 
true, toxic chemical or b10/og1cal materials man 
amount or manner which would be hazardous 
to pub/re health or safety 
"(b) Unless otherwise agreed, other than for transit or 
overflight purposes or dLmng time of a national emergency 
declared by the President of the United States, a state of 
war declared by the Congress of the United States or as 
necessary to defend agarnst an actual or impending armed 
attack on the United States, Palau, the Marshall ls/ands or 
the Federated States of Micronesia, the Government of the 
United Stutes shall not store m Palau, the Marshall ls/ands 
or the Federated States of Micronesia any toxic chemical 
weapon, nor any rad1oact1ve materials nor any toxic chem 
real materials intended for weapons use 
"(c) Radioactive, toxic chemical, or b1o/og1ca/ materials 
not intended for weapons use shall not be affected by 
Section 314(b). 
"(d) No material or substance referred to in this Section 
shall be stored m Palau, the Marshall ls/ands or the 
Federated States of M1crones1a except m an amount and 
manner which would not be hazardous to public health or 
safety. ln determining what shall be an amount or manner 
which would be hazardous to public health or safety under 
this Section, the Government of the United States shall 
comply with any app/1cab/e mutual agreement, inter· 
national guide/mes accepted by the Government of the 
United States and the laws of the United States and their 
implementing regulations 
"(e) Any exercise of the exemption authority set forth in 
Section 161(e) shall have no effect on the ob/1gat1ons of the 
Government of the United States under this Section or on 
the application of this subsection .. " 
LOW LEVEL WASTE DANGERS 
"To the extent that these two classifications, low-
and high-level radioactive waste, are interpreted to 
indicate relative degrees of hazard, they are 
misleading. Although the low-level-waste category 
does include material so slightly radioactive as to be 
almost innocuous. such as empty plastic vials that 
once contained mildly radioactive liquids used in 
medical tests, it also includes material-reactor-
cooling-system filters, for example-that, in a given 
quantity, can be just as dangerous as the same quan-
tity of high-level waste and will remain lethally radioac-
tive for millions of years." 
"Nuclear Waste", by Fred C. Shapiro, The New Yorker, October 19, 1981. 
lmpUcatlons: 
1 Sections 314 (a) and (b) allow nuclear waste 
storage and disposal in the Federated States of 
Micronesia (FSM), Palau and the Marshall Islands if it 
rs considered "not hazardous." Both the Palau the FSM 
subsidiary agreements on Radioactive materials 
modify this slightly The U S. must abide by "the laws 
of the United States and their implementing 
regulations" (Section 314(d)) in determining what is 
"hazardous." 
2. The U.S. recognizes the acute danger of 
exposure to almost all radioactive materials and yet 
has justified their use and disposal as the necessary 
cost of an industrialized society. People from Palau, 
the FSM and the Marshall Islands whose lives depend 
heavily upon non-contaminated ocean and land could 
be forced to bear the burden of radioactive materials 
without their benefit. 
3 Moreover, United States "safety" standards 
allowed the dumping of thousands of barrels of 
rad1oact1ve waste into the Pac1f1c ocean off California 
between 1942 and 1970. 1 Federal documents point out 
that contrary to public statements by the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency, nuclear waste dumped in the 
Pac1f1c was not "low level" Many of these wastes are 
dangerous for hundreds and thousands of years. 
Currently, the Reagan administration is trying to 
relax environmental restrictions on ocean dumping of 
nuclear waste so that the U S. can resume dumping of 
nuclear waste in the Pacific region 
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GLOSSARY 
Half-life: The time it takes for a given amount of 
radioactive element to decay into half the original 
amount. 
High-level wastes: Used fuel from nuclear reactors 
and certain materials left over from making nuclear 
weapons. 
Low-level wastes: Waste from nuclear power plants 
and . other forms of nuclear technology having 
relatively low levels of radioactivity. 
Meltdown: A very dangerous situation in a nuclear 
power reactor which happens when the cooling 
system stops working. 
Plutonium2-= A very poisonous radioactive element 
formed in nuclear reactors, said to be the most 
dangerous substance known. It is used for making 
nuclear weapons. If leaked into the environment, it can 
do great damage to living things. It has a half-life of 
24,000 years. 
Radioactive wastes: Radioactive waste material from 
nuclear plants, mining and milling of uranium, the 
making and testing of nuclear weapons and from the 
medical use of nuclear materials. These must be put in 
places where they will not be near living things. Some 
radioactive wastes are dangerous for one or two cen-
turies. some for thousands of years. 
From A Call to a New f)(odus by Suliana Slwattbau and Oav1d Williams (Suva. 
Pacific Conference of Churches, 1982). 
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Implications: 
4. With more than 70 U.S. nuclear reactors, 20 
Japanese nuclear power plants and a growing U.S. 
export industry for nuclear power to Asian Third World 
nations, nuclear waste storage and disposal has 
become a critical problem for the U.S., Japan and 
other Asian nations. Within the U.S .. attempts are 
being made to stop the government from dumping any 
wastes, low or high level, in the ocean. David Roberti, 
President of the California State Senate, wrote:" .. .The 
Rules Committee has unanimously passed a 
resolution calling on President Reagan to ban ocean 
dumping of radioactive wastes. The committee's 
action was intended as a response to reports we 
received that the U.S. Navy is considering the offshore 
burial of 100 ... nuclear submarines .... 
"The Navy does not have a good record on nuclear 
waste disposal and certainly not good enought to 
warrant blind faith on our part Both California's 
government and citizens must be vigilant against any 
potential dangers to our environment, especially a 
danger of such massive proportions ... "2 
NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
1. Section 314 bans the testing by detonation or 
disposal of nuclear weapons in Micronesia Nuclear 
weapons may be transported and stored in the FSM 
Palau and the Marshall Islands if the U.S decides th~ 
nuclear weapons are "not hazardous" to the public 
The subsidiary agreements dealing with radioactive 
wastes and weapons allow the U S. greater flexibility 
for storing, transporting and system testing of nuclear 
weapons in Palau, the Marshall Islands and the 
Federated States. 
2. The Compact does not restrict transit and over-
flight ~f nuclear powered and nuclear weapons carry-
ing ships, submarines and aircraft in the ports. waters 
and airfields of Palau, the Marshalls and the FSM . The 
U.S. military states that its nuclear weapons pose "no 
significant hazard" to the public , but this fails to 
address the fact that submarines, warships and 
bombers carrying nuclear weapons -- in addition to 
nuclear weapons storage sites -- will be the first target 
an enemy will seek to destroy Additionally, the 
majority of U.S. nuclear weapons accidents have 
occured during the transporting of nuclear weapons 
on ships and planes. (See box, Page 63.) 
3. Section 314(e) at first appears to offer the people 
of Micronesia the best protection from future military 
and nuclear hazards introduced by the U.S. Although 
an earlier section (161 (e)) gives the US. President 
authority to exempt any U.S. activity from complying 
with U.S environmental laws, Section 314(e) states the 
P~e.s1dent ma~ not use this power of exemption for any 
m1l1tary act1v1t1es. Continued on Page !>6 
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PACIFIC NATIONS 
BAN NUCLEAR VESSELS 
Recognizing the hazards of all owing nuclear YHHls 
Into their Islands, the offlclal government policy of two 
South Pacific nations, FIJI and Vanuatu, as announced 
In 1982, bans the entry of any nuclear powered or 
nuclear weapons-carrying vessels Into their ports. 
DANGERS OF SEA-BASED 
NUCLEAR REACTORS 
Nuclear submarines and warships are powered by 
nuclear reactors. What are the hazards of these sea-
based nuclear power plants? Albert D. Rich, a 
lieutenant in the submarine nuclear program for five 
years (1971-1976) wrote: 
"Because of the severe space limitations inherent in 
the design of ships, especially submarines, naval 
reactors must have much higher power densities than 
civilian (land-based) ones. 
"Thus naval reactors must be operated nearer their 
core thermal limits-limits at which fuel damage or 
even melt-down could occur ... I take issue (with) the 
supposed safety advantage that mobility gives to naval 
nuclear reactors. At least when a land-based reactor 
melts down. the highly radioactive fuel will remain 
more or less in one place. But consider what would 
happen if a melt-down occurred on a floating platform 
in or near a port. What would you lose ... I don't know 
and I doubt anyone else does. 
"One other thing about floating reactors: They can 
sink And not only sink. but sink on their sides or even 
upside down (submarines are cylindrical) . Thus 
instead of falling Into the core during an emergency 
shutdown, the control rods which normally regulate 
the nuclear reaction would tall out. causing an almost 
instant melt-down. 
"I would like to say that the Navy is extremely con-
cerned about maintaining its excellent .record in 
nuclear safety ... However. the constant pressure for 
machine-like perfection demanded from nuclear 
submarine crews leads to severe morale problems. 
Ironically, this in turn is compounded by long patrols 
in cramped quarters. all made possible by, you 
guessed it, nuclear power." 
Adapted from an article in the Honolulu Srar-Bulletm Apnl 7 1979 
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lmpllcatlons: Continued from Page 55 
A recent U.S. Supreme Court decision concerning 
nuclear weapons storage in Hawaii has made the 
314(e) prov1s1on virtually meaningless. The 
environmental protection Section 161(a) binds the 
U.S to abide by the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA) in completing an environmental impact 
statement "significantly affecting the quality of the 
human environment" on any activity in the Federated 
States, Palau or the Marshalls. It is reasonable to 
assume that storage, disposal or system testing of any 
radioactive materials or nuclear weapons would 
"significantly" affect the environment and therefore 
require an environmental inpact statement (EIS). The 
importance of the EIS process is that it allows public 
review and discuss11on of U.S. government decisions. 
Recently, the US Navy planned to build 48 
earthcovered cement bunkers near Pearl Harbor for 
storing nuclear weapons and other ammunition. The 
Navy asserted that storage of weapons would have "no 
significant" environmental impact and so refused to 
conduct an EIS. Hawaii residents disagreed with the 
Navy and brought suit in federal court to force the 
Navy to conduct an environmental impact statement 
for public review. 
But the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Navy does 
not have to disclose "matters that are specifically 
authorized by an Executive Order to be kept secret in 
the interest of the national defense or foreign policy 
and are in fact properly classified." The ruling 
concluded that "an Environmental Impact Statement 
concerning a proposal to store nuclear weapons at 
West Loch {Pearl Harbor) need not be disclosed ... " 
(emphasis added). 
This 1981 decision effectively cancels the 
protections Section 161 offers the FSM, Palau and the 
Marshall Islands Because of Micronesia's strategic 
importance to the Pentagon. much of the information 
on military plans for the islands will likely be classified. 
Under the name of "national security" the U S can 
prevent the governments and people of Micronesia 
from gaining information on proposed military 
act1v1ty 3 
4 The extent of testing, storage and disposal of 
rad1oact1ve materials and nuclear weapons is limited 
by the statement that 1t "not be hazardous to the public 
health and safety" The U.S military's record shows, 
however. that what it considers "not hazardous" is 
decided according to US military or political necessity 
and not necessarily according to what will protect the 
people's health and safety. 
W Jackson Davos. They Loe About the Seabed Chain Reaction (Australia). 
Mar 1981 
David Roberto . President Pro Tempore. Cahfornoa Senate. to the 
Envoronmen1a1 Law Society Unoversoty of Santa Clara Feb 12 1982 
'John Reaves Permossoble Handling o f Radooactove Materials on Palau Voa the 
Compacl of Free Assoc1a11on · Un1vers1ty of San1a Clara Law School 
cCahfornoa) May 1972 
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BIKINI PEOPLE AND RADIATION 
The extent of testing, storage and disposal of radio-
active materials and weapons is limited by the quali-
fication that it "not be hazardous" to public health and 
safety. The U.S. Government's record shows, however, 
that what it considered "not hazardous" is decided 
according to military or political 'necessity.' 
An example of this is the U.S. attempt to resettle 
Bikini Atoll, site of 23 nuclear tests. 
By the mid-1960's the Bikinians, who had lived in 
exile for 20 years, facing constant food shortages and 
harsh living conditions, increasingly voiced demands 
to return to Bikini. Widespread international publicity 
about their plight pressed the U.S. At the same time, 
the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, facing criticism 
from American citizens for its position that there is a 
"safe" level of radiation exposure, was eager to prove 
that low doses of radiation were not harmful to people. 
So in 1968 President Johnson announced that Bikini 
would be returned to its people. In 1969 the U.S. 
Atomic Energy Commission said "the exposures to 
radiation of the Bikini people do not offer a significant 
threat to their health and safety." 
A small-scale cleanup and rehabilitation program 
was begun, and by the early 1970s a few people had 
begun moving back. Many Bikinians tell of AEC scien-
tists demonstrating Bikini's safety by eating coconuts, 
fish and other foods in front of the islanders who were 
refusing to eat local foods, fearing radiation exposure. 
Because of continued AEC assurances, people kept 
returning to Bikini during the early 1970s. 
During an Atomic Energy Commission survey of the 
more than 100 people living on the atoll in 1975, the 
"presence of low levels of plutonium" in their urine was 
discovered, but U.S. Government scientists did not 
consider this "radiologically significant". 
In contrast to a 1967 study which said well water on 
Bikini was safe to drink, a 1975 government report said 
that some wells on Bikini were too radioactive to be 
safe for drinking. Despite a statement from an Interior 
Department official in 1975 that Bikini "appears to be 
hotter or questionable as to safety" no action was 
taken to remove the people from a hazardous 
environment. 
In June 1977, a Department of Energy study said "All 
living patterns involving Bikini Island exceed federal 
radiation guidelines .... " 
Despite the obvious hazard to the people, the DOE 
seemed reluctant to give up "Bikini (which) may be the 
only global source of data on humans where intake via 
ingestion is thought to contribute the major fraction of 
plutonium body burden .... " 
Finally, more than a year later, in September 1978, 
the people were evacuated from Bikini, but not before 
they were exposed to radiation levels at least 2 times 
the maximum "allowable" dose in the U.S. As early as 
1975, the U.S. government had information about 
Bikini hazards, but for political and scientific reasons. 
the U.S. government encouraged the people to stay. 
Adapted from "Paradise Lost ... by Giff Johnson. The Bulletin of the Atomic 
Sclenr1sts, December, 1980. 
JAPANESE N-WASTE DUMPING PLANS FOR MICRONESIA 
All past seadumping programs pale before the 
planned Japanse program ... This would entail sea 
dumping of more radioactive garbage annually than 
the U.S. claims it dumped in 24 years. The site of the 
planned dumping is the Pacific waters just north of 
Micronesia .... 
The Japanese Government has testified at length on 
the 'safety' of their program, but their testimony and 
their documents reveal fundamental flaws ... They have 
assumed that the massive quantities of 
] radioactivity ... will disperse evenly in the entire Pacific 
Ocean, and thus be diluted to 'acceptable' levels. In 
fact the Farallon experience shows that the released 
radioactivity sticks to the ocean floor in concentrated 
form, where it is eaten by animals attracted to the 
dumpsite ... 
Politically. the Japanese would have to carry out the 
program against the unanimous wishes of the 
Micronesian people. But there is a more sinister theme 
unfolding in the Japanese dumping program. 
involving the U.S. The U.S. is legally obliged to 
"protect the health and resources" of the Micronesian 
people by its U.N. Trusteeship Agreement, and yet has 
adopted a strict hands off policy with regard to the 
Japanese radioactive dumping program. Why? The 
U.S. research vessel Verna has just concluded an 
extensive survey to assess the suitability of this area of 
ocean for disposal of high-level wastes by the U.S. The 
chief scientist reported that the area studied could 
hold "all the nuclear waste that has been or ever will be 
produced by the world." 
The lesson of the Farallon incident is clear: what we 
put into the ocean eventually returns to us in our food. 
Jackson Davis, .. They Lie About The Seabed0 • 
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NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND WASTE 
From the Compact: 
Memorandum of Underetanding 
of the Government of the United States 
and the Government of the Federated 
States of Micronesia with respect to 
Meanings of Terms and Expressions 
Used in Section 314 of the Compact 
of Free Association 
FSM 
RADIOACTIVE 
AGREEMENT 
"With reference to Section 314 of the Compact of Free 
Assoc1at1on and with respect to the meaning of the terms 
and expressions used therein, the Gouernments of the 
United States and the Gouernment of the Federated States 
of Micronesia confirm their understanding as follows: 
1 Section 314: 
"(a) Section 314 reod rn con1unct1on with Sections 311 
and 312 authorizes the Gouernment of the United 
States to store nuclear weapons in the respectiue 
Freely Associated State, so long as such storage is 
done in an amount and manner which would not be 
hazardous to public health or safety. The standard of 
what 1s hazardous to public health or safety 1s the same 
as that used by the United States Gouernment rn the 
United States 
"(b) The Constitution of the Federated States of 
Micronesia requires the national gouernment of the 
Federated States of M1crones1a to giue its express 
approual to those prou1s1ons of Section 314 of the Com· 
pact of Free Assoc1at1on which refer to the testing, 
storage, use or disposal of radioact1ue, toxic chemical, 
or other harmful substances w1th1n the 1unsd1ct1on of 
the Federaated States of Micronesia .Section 314 pro· 
u1des for such testing, storage, use or disposal under 
specified safeguards, and therefore the express 
approual of the National Gouernment of the Federated 
States of M1crones1a 1s reqwred 
"(c) The express approual that the national gouern 
ment shall giue at the time that the Compact becomes 
effectiue 1s attached hereto as Appendix A It provides 
that "if and to the extent that" such storage 1s "deemed 
essential by the Gouernment of the United States" 
such express approval 1s given. That approual shall be 
submitted for popular and leg1slat1ue approval together 
with and m the same manner as the Compact and shall 
not be effective until so approved. 
lmpllcatlons: 
1. Paragraph 3 of the Memorandum makes it clear 
that the Compact does not ban the testing, storage, 
disposal of radioactive waste and other materials -- it 
only prevents this if the U.S. decides the disposal 
would be dangerous to the people. 
2. According to the Memorandum the U.S. is 
required to use the same safety standards that it uses 
in the U.S . These so called 'standards" for radiation 
exposure have constantly been and continue to be 
lowered as more is learned about the dangers to 
people from low level radiation These guidelines have 
often failed to protect American citizens and would be 
unlikely to provide protection for people in the 
Federated States. 
3. U.S. environmental laws allowed the dumping of 
thousands of barrels of both low and high level 
radioactive waste in the Pacific from 1942 to 1970 The 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is cur-
rently planning to dismantle environmental protection 
laws to allow the resumption of ocean dumping of 
radioactive waste.1 In a strictly legal sense, disposal of 
low or high level radioactive waste in the Federated 
States of Micronesia might be considered "not 
hazardous" by Compact standards, but there is no 
evidence that the specified levels of radiation are 
actually safe. 
4. Verbal assurances by U.S. officials that there are 
no plans to dump or dispose of radioactive waste in the 
FSM are not binding on future U.S. action. The FSM 
government has given its "express approval for the 
testing, storage, use or disposal of (radioactive, toxic 
chemical or other harmful substances). including 
nuclear weapons" if the U.S decides it is "essential." 
The important issue is that the U.S. decides what is 
"essential" and "hazardous to the public health and 
safety" The secrecy surrounding nuclear weapons 
and waste will further prevent the FSM from obtaining 
relevant health and safety information from the U.S. 
Under the guise of " national security" the U S. can and 
will (as it has done elsewhere) refuse to comply with 
requests for information, thus putting the FSM in the 
position of having to rely on the U.S military judgement 
of safety factors U.S. military and nuclear policies are 
determined by political and economic needs The U.S. 
has ignored the health of other Micronesians in 
pursuing its military mission 
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From the Compact: 
3. Set11or 314(a)(12) 
"Does not p10/i1b11 oil leslmg. disposal or discharge of 
oll rnd100< /1L P , /O\ll chenuc o/. or b1olog1u1/ materials 
but proh1b1ts 011/v the test mg, disposal, or discharge of 
those malerru/s "111 an amount or manner whilh would 
be hazardous to public health or safety." The> standard 
of what i!> "hozmdous to public health or safe/}" 1s the 
same as that u::.ed by the> US Gouernment rn the 
United States. 
4. Section 314(b): 
"The term "rad1oactn;e materials" doe!> not mean 
"nuclear u.;eapons " Nuclear weapons ore therefore 
not subject to the restnct1ons contarned 111 Section 
314 ... 
5. Set11011 314(t). 
"Perrrnts the storage of rad1ooct1ue, toxic l hemical, or 
b10/og1cal materials not 111te11cled for weapons use, 
such as X rov film or eqwpmen/, chernicol cleaning 
cigents or b1olog1cal substcmces used lo elinwwte oil 
spills. and other items used routinely or 111 Cl prescribed 
manner. All !>forage permitted bv Sectron 314(c) is sub 
)et t to the sofetv reqUJrenwnts of Section 314(d) 
"(b) Provide!> thot wheneuer anything, 1ncludrng 
nucleor weopons, 1s stored by the United States in the 
respective Freely Assoc10/ed States, 1t will be stored rn 
such a wov t /wt 1t will not be hazardous to public 
health or safe!> 
7 Section 314(e) 
" .. The President of the U111ted Siates ccmnot exempt 
the Section 314 activities from the env1ro11mental 
!>landards or procedures which may be opp/icab/e 
Lmder Section!> 161(a)(3) and 161(a)(4), even 1f he 
determines 1t to be rn the paramount mterest of the 
Government of the United States to do so 
Appendix A 
" The Const1tut1on of the Federcited States of 
Micronesia forbids the testmg, storage, use or disposal of 
rad1oact1ve, toxic chemical, or other harmful substances 
withm the Jtmsd1cl1on of the Federated States of 
Micronesia without the express approval of the national 
government of the Federated Stoles of Micronesia. 
"The Government of the Unrted States in exercising its 
authority and responsibility for security and defense pur-
suant to Title Three of the Compact of Free Association 
may under certwn rncumstances reqUJre such testmg, 
storage, use or disposal, subwct to all of the cond1t1ons and 
safeguards of Section 314 of the Compact 
"Therefore, subiec I lo all of the condiflons and safe 
guards of Section 314 of the Compact which are 111 no way 
modified hereby, the national Government of the Feder 
ated States of Micronesia gives express approval for the 
test mg. storage, use or disposal of such subs/ant es, rnclud 
ing nuclear u.:eapons. 1f and to the> extent deemed essential 
bv the Government of the United States. " 
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<) Polson 
Implications: 
5 As the U S has expressed no public plans for 
military use of land. why does the U S need this 
authority? The language of the agreement raises the 
question of what other military operations U.S plans 
for the FSM The power the FSM grants to the US rn 
this Memorandum undermines the intent of the ban on 
nuclear substances in the FSM const1tut1on Would the 
U S demand such a significant mod1f1cat1on of the 
FSM Const1t1on if there are no future U S. military 
plans for the islands? Moreover, Section 354(b) of the 
Compact confi rms the "existence of separate 
agreements with each of (the governments)" for U S 
military land use. A review of this Memorandum and 
the Military Use subsidiary agreement wil l be 
necessary to understand the full implications of the 
Defense Title for the FSM 
7 Although this Memorandum of Understanding 
conflicts with the intent of the FSM Constitution ban 
on nuclear and other hazardous materials, there is no 
provision for it to be voted on separately. Therefore. it 
will be voted on as part of the Compact, and approval 
of the Compact means approval of this Memorandum 
1W Jackson Davis 'They L•e About The Seabed," Chain Reaction (Australia\ 
March 1981 
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NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND WASTE 
PALAU 
From the Compact: 
PALAU 
RADIOACTIVE 
AGREEEMENT 
Agreement Regarding 
Radioactive, Chemical and 
Bio logical S ubstances 
Article I 
"In accordance with Artrcle fl, Section 3, and Article Xlll, 
Section 6 of the Constitution of the Republic of Palau, the 
Government of Palau shall seek approval of this Agree 
ment by not less than three-fourths of the votes cast in a 
referendum in which this specific question shall be 
presented rn conjunction with the plebiscite on the 
Compact . . 
Article III 
Section I 
"Secllon 314 of the Compact permits the storage in 
Palau of radioactive, toxic chemical. or biological materials 
not intended for weapons use, such as X ray film or equip 
rnent, chemical cleaning agents or biological substances 
used to eliminate oil spills, and other items used routinely or 
111 a routme manner. 
S e ction 2 
"None of the areas covered by the Agreement Regarding 
the M1/1tary Use and Operating Rights of the Government 
of the United States 111 Palau Concluded Pursuant to 
Sections 321 and 323 of the Compact shall be used by the 
Government of the United States for storage or disposal of 
radioactive wastes. None of the areas in which the Govern 
THE HAZARDS OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE 
Radioactive wastes emit gamma rays and atomic 
particles that can injure or kill living things. This 
radiation may kill cells or damage the genetic material 
essential to reproduction. Very high levels of exposure 
to radiation can make people sick and kill them very 
quickly. Lower levels of exposure can cause cancer, 
sterility, or birth defects. There is considerable contro-
versy over just how little exposure to radiation can be 
harmful. 
Nuclear wastes can be dangerous to human beings 
not only through direct contact, but also by getting 
into water supplies or the food chain of plants and 
animals that we eat. 
Defense Monrtor. Center for Defense Information. Washington, DC. 
Implications: 
Palau Radioactive Agreement 
1. Article 3, Section 1 allows the storage in Palau of 
radioactive. toxic chemical or biological "items used 
routinely or in a routine manner." (Emphasis added.) 
This is an ambiguous phrase that will allow storage of 
radioactive materials which are used "normally" 
dunng military operations The word "routine" does 
not imply that these materials are safe for people or the 
environment. An example of "routine activity" on 
nuclear powered submarines and warships is dis-
charging of low level radioactive waste from their 
nuclear reactors into the ocean. There is no ban rn this 
Agreement on the disposal or discharge of low level 
radioactive wastes, presumably because Article 4, 
Section 4(b) allows these nuclear powered warships 
and submarines to use Palau's harbors. 
2 Article 3, Section 2 speci f ically prohibits the 
storage or d isposal of radioactive waste on the military 
bases in Palau. but other parts of this Agreement allow 
storage of high level rad ioactive waste in other parts of 
Palau if below a certain quantity (Article 7), and the 
disposal of low level radioactive wastes into the ocean 
with an Environmental Protection Agency permit 
(Article 3, Section 3) 
3 The Marine Protection Act referred to in Article 3, 
Section 3 allows permits to be issued for the ocean 
dumping of "radiological. .. warfare agents, radioactive 
matenals ... laboratory wastes ... " The Environmental 
Protection Agency may issue a permit for ocean 
dumping after (1) notice and opportunity for public 
hearings: and (2) determ1nat1on that such dumping 
will not unreasonably degrade or endanger human 
health, welfare or amenities or the marine environ-
ment. ecological systems or economic potentialities. 
The review process may include "consultation" with 
government officials and the public as the EPA 
PAAT Ill COMPACT 
From the Compact: 
ment of Palau has 1unsd1ct1on ouer the /1uing resources of 
the seabed. subsoil and water column ad1acent to its coasts 
shall be used by the Gouernment of the United States for 
storage or disposal of materials m whateuer form produced 
for b10/og1cal and chemical war/ are, or for high level radio 
active waste or other high leuel radioactive matter as those 
terms are defined by the London Convention on the Pre 
vent ion of Marine Pollution by the Dumping of Wastes and 
other Matters. 
Section 3 
"The safety provisions set forth m Section 314 of the 
Compact shall apply within the area in which Palau exer 
cises 1unsdict1on over the livmg resources of the seabed, 
subsoil and woter column adjacent to its coasts. The 
Government of the United States shall not issue permits 
pursuant to 33 USC. 1412 and 1413 for any material for 
the purpose of dumping it into ocean waters in which Palau 
exercises 1unsdictron over the living resources of the sea· 
bed, subsoil and water column ad1acent to its coasts with· 
out consu/trng with and according due deference to the 
Government of Po/au 
Section 4 
"(b) The Governmenl of the United States may use 
nuclear power p/onts 01 reactors in Palau on military ships 
or vessels under thP ownership or control of the Govern · 
ment of the United States .. . 
S Arakawa 
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J V1tarelh 
Implications: 
decides appropriate. "Consultation" does not imply 
that the advice or opinions of the public or government 
representatives must be heeded by the U.S.· 
4. The London Dumping Convention (referred to in 
Article 3, Section 2) prohibits the dumping of high level 
rad1oact1ve matter. but does not include radioactive 
materials below a certain amount An American sc1en-
t1st . however. has described the London Convention 
"as a sc1ent1f1cally outmoded law it 1s a license to 
dump The London Convention :ust leg1tirr1zes poll..i-
tron It doesn t prevent 1t " 
5. Tt"ie lariguage of the Agreement ::;uggests that 
rad1oact1ve materials cannot be disposed of in the 
ocean surrounding Palau But US E=nv1ronmental 
Protection Agency and London Convention regu-
lations do allow dumping and disposal under certain 
circumstances. and the US retains final authority to 
issue permits for dumping radioactive wastes into the 
ocean around Palau The only restriction 1s that the 
US. shall not issue permits for ocean dumping "with-
out consulting with and according due deference to 
the Government of Palau" (Article 3, Section 3) The 
words without the consent of Palau could easily have 
been used but they were not Only consent will grant 
Palau veto power over the issuance of perm•ts by the 
U S EPA But under the terms of this Agreement. the 
U S has no legal duty to abide by the consultation with 
the Government of Palau The fact that the EPA must 
go through a public review process before granting a 
dumping permit allows the Palauans the right to 
protest such dumping plans. but the final decision to 
grant permits for ocean disposal of radioactive wastes 
rests with the U.S.3 
PAP.T Ill C~ACf 
From the Compact: 
Article IV 
Section 3 
"The Gouernment of the United States shall permit the 
presence of nuclear weapons in Palau only incident to 
transit and ouerflight, during a national emergency 
declared by the President of the United States, during a 
state of war declared by the Congress of the United States, 
in order to defend against an actual or impending armed 
attack on the United States or Palau including a threat of 
such attack, or during a time of other military necessity as 
determined by the Gouernment of the United States .. . 
Article V 
"The Compact requires that wheneuer materials or sub-
stances, including nuclear weapons, nuclear power plants 
or reactors rn nuclear ships or uessels, or any toxic 
chemical or b1olog1cal materials are present in Palau, the 
Gouernment of the United States shall handle them rn such 
a way that they shall not be hazardous to public health or 
safety. In de1em11111ng what would be hazardous to public 
health or safety, the Gouernment of the U111ted States shall 
comply with the strictest standards of international guide· 
Imes uc<.epted by the Gouernment of the United States, 
anv applicable agreements betu..een the Gouernment of 
Palau and the Gouernment of the U111ted States, and all 
appl1coble treaties cmd other international agreements. 
ond the laws of the Unrted States and their implementing 
regulations. 
Article VI 
"All disputes under this Agreement shall be referred to 
the Joint Committee established ptirsuant to Section 351 of 
the Compact. 
Article VII 
" .. The words "radioact1ue waste" as used in Article Ill, 
Section 2 of this Agreement exclude small quantities of 
such waste temporanl1,.· present in exclusive use and 1oint· 
use defense sites and u:h1ch are 111c1dental to routine mili 
tary operations .. 
Article VIII 
Section 3 
"This Agreement shall remain 1n effect so long as the 
Agreement Regarding the Military Use and Operating 
Rights of the Gouernment of the United States in Palau 
Concluded Pursuant to Sections 321 and 323 of the 
Compact remains in force." (a SO-year period-Ed.) 
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lmpllcatlon1: 
6. The language of the nuclear weapons ban (Article 
4, Section 3) is misleading as it gives the impression 
that nuclear weapons will not be allowed into Palau 
except in extreme emergencies. The question is what ... 
might constitute a "threat" of an armed attack or a 
"military necessity"? Is there not always a threat of 
war, whether real or imaginary? And couldn't the ~ 
storage of nuclear weapons in Palau always be 
considered a "military necessity"? Nevertheless. it is 
the U.S. which retains the ultimate power to determine 
when nuclear weapons will be stored in Palau. 
ROUTINE MILITARY OPERATIONS 
Article 7 of the Palau Radioactive Substances Agree-
ment gives the U.S. the power to use, store and dispose 
of "small quantities" of radioactive waste used in 
"routine military operations." 
Routine milltary operations can include some 
surprises. In the words of Navy reports released in 
January 1982, "Chemicals and water used to clean 
ships turned radioactive by nuclear test explosions in 
the Pacific were routinely dumped into San Francisco 
Bay." 
The Navy documents indicate that the USS 
Independence, a small aircraft carrier that was 
anchored less than a mile from nuclear test explosions 
on two occasions, was later routinely docked at San 
Francisco. 
While at San Francisco. the Independence was 
'decontaminated' with use of chemical solutions and 
sandblasting equipment. The sand was considered 
safe and was sold to private contractors for landfill, but 
they were not told of its origin for fear they would 
believe a hazard existed. Cleaning solutions were 
apparently dumped into the bay to save the expense of 
taking them to sea, according to minutes of a meeting 
of Navy officials. 
(Honolulu Advertiser. January 16. 1962). 
7. It is stated that the Government of the U.S. deter-
mines what a "military necessity" is. But no definition 
is given for the U.S. Government. Can a naval officer or 
the commanding officer of a ship or base in Palau 
make the decision? Is it the Pentagon, the Secretary of 
the Interior or the President who makes the decision to 
bring nuclear weapons into Palau? 
PART Ill COMPACT 
INADVERTENT EXPLOSIONS 
Nuclear weapons accidents can and do happen. In 
the authoritative Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute 1977 Yearbook, Professor Milton 
Leitenberg of Cornell University states that "there have 
been about 125 (U.S.) nuclear weapon accidents, 
major and minor combined, between 1945and 1976, or 
about one every two and a half months." The Atomic 
Energy Commission(AEC) and the Defense 
Department recognize the very real danger of nuclear 
weapon accidents in their jointly published document, 
The Effects of Nuclear Weapons: 
"Nuclear weapons are designed with great care to 
explode when deliberately aimed and fired. 
Nevertheless, there is always a possibility that, as a 
result of accidental circumstances an explosion will 
take place inadvertently Although all conceivable 
precautions are taken to prevent them, such 
accidents might occur in areas where weapons are 
assembled and stored, during the course of loading 
and transportation on the ground, or when actually 
in the deliverable vehicle, e.g .. airplane or a missile." 
AECtDept of Defense. 1962 
FISH CONTAMINATED BY U.S. NUCLEAR WASTE 
DUMPING 
For 24 years beginning in 1946, the United States 
Government dumped radioactive wastes into the 
ocean. Nuclear garbage was packaged in used 55 
gallon drums and casually jettisoned at sea at 50 sites 
up and down both USA coasts and in mid-Atlantic and 
Pacific oceans. 
After several years of incessant prodding, the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was forced to 
release the results of 1977 surveys of the major US 
nuclear dumpsites, including one that occupies 5,000 
square miles near the Farallon Islands off San 
Francisco. As scientific advisor to Quentin Kopp, 
Supervisor of San Francisco, I analyzed the EPA data 
and found: 
• plutonium levels 2,000 above background in 
ocean bottom sediment 
* deteriorating containers, with the worst 
contamination yet to come 
• extensive animal life in the dumpsite 
" released radioactivity stuck to the ocean bottom 
in the dumpsite, rather than dispersed by 
diffusion 
• radioactivity 5,000 times background in animal 
life, including edible fish. 
In sworn testimony before Congressional Hearings 
last October the EPA could deny none of these 
disclosures. 
From "They Lie About The Seabed" by Jackson Davis, Professor of Biology 
and Environmental Studies. Un1vers1ty of California. Santa Clara 
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lmpllcatlons: 
8. The smaller 600 acre site of the two proposed 
weapons storage areas on Babeldaob will most likely 
be where nuclear munitions will be stockpiled. Such 
sites are commonly separated because of more 
stringent regulations regarding security, fencing and 
lighting. Shuttling the weapons from storage 1n 
western Babeldaob to the airports or seaports further 
south will probably be by helicopter. The people of 
Palau can expect nuclear weapons and other ammuni-
tion movement in the skies over their homeland. The 
vast majority of the milltary's nuclear accidents 
between 1950 and 1980 occurred during transport and 
training operations. 
9. The U.S. promise to defend Palau will not provide 
greater security to Palauans. It is precisely the 
presence of United States nuclear submarines and 
warships, military bases and nuclear weapons which 
will make Palau a primary target forattack by an enemy 
of the US. The experience of World War II, when 
islands with Japanese military installations were 
devastated by U S attacks and thousands of 
Micronesians died, is a cogent reminder of this fact. 
Continued on Page 64 
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A BASE FOR THE TRIDENT? 
The proposed Radioactive Agreement, the Military 
Use Agreement, and the Compact give the U.S. 
(1) exclusive use of the 40-acre ocean and land area in 
Malakai Harbor, Palau's main port, (2) the authority to 
bring in nuclear powered and nuclear weapons 
carrying warships and submarines, and (3) the power 
to "fit the premises (Malakai Harbor) to their intended 
use." These are facts that. combined with the 
following, point to Palau as an important future transit 
and operations base for nuclear weapons and sub-
marines, Trident or others: 
(a) Malakai Harbor is the only Western Pacific port 
where the submarine commander has a choice of two 
exits to avoid being bottled up in port {Subic Bay in the 
Philippines opens only directly into the China Sea). 
This would, however, require blasting a new channel 
through the barrier reef which protects Palau's vital 
marine resources; 
~ "' • ,. 
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(b) Current Pentagon policy is to disperse forces so 
they cannot be so easily destroyed by an enemy 
nuclear attack. Guam and Subic Bay now have heavy 
concentrations of military bases, and under this policy 
would be poor candidates for a Trident port; 
(c) It is unlikely that Trident submarines operating 
in the Western Pacific will travel 7 ,000 miles back to 
Puget Sound in the State of Washington each time it is 
necessary to change parts or rotate crews. Palau is 
strategically located in the area that Tridents will 
patrol. 
{d) With growing global opposition to military 
bases, perhaps the most attractive consideration to 
military planners is that Palau has a population of less 
than 15,000 people in a region isolated from world 
opinion. 
Adapted from "Trident Subs Headed for Port in Palau?", by Robert C 
Aldridge. M8tlanas Variety, April 30, 1982. 
Implications: Continued from Page 63 
10. The Palau constitution states that: "Harmful 
substances such as nuclear, chemical, gas or 
biological weapons intended for use in warfare, 
nuclear power plants, and waste materials therefrom, 
shall not be used, tested, stored or disposed of within 
the territorial jurisdiction of Palau without the express 
approval of not less than three-fourths (3/4) of the 
votes cast in a referendum submitted on this specific 
question " Because the Radioactive Agreement will 
allow nuclear submarines and warships entry into 
Palau, nuclear weapons storage and disposal of 
nuclear substances under certain circumstances. this 
Agreement must be approved by 75% of the voters in a 
referendum. The Radioactive Agreement will be voted 
on as a separate question from the Compact. which 
needs only a majority vote for approval. 
11 The Palau radioactive agreement will be 
effective for the 50 year life of the Palau Military Use 
Agreement. 
'John Reaves, p 26 
'Jackson Davos. articles 1n Pacific Daily News (Guam) November 9 & 12 1980. 
'John Reaves. p 29 
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E. SETTLING DISPUTES 
From the Compact: 
General Provisions 
Section 351 
"(a) The Government of the United States and the 
Government of Palau, the Marshall Islands or the 
Federated States of M1crones1a shall establish three Joint 
Committees empowered to consider disputes under the 
implementation of this Defense Title and its related 
agreements. 
"(b) The membership of em h Joint Committee shall 
comprise selected senior officrols of each of the two 
participating Go1.:ernments . The senior United States m1l1 
tary commander 1n the Pacific area shall be the senior 
United States member of each Joint Comrrnttee 
"(c) Unless otherwise muluoll_v ogreed, eoch Joint 
Committee sholl meet semi anmwlly ... A J<J1nt Committee 
also shall meet prompt /y upon 1 equesr of e1t her of its 
members ... 
"(d) Unresolved issues 1n each Joint Comm1ttc>e shall be 
referred to the Gouernments concerned for resolu/1011, and 
the Government of Palau, the Marshall lslw1d'> or the 
Federated States of Mrcrones10 shall be offorded, on an 
exped1t1ous basis. cm opportunity lo raise its concerns with 
the U111ted States Secretary of Defense personally 
regardmg any w1resolved issue which threotens rts 
contrnued assocratron with the Government of !he United 
States." 
Conference and Dispute Resolution 
Section 421 
''The Government of the United States shall confer 
promptly at the request of the Government of Palau, the 
Marshall Islands or the Federated States of M1cronesra and 
any of those Governments shall confer promptly at the 
request of the Government of the United Stoles on matters 
relaling to the provisions of this Compac/ or of rts related 
agreements .. 
Section 423 
"If a dispute between the Gouernment of the United 
States and the Gouernments of Palm1, the Marshall Islands 
or the Federated States of Micronesia cannot be resolved 
within 90 days either party to the dispute mav refer 11 to 
arb1trat1011 111 accordance with Section 424. 
Implications: 
1. The method fo r solving military disputes between 
the United States and Palau, the Federated States of 
Micronesia and the Marshall Islands is completely 
d ifferent from the Arb1trat1on board set up accord ing 
to Section 424 to handle all Compact disputes o ther 
than m ilitary issues. The Arbitration Board gives equal 
rep resentation to the U.S and the Federated States. 
Palau and the Marshall Islands. and its decisions are 
binding on both parties involved in the dispute But the 
Arb1trat1on Board has no 1urrsdict1on over any m1l1tary 
disputes. All conflicts involving m1l1tary operations 
come under the Joint Committees described rn 
Section 351 . 
2 The senior U.S member on the Joint Committees 
will be the Commander rn Chief Pac1f1c (CINCPAC) . 
Hawaii. This officer authorizes and directs all 
operations for the area. including those which are 
causing the disagreements If the Joint Committees 
cannot resolve a disagreement. then the FSM. Palau of 
the Marshall Islands will be granted a personal 
interview with the US. Secretary of Defense. This 1s 
the final legal recourse of the Micronesian 
governments in cases of oppos1t1on to any proposed 
U S. defense act1v1ty Of course, rn meeting with the 
Secretary of Defense. the Micronesian governments 
are meeting with the official under whose superv1s1on 
the problem originated There 1s no fu rther appeal 
provided for. 1n the courts or otherwise 
3. Therefore. the U S has ultimate authority to 
decide disputes in its own favor. With this overriding 
control, the U.S. can ignore Micronesian protests over 
health and safety issues, knowing the FSM. Marshall 
Islands and Pa lau have no power in the disputes 
4 The apparent safeguards 1n the arb1trat1on 
process providing for a neutral third party do not exist 
rn the prov1s1ons for resolving disputes about m1l1tary 
matters 
PART Ill COMPACT 
Section 424 
"Should a dispute be ref erred to arbitration as provided 
for in Section 423, an Arbitration Board shall be established 
for the purpose of hearing the dispute and rendering a 
decision which shall be binding upon the two parties to the 
dispute unless the two parties mutually agree that the 
decision shall be advisory. Arbitration shall occur 
according to the following terms: 
"(a) An Arbitration Board shall consist of a Chairman 
and two other members, each of whom shall be a citizen of 
a party to the dispute. Each of the two Governments which 
is a party to the dispute shall appoint one member to the 
Arbitration Board. If either party to the dispute does not 
fulfill the appointment requirements of this Section within 
30 days of referral of the dispute to arbitratron pursuant to 
Section 423, its member on the Arbitration Board shall be 
selected from its own standing list by the other party to the 
dispute. Each Government shall maintain a standing list of 
10 candidcites. The Parties to the dispute shall Jointly 
appoint a Chairman within 15 days after selection of the 
other members of the Arbitration Board Failing agreement 
on a Chairman, the Chairman shall be chosen by lot from 
the standing lists of the parties to the dispute within 5 days 
of /er such failure . 
"(b) The Arbitration Board shall hove jurisdiction to 
hear and render its final determination on all disputes 
arisrng exclusively under Articles I, II, Ill, IV and V of Title 
One, Title Two, Tttle Four and their related agreements. 
"(c) Each member of the Arbitration Board shall have 
one vote. Each decision of the Arbitration Board shall be 
reached by ma1orrty vote. " 
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PART IV: CONCLUSION 
Since World War 11, as with former colonies the world 
over, the d1rect1on of Pac1f1c island nations has been 
toward greater autonomy. A recognition of shared 
colonial experiences and also current Pac1f1c real1t1es 
increasingly draws them together into a variety of 
regional and Pac1f1c Basin groupings in which Palau, 
the Federated States of Micronesia and the Marshall 
Islands now Join 
In matters concerning the environment of the Pacific 
and the future of its people, these groups are taking 
strongly outspoken pos1t1ons in support of the rights of 
small nations of the region For example. concerted 
response of the Pac1f1c people to the Japanese 
proposal for dumping nuclear waste in the ocean near 
Micronesia has postponed the dumping "experiment" 
so far But 1t 1s not alo'"le the regional groups and 
leaders that have blocked the Japanese action equally 
effective was the dramatic and public oppos1t1on wher 
JapariPSe government representatives and SC1ent1StS 
promot1rq the dumping program were confronted with 
a demonstration of women ir Samoa and a packed 
meet1'"lg room 1ri Sa1pan 
In 1973 tht' people of.,.. '"l1an told the United States 
Navy ttnt 'heir only v1ll.iqt WdS '"lot t0 be m >Vt>d ard 
that t'1 y rr•f 1;.<' to g1vP 1p al f t'1e1r 1s ard • the Uc:; 
for a rri1 •ary base Pa 1 a'1 c;talled a rrop sed J1 
superpor• tt11• t'lreatened the r w'1ole en~ 1ronf"")f nt 
they later organized orce more a'1d successfully 
defended their nuclear-free const1tut1on in three 
separate referendums 
Enewetak people. discovering that their atoll was 
again to be part of a destructive proiect called PACE 
(Pacific Cratering Experiments). by filing a lawsuit and 
arousing public opinion in the Marshalls and Hawa11. 
succeeded in forcing the U S Air Force to cancel 
PACE Kwaialein landowners have repeatedly moved 
onto their islands occupied by the army. seeking a iust 
solution to the problems posed by the military takeover 
of land needed for food and space for those on over-
crowded Ebeye 
With all of these actions and others like them. the 
people of M1crones1a have been self-determining their 
history even while the long process of ending the U N 
trusteeship has slowly moved forward In 35 years of 
U S. trusteeship M1crones1ans have shown that 
econorT'1c dependency does not mean lack of courage 
or resourcefulness They have been demonstrating the 
strength to take the in1t1at1ve for the future into their 
owr hands with self-government 
T~1e ed1torc; hope this booklet will st f"")Ulate d1scuss1on 
arnorq the people wr > w1 be vot1rg o'"l the CofTlpact 
of F ·ee Assoc1at1o'"l sool' A Selected B1bl1c,qraphy c., 
includf'd and rT'ariy of thE' art1c p 1n lt'f' text have 
references for f 1rthc 1 1orr- dt on Spec f1c, QuPst1ons 
arid coricerns .. ar be a1sed direct y with statue; 
comri1ss1ori rrerrbers 1n Palau. the FSM and the 
Marshall Islands 
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